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CHAPTER I 
lNTRODUCTION 
Statement of the Problem 
There is no question that man can influence his environment and 
that man can be shaped by environmental variables. Man has an excep-
tional ability to adjust to a variety of environmental conditions and to 
modify the environment and bring it more nearly into accord with his 
needs and conceptions. This ability is manifested in the power to 
abstract and generalize and has raised practical skills to the level of 
scientific technology. That is why, in the early twentieth century, 
technology has appeared as the most potent force in the environment. 
Technology became a watchword in the early twentieth century, and 
eventually it came to define civilization. To be civilized is to be 
technological; to be a developed nation is to be a technological nation; 
to lack technology is to be behind, to be underdeveloped. Technology is 
especially regarded as the key to solve the basic problems, whatever 
they are, facing our society. Many people seem to t;hink that there is 
no need for further thought over and above technological development. 
On the other hand, it has not been realized what problems might 
occu~ in an exclusively technological culture. Early in this century, 
educators advocated reorganizing education to produce individuals able 
to "man" the machines of the industrial society. Under these 
1 
2 
circumstances, tests generally do not measure an ability to think or 
to solve problems, but measure only the ability to remember facts and 
to perform behavioral tasks. ~der this kind of education, ev7n though~ 
technically exc.e-11.ent radio ~ograms can be tuned in., some people may 
... 
not know how to listen thoughtfully ~nd critically. Edgar Dale implies 
this as follows: 
The trained worker ma~ ,be technically literate but aesthet-
ically, economically, and politically illiterate in the sense 
that he lacks thoughtfulness, futuremindedness, --;_nd a deep 
concern about the way society is moving. 1 
In other words, in the early twentieth century education emphasized too 
much the_process of proQl§n-so~ing_Jor the sake of techniques. There 
is an interesting story which tells something about the condition in our 
times. 2 There was once a man who discovered his shadow. Because the 
shadow followed him so faithfully, he decided that it must be his 
servant. But gradually, he began to believe that he was imitating the 
shadow. Finally, the man became, in effect, "the shadow of his 
.§.__hado~' The story tells us that man is constantly struggling to under-
stand himself and the relation between this self and its many images. 
It also tells us that man~s lost sight of himself and has lost his 
direction. In other words, man has become a tool for technological 
society. He is almost entirely directed by machines. Our age is going 
in a peculiarly troubled way. Man sees the ability of human power 
advance and move, while he is supposed to fit to environmental variables. 
Is man the creator of the roles he plays, or is he reduced to be 
the image of his image? Needless to say, the crucial problem for today's 
education is not technological. Today's education does prepare people 
for the machines of technology. Nevertheless, contemporary man has 
become what is indicated by John M. Rich in hif? book, Education and 
Human Values: 
Contemporary man derives his values from the group; he has 
few independent beliefs or convictions; the average or 
'normal' person has little idea of who he is or where he is 
going. 3 
In other words, man in a technological culture ,has lost sight of "who 
he really is," and "where he is going." He has also lost certain con.,.. 
victions about himself. Such a man can be called "dehumanized." De-
3 
humanization is an outcome of technological culture,in a modern society • 
...... 
How did this come about? It resulted from man's ignoring his true 
"human nature." 
What solution to the problem of dehumanization is there? Strictly 
speaking, one solution is to let man have independent beliefs about him-
self and an idea of who he is or where he is going. How can this be 
accomplished? Through education. This is a new role of education in a 
modern society. Because of such circumstances, not only the methodology 
but the aim of education needs to be revolutionized. How? Education 
should emphasize techniques for the sake of using them for understanding 
"human nature," that is, education should be concerned with human 
nature. Education should stand for the rediscovery of human nature 
which can be manifested in human life. 
Contemporary man has to be educated in a way different from what 
is customary in order to restore his independent belief or conviction, 
and in order for him to know '~ and "where he is going." To 
attain these goals, Eow should man he educ~ "Developing the powers 
of the individual" is a cliche in statements of present educational aims 
rather than an adequate answer to this question. What does it mean to 
speak of human nature? What is the peculiar nature of man which 
distinguishes him from all other creatures? Everyone has attempted to 
say, but no one has been, in fact, satisfied with each other's answer. 
Speculation and conjecture have been the rule and continue to be until 
today. Does it make sense to talk about human nature? 
4 
This study reveals that there are in history several strong beliefs 
about "what man is," intrinsically, prior to any accounting of what man 
has achieved or received. Because education, in the present author's 
view, has to do with values in action, this study will seek to determine 
whether or not the idea of "the intrinsic worth of the individual (the 
sanctity of the individual)" can be identified strongly enough to be a 
guiding principle in educational theory and practice. 
Justification of the Study 
Concern about man is important not only to philosophers but to 
everyone who seeks to make sense of his life and to direct his activ-
ities into the most significant channels. While man can be influenced 
by environmental variables, our understanding of human life in society 
can also be altered through investigating human nature. That is why 
knowledge about human beings has been spread today through cultural 
anthropology, psychology, and sociology in the sense of the actual 
behavior of human beings, and why some allied fields of study, such as 
ethics and existentialism, continue to influence by their respective 
aspects "what man is" and "what man does," in the sense of the under-
standing of human nature. 
Among the prophets of technology there are some dissenting voices: 
rather than equating technology with civilization, some have said that 
the more technological we become, the closer we may be moving to the 
spiritual destruction or the actual extinction of man. What does 
"spiritual destr11ction11 mean? It can be defined as "a dehumanized 
r ' 
~ (alienated person)." Dehumanization has been defined as "trans-
fer of ownership to another. 114 In .Paul Tillich's interpretation5 
"alienation" is used as a term of disparity between man's actual 
(existential) condition and his essential nature. This sort of "de-
humanized person" has been described in the statement of John M. Rich: 
a person who has little idea of who he is or where he is going. 6 
According to Arthur W. Chickering, 7 the dilemma for many, especially 
young adults, is not just "who am I?" but "who am I going to be?"; not 
just "where am I?" but "where am I going?". These problems of dehuman-
ization will be dealt with in the thesis: the self-identity crisis; 
5 
having few independent beliefs; and the general meaninglessness of life. 
As pointed out by Chickering, many young adults are all dressed up, and 
do not know where to go; they have energy, ~ut no destiuation. Such 
problems will be examined as the first topic in this thesis. 
How may the problem of dehumanization be solved? Some alternative 
suggestions may be noted: Erich Fromm's method emphasizes love, intel-
ligence and courage; 8 Paul Tillich's Christian way emphasizes changing 
"anxiety of alienation" into "courage to be" through the person of 
Jesus as Christ; 9 Karl Marx's cl~ surpasses class con-
sciousness.10 In order to gain insight into ways of addressing the 
problem of dehumanization here, however, the following questions will be 
dealt with i~is thesis: What is "human nature"? What is the nature 
of the perso~that is, how do we conceive of the phenomena of our liv-
ing? On the basis of these questions, the thesis will address the 
problem of human nature and its relation to the phenomena of our living. 
The phrase "human nature" has both an empirical and a normative 
sense. "Human nature," in its empirical sense, means something which 
6 
is innate to the human being; in its normative sense it means something 
which ought to be as a quality or characteristic of man--virtue. Virtue 
is not something underlying human nature, but a way of living (the art 
of living). In other words, "knowing human nature" and "the art of 
living (virtue)" can give answers to the question of "who am I going to 
be?" and "where am I going?" How? Through the process £t becoming !!.. 
person (education). As far as a human being is concerned, "knowing" 
human nature cannot be separated from "living" in a society and from "be-
coming a person." Knowing, living, and becoming should be put into one 
task as a whole. These three elements are interrelated and influenced 
through each other as a whole. Through the unification of these 
elements, the value of a person can be recognized in a society. 
Previous Work on These Problems 
Every age has its key ethical notion around which it can best 
formulate the cluster of its basic problems. For instance, "duty," 
systematized by Kant, summarized the meaning of life in the Prussian 
bureaucratic and pietistic society; "peace," the basic longing of 
Hobbes, was promoted as the key which could challenge the arbitrary 
rule of a landed aristocracy. Today, the notion of "alienation1111 might 
be used to summarize the present situation. 
Some studies on human nature and its phenomena of living have been 
done by some philosophers such as Olaf Stapledon, Erich Fromm, B. F. 
Skinner, Paul Tillich, and Lawrence Kohlberg. 
12 The general map of human nature has been sketched by Stapledon. 
Man, according to him, is limited, but has an important uniqueness, 
although he is at bottom identical with the beasts. The uniqueness of 
a man is moral experience. Some of man's powers, e.g., "free intel-
ligence, 11 "community," "creative imagination," are developed in him to 
such an extent that they transform his whole experience and behavior 
into something essentially different from the other non-human beings. 
7 
This something is moral experience. But Stapledon concluded his article 
by indicating that human nature strongly suggests a goal toward which it 
approximates but which it can never attain. 
Man, according to Erich Fromm's writings, shares with other animals 
physiological needs which must be minimally satisfied for human survival. 
Yet even if these are satisfied, man is still affected by other needs. 
Fromm says: 
.•• inasmuch as man is human, the satisfaction of ••. 
instinctual needs is not sufficient to make him happy; they 
are not even sufficient to make him sane. The archimedic 
point of the specifically human dynamism lies in this unique-
ness of the human situtation; the understanding of man's 
psyche must be based on the analysis of man's needs stemming 
from the conditions of his existence.13 
What are these needs? The characteristics as described by Fromm are: 
relatedness, transcendence, rootedness, self-identity, and a frame of 
orientation and devotion. They are based on a psychoanalytic perspec-
tive on man. 
On the basis of human nature, Fromm states that the procedure 
which promotes human nature is also more "real" and "alive" than that 
which promotes the concepts such as virtue or justice. Maximizing the 
quality of human existence is part of the "game" of survival. Ethical 
dispute hinges not on our assumption that survival is good but on what 
kind of behavior contributes to it. Fromm thinks that society goes 
through a course of development analogous to the growth of the indi-
vidual. The role of society for Fromm, therefore, has been emphasized 
in shaping the content of human consciousness which has a profound 
effect upon human character. 
In Skinner's study of human nature, he begins by rejecting any 
traditional philosophies or religious approaches, and employs a 
positivistic methodology emphasizing the effects of environmental var-
iables on human behaviors. 14 He aims at exhausting the explanatory 
8 
power of external variables, rather than dwelling on the possible nature 
of man's inborn propensities. 
He then proceeds with the methods of comparative psychology, the 
S-R paradigm of the behaviorist, as stated in Beyond Freedom and Dignity. 
He says, 
Human behavior does not depend upon the prior choice of any 
value. When a man jumps out of the way of an approaching 
car, we may say that he chooses life rather than death. But 
he does not jump because he has so chosen; he jumps because 
jumping is evoked by certain stimulating circumstances.15 
Skinner insists that man does not have any hypothesis about the peculiar 
causal relationship between internal mental events and external 
-==--'" ..________ 
behavioral events. What man is pleased to view as knowledge or under-
standing is nothing more than connections among traces of experiences. 
Man acts according to the reinforcing consequences of the way he acted 
before. 
Refutation of Skinner ought not to be based on basic similarities 
between man and lower animals, but on a too restrictive concept of 
man's nature, which differs essentially from other animals. In areas 
of similarity which do not distort the basic essential nature of man, 
9 
Skinner's behavior modification can be employed as a method, but not the 
only method, for improving the learning process and for treating a man as 
an end in itself. It might be said that Skinner abandons the search 
for the causes of behavior in motives, will, and entelechy. Is man's 
part in making the environment only a mechanical reaction to what the 
environment has made of him? Is man not a creature who sometimes knows 
why he is doing what he is doing? 
In Tillich's philosophy, man is seen as separated from God, who is 
conceived as the "ground of all being." Human nature is analyzed and 
d . . . 1 d . 16 expresse is existentia terms an categories: for instance, an 
immediate awareness; Being-in-the-world through awareness; a finite man; 
and the self-awareness of man as a finite being feeling anxiety. The 
significance of the finite being, the self-awareness of anxiety is ex-
pressed in the religious term "sin" and in the philosophical term 
"estrangement." 
Is there any way to solve the problem of "sin"? This is Tillich's 
own theological answer to a philosophical question. This is the way 
through which the problem of estrangement can be solved: that is, only 
on the basis of the Christian revelation. Revelation is not by 
philosophical analysis, but it is "spoken to man" from beyond and not 
by man to himself. The source of man's courage and of the healing of 
his estrangement is the ground (God) of the ontological structure in 
which man and all other finite beings participate. 
Every type of education for Tillich, therefore, is ultimately 
dependent upon the spiritual (religious) meaning which determines what 
its goals and method are to be. The educational method is also in a 
10 
certain sense epistemologically dependent. The positive content of the 
Christian faith, though not derivable from an analysis of the human 
situation, can be formulated in a way that will provide answers to the 
questions actually raised in man's contemporary self-analysis. This 
view, however, can be criticized on the ground that the gap between 
knowledge and action is not satisfactorily bridged. 
Kohlberg's "cognitive-development" approach is concerned both with 
analyzing the thought structure underlying the moral concepts of indi-
viduals of varying ages, and also is concerned with investigating the 
individual's attempts to structure his social environment. 17 This 
approach aims not at producing mere conformity with the society or the 
teacher, but at developing capabilities in decision-making and problem-
solving. 
The stimulation of cognitive .capacities has been encouraged by 
Kohlberg through his famous cognitive-development stage theory of 
moralization18 for moral education. What is moral education for him? 
It is defined in one place as "the encouragement of the capacity for 
principled moral judgment and of the disposition to act in accordance 
with that capacity1119 ; in another place he states that "the goal of 
moral education is the stimulation of the 'natural' development of the 
individual child's own moral judgment to control his behavior. 1120 
Another more specific strand, however, attempts to set goals, 
methods, and tests for curriculum use. In an article entitled "Develop-
ment as the Aim of Education, 1121 Kohlberg says that there have been 
three broad streams in the development of Western educational ideology: 
Romanticism, Cultural Transmission and Progressivism. Romanticism holds 
what comes from within the child; Cultural Transmission puts its emphasis 
11 
on the view that educating consists of transmitting knowledge, skills, 
and social and moral rules of the culture. As an educational ideology, 
progressivism holds that education should nourish the child's natural 
interaction with a developing society or environment. 
Among these three aspects of educational objectives, Kohlberg 
maintains that only progressivism provides an adequate basis for a 
higher level or stage of development in the process of education. He 
states its reason as follows: 
The progressive educator stresses the essential links between 
cognitive and moral development; he assumes that moral devel-
opment is not purely affective, and that cognitive development 
is a necessary though not sufficient condition for moral 
development •..• The progressive also points out that moral 
development arises from social interaction in situations of 
social conflict. Morality is neither the internalization of 
established cultural values nor the unfolding of spontaneous 
impulses and emotions; it is justice, the reciprocit2 between 
the individual and others in his social environment. 2 
He then concludes that the aim of education should be progressivism with 
its cognitive-developmental psychology, its interactionist epistemology, 
and its philosophically examined ethics. 
Kohlberg, however, seems to put his emphasis only on the role of 
reason in making decisions. On the basis of the cognitive-developmental 
theory of morality, we can see that the place of "habit" is rejected by 
Kohlberg. He believes that the aim of moral education should not be to 
instill in the individual various habits but rather to facilitate the 
individual's pattern of thought between stages of moral development. 
What makes a human being to be a (morally) valuable being? It is, 
at first, necessary to infer within the substantial makeup of the human 
being a factor completely absent from the makeup of other animals. 
Through that factor a man can be a being who is the subject of inviolable 
12 
rights that are to be recognized and protected by society. It is, 
then, necessary for man to live well by exercising the essential human 
factor theoretically as well as practically. Through the combination of 
these two aspects, a human being can be, finally, made to be a being of 
moral worth. There have been some philosophers who have attempted to 
advance some views that would help us to get answers to those problems: 
Aristotle, Confucius, and John Dewey. 
Aristotle in his "Nichomachean Ethics" argues that man has a 
special function different from non-human beings, and that the function 
relates to the actions in which the human nature finds its expressions. 
Confucius attempts to offer a philosophical reconstruction of reasonable 
action and its relation to moral arguments. Confucius introduces us to 
a schematic map of various validity-factors in terms of the spirit of 
the doctrine of rectifying names. John Dewey argues that an adequate 
ethical theory of self-realization requires for its completion the 
specification of what man's nature is, toward what ends he should 
progress, and what pattern of inter-relationships exists among these 
ends. 
Aristotle's thought is very well known internationally; Dewey has 
been one of the most influential recent American thinkers in philosophy 
and education; and Confucius is the most significant, influential 
philosopher in Oriental societies and has begun to be known to Western 
thinkers. These three philosophers have developed their own thought 
with unique emphases on the above problems. 
William K. Frankena23 has done a comparative study of educati9nal 
theories in Aristotle, Kant and Dewey. The primary purpose of this 
book, as indicated by the author, is to give the reader an opportunity 
13 
to look long and deeply into three rather different historical 
philosophies of education and thus to learn some account of their origins 
and influences. This study presents the historically important types of 
educational philosophy through comparisons on three basic questions: 
views about dispositions, aims of education, and methods for education. 
A study on Confucius and Socrates is presented by M. Cohen in an 
article entitled "Confucius and Socrates. 1124 Confucius and Socrates, 
according to Cohen's view, lived in similar times and had comparable 
views. Their activities were practical and reformist, not theoretical--
a genuine choice in each case. But their lives and work generated 
philosophical traditions which are still alive, practically as well as 
theoretically. 
Nothing, however, has been done yet on the comparative study of the 
problem noted above between Oriental and Occidental views as these are 
represented in the thought and works of Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey. 
According to George Dykhuizen, 25 one of the most important influences 
in Dewey's thinking is reflected in his constant reference to ancient 
Greek philosophy, especially that of Aristotle, and his use of Greek 
philosophy in formulating some of his own theories. John Dewey found 
in Greek philosophy insights and approaches that enabled him to escape 
the assumptions and methods of modern science and philosophy. This 
means, as John H. Randall, Jr. remarked, that "Dewey is not inside the 
classic tradition looking out, but stands outside it, looking in, , • , 1126 
Methods in the Western world emphasize experience, the highly developed 
scientific method, and the historical or evolutionary view of truth and 
morality. According to Hu Shih, however, 
These methods of the West are not totally alien to the Chinese 
mind, and on the contrary, they are the instruments by means 
of which and in the light of which much of the lost treasures 
of Chinese philosophy can be recovered.27 
This similarity has been indicated by John Dewey as follows: "Some of 
the elements in Western cultures and Eastern cultures are so closely 
14 
allied that the problem of 'synthesizing' them does not exist when they 
k . . 1 . 1128 are ta en in iso ation. 
Even though they come from different cultural backgrounds, these 
philosophers (Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey) have asked some common 
questions, each with some degree of originality: "What is human 
nature?"; "How can knowing about human nature be connected to human 
conduct?"; "How can the theory be applied to practice?". They seem to 
be concerned with the essence of ultimate human nature, such a concern 
defining the metaphysical quest; they are concerned with formulating the 
nature of ultimate reality in a systematic way. Aristotle has been 
described as "the first person to approach the study of human beings in 
29 
an objective and systematic way." In the field of ethics and social 
philosophy, there is probably more fundamental agreement between them: 
the ver.ities about human nature (metaphysics) determined what rule of 
conduct should be observed (ethics); in all ethical systems, a close 
relationship between ethical and metaphysical theory is recognized. The 
good life must at least be in accord with the nature of things. Through 
discussing the problems of "human nature," and "the phenomena of living," 
this thesis attempts to bring about the ultimate objective for a "sub-
30 
stantial synthesis of East and West," as already suggested by Dewey. 
15 
Proposed Methodology of the Study 
The following approach will be used in this thesis: (1) an effort 
will be made to define some of the basic philosophical postulates and 
beliefs which may have, entered into the development ·of the psychology 
pervading the thought of each of the philosophers to be studied 
(Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey); (2) an analysis will be presented of 
their concepts of original human nature and its workings (virtue); and 
(3) their views on human educability will be examined in order to relate 
them to their concepts of human nature. 
In order to analyze, understand, and evaluate their notions on the 
relation between human nature and virtue, their views on "the good life 
for man" will be emphasized. It will be hypothesized that their views 
on the good life for man will manifest the same fundamental meaning of 
moral wisdom: moral virtue and practical wisdom are the same in 
Aristotle; moral psychology and Jen are the same in Confucius; experience 
and practical judgment are the same in Dewey. 
This hypothesis consists of the following specific points: the 
(moral) good life for man is not only intellectual but is also practical. 
While it is important to know the essence of human nature, and to 
recognize human living as the manifestation of a philosophic mind, it is 
more important for man to adjust himself to principle by practice. It 
is not enough to know what the doctrine of the golden mean is; the 
doctrine of the mean should be applied to concrete circumstances by 
practice. This suggests that the art of livin~. can be improved, and 
learning by practice is the means of developing the art of living in 
order to become a wise man (an educated man). "Learning" here is more 
16 
than something acquired through a formal process in a social institution. 
There must be a personal relationship between two distinct human beings--
learner and teacher. Because of this, teaching another human being 
cannot be compared with lighting a stick of wood or inducing a chemical 
reaction. "To learn" means to learn how to think and to act. This 
should be a prime outcome of the educational process as such--the think-
ing man who contemplates the truth and then communicates it. These two 
aspects of life, it will be argued, are continuous and unified, rather 
than disjointed, because activity is merely an extension and fulfillment 
of contemplation. The conclusion to be demonstrated is that the good 
life for man can be derived from and based on the essential character-
istic of human nature (rationality), and should be practiced by means 
of the principle of rectification (learning by practice) based on 
reason. 
This study, then, will (1) analyse selected writings of Aristotle, 
Confucius, and Dewey in order to discover their views on the relation 
between human nature and virtue; and (2) point out and clarify their 
recommendations concerning the "good life" for man through the educa-
tional implications of their views on human nature and virtue. 
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CHAPTER II 
THE DEHUMANIZATION--A PROBLEM FOR 
CONTEMPORARY MAN 
The impact of scientific knowledge and of technological innovation 
upon society has been the main factor in the twentieth century social 
change. Economic goals and technological development assure a basic 
importance to this continued growth-model of the future. The increase 
in scientific knowledge and the technological advances of recent years 
have been instrumental in bringing about the new conditions which affect 
us educationally. But this continued growth with the technological 
development characterizes a society by a rapid rate of change in its 
quantitative dimensions more than in its qualitative dimensions. The 
tempo of change in the social order is so rapid that one never expects 
to see a constant which is unchangeable in reality so far as the things 
themselves are concerned. All real things are variables; they are pass-
ing events. A person is also variable in that sense, and he is a passing 
event exhibiting a pattern of behavior. The pattern of behavior in-
volves a plan, an organization; and also the capacity to react to a 
variety of situations. 
This approach seems to have given rise to new problems of an acute 
form: It does not specify what the precise content of the "quality of 
life" is for most people. In other words, the peculiar problem of our 
age is that the same achievements that have been developed in our own 
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powers have also threatened human personal being and integrity. What is 
the real problem? The science that elevates man's capacities also de-
grades him by turning him into an object for research and manipulation. 
The industrial technology that raises the economic standard of living 
also seems increasingly to make human personality unnecessary as a basis 
of human evaluation. What is meant by such an expression? Nikolai 
Berdyaev answers: "The machine dehumanizes human life. Man, desiring 
no longer to be the image of God, becomes the image of the machine. 111 
The present has been described as a technological age and consequently 
as the age of dehumanization. Dehumanization here means that mankind 
becomes alienated by losing the basis of supposed human dignity. What 
has been seriously taking place in the world today is "not a crisis of 
humanism, but the crisis of humanity. 112 This crisis is the crisis of 
alienation. 
What is alienation (dehumanization)? Some definitions are given in 
a major unabridged dictionary. 3 It, first, denotes alienation as a 
"conveyance of property to another party," and second, relates the term 
to the "estrangement of a person" or of his affections, and third, de-
fines it as "mental derangement." Kurt Lang defines alienation as "an 
estrangement or separation between parts or the whole of the personality 
and significant aspects of the world of experience. 114 He describes the 
term in its reference to (1) objective states, (2) states of feeling 
which accompany alienation, and (3) motivational states tending toward 
estrangement. In these latter states, separation is possible between 
self and the objective world, self and factors"within the self, and 
finally, between self and the compl~te self. George Lichtheim5 has 
described the concept of alienatiqn a~ a basic ontological theme in 
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Western culture stemming from a Neo-Platonic doctrine of emanation. 
Through this doctrine, finite, existent beings are depicted as creations 
springing from some ultimate source. He traces the fusion of this con-
cept with early Christian interpretations of creation. 
The above situations of alienation6 apply equally to the three fol-
lowing contemporary circumstances. (1) Alienation as separation 
describes the process or state whereby two or more entities become 
distinguished; for example, Tillich's distinction between the essential 
and the existential entity. (2) Alienation as transfer is closer to the 
meaning of transfer of property or of right belonging to an individual 
over others, that is to say, the machine, or masses. This point was 
shown by Marx: 
The external character of labour for the worker appears in the 
fact that it is not his own, but someone else's, that it does 
not belong to him, that in it he belongs, not to himself, but 
another.7 
(3) Alienation as objectivity suggests its source in being aroused by 
the basic, subjective "awareness of others". Here, man's capacity to 
perceive "the other" as discrete from himself is identified as the basis 
of alienation; for example, Fromm uses the term "alienation" to charac-
terize certain possible relations of a person to his own self, other 
men, and nature. Alienation from oneself in Fromm8 consists of some-
thing like the loss or lack of "a sense of self-identity." There is 
consequently no unique individual entity. Man's alienation from his 
nature means "making man a slave of his nature." His nature here means 
a natural environment, and the world of physical objects. Man's aliena-
tion from "others" especially means two things: "distinctness from 
others," which means "separated from all others;" "relatedness to 
22 
others," which means "using others as a means." 
In much current writing connected with this term "alienation," 
distinctions often are not made among the above three meanings. 
Although admitting a broad meaning of alienation as separation, the word 
· "alienation" is used to express "negative aspects (pessimism, despair, 
hostility)" presented in any circumstances. Robert Blauner points this 
out as follows: 
Alienation exists when workers (human beings) are unable to 
control their irmnediate work processes, to develop a sense of 
purposes and function ••• , to belong to integrated indus-
trial connnunities, and to become involved in the activity of 
work as a mode of personal self-expression.9 
The various shades of meaning involved in the word "alienation," 
have also been introduced through an operational description of its mean-
ing and uses within particular disciplines. For instance, in the 
discipline of Biblical interpretation, Genesis in the Bible is a story of 
separation--creation and the fall; man is seen as not only separated from 
God but also as separated from meaningful experience with other men, 
institutions, Nature and even himself. 
There is again a very strong tendency to identify alienation as a 
post-industrial phenomenon for human beings in the technological society. 
Through industrial progress, men as individuals have actively and 
passively been cut off from significance, meaning, and power. Some 
social scientists have tried in recent years to define this dimension of 
alienation. 10 Melvin Seeman distin,guishes five variants in alienation--
powerlessness (the perceived lack of freedom), the events in which one· 
is engaged, normlessness, isolation, and self-estrangement. R. Blauner11 
in Alienation and Freedom clarifies the idea through four ways: power-
lessness (modes of freedom and control in industry), meaninglessness 
(purpose and function in manual work), social alienation (integration 
and memberships in industrial communities), and self-estrangement. 
Lewis Feuer12 divides the phenomena of alienation somewhat differently 
listing the following modes: the alienation of class society, the 
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alienation of competitive society, the alienation of industrial society, 
the alienation of man's society, the alienation of race, and the aliena-
tion of the generation. M. B. Scott13 describes alienation in regard 
to its sources as a series of deficiencies: lack of commitment of 
values, absence of conformity to norms, loss of responsibility in roles, 
and deficiency in control of facilities. 
The chief perspective in the theory of alienation traditionally has 
been sociological or perhaps socio-psychological. But through a more 
philosophical-ethical approach, it will become clear that the problem of 
alienation is also crucial in relation to a personal value-system as 
well as to a sociological theory. As already stated by John M. Rich, 
contemporary man has few independent beliefs and convictions about his 
own self, and such a man does not even know "who he is" or "where he is 
going." Such a human being might cease to be, as Berdyaev says, "a 
being with a spiritual center, retaining his inner continuity and his 
unity. 1114 15 The alienated man, described by Berdyaev, refuses to con-
sider every man as of real value, as the likeness and image of God. An 
"alienated" man has energy in himself, but no destination, and thus does 
not know where to go. The "alienated" are those people who have been 
excluded or who have excluded themselves: the escapists, nihilists and 
self-destroyers. The "alienated" can easily fall prey to self-identity 
crises, soctal alienation and meaninglessness. 
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How may the problem of alienation (dehumanization) be solved? 
For some alternative solutions, I would like to examine, first, 
through a philosophical-ethical approach, situations which have been 
described as phenomena of the "alienated," and then I will observe 
through the philosophical writings of Aristotle, Confucius and 
Dewey that personal autonomy, responsibility, social connection with 
others, and self-actualization should be positively recognized as the 
dignity of the human individual in order that he not be dehumanized. 
The Self-identity Crisis 
The first attempt to understand the concept of "alienation" in a 
philosophical-ethical approach can be accomplished by means of an 
examination of the concept of "self-identity." The Oxford English 
Dictionary gives the following definition of "identity": "the quality 
or condition of being the same in substance, nature, and properties." 
"Identity" refers to the self or the person one feels oneself to be; the 
same entity through time and space. The entity means, according to 
W. E. May, "the subject of inalienable rights that are to be recognized 
by other entities capable of recognizing rights and that demand legal 
. b . 1116 protection y society. A. C. Paranjpe states the concept of self-
identity as follows: "Identity accounts for the unity, self-sameness, 
and continuity of the personality, and for the shared sameness and 
solidarity of the individual with his community. 1117 Self-identity can 
mean something unique and irreplaceable in a person: A is A, 
and A is not non-A (the principle of identity). Here I do not 
mean to analyze the logical proposition or the mind-body theory; 
instead I am interested in how to characterize the definite, fixed, 
circumscribed personality. I do not mean an observed scientific or 
even explicit aspect. but I am describing an implicit concept, 
which remains permanent or unchanging in the sense that we say it is 
the same individual. 
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I think that human beings are the unity, self-sameness, and 
continuity of personality, no matter what happens externally to them. 
The self-sameness which is valuable, precious and irreplaceable makes a 
human being valuable. This self-identity makes "a human being to be a 
person or a meaningfully human existent (a being of moral worth), 1118 
which means a being of inherent dignity and incomparable value. On the 
basis of this self-identity, a human being can be a subject of moral 
rights, and a subject of protectable rights. 
Man is also an integral working part of the world of technology. 
His goals and desires are not only to manage his environment, but also 
his mind becomes one of the tools and forces he uses both to construct 
and to operate other tools. In other words, man is a determining or a 
determined part of technology. The characteristics of the technological 
society have been well described in A. Toffler's writing. 19 Among some 
features are the reliance on complex mechanical and electronic devices 
and on technical process; the substitution of technical organization for 
interpersonal relationship; emphasis on utility as a measure of indi-
vidual worth by deemphasizing personal characteristics. Some people 
discover themselves less useful and more trouble than the machines that 
replace them. Replaceable skills rather tpan irreplaceable personality 
are more useful for the society. Technology refers to the complex of 
physical objects and technical operations (both manual and machine), but 
it also includes the technical "know-how" and mechanical skills involved 
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in production. Much work in technology is done by man's skill. For 
modern cultures, the definition of what a man is depends in part on the 
stage of technological development. What a man can do in a technolog-
ical context determines what he is. 
In this circumstance, "social roles" in a social organization can 
be substituted for "personality." Everything that a person is involved 
with becomes and constitutes the characteristics of the person. 
William James pointed this out by saying, "In its widest possible sense 
•.• a man's self is the sum total of all that he can call himself, not 
only his body, his psychic powers, but his clothes, and his house 
1120 h 
• • • • T e concept of identity has apparently become obsolete in a 
technological/technocratic society. This seems to have come about 
through the following common practices. We establish our identity by 
showing a driver's license or some document which tells about us. This 
paper-identity has been substituted for something fixed and definite 
. h . 21 in t e present society. Or, we establish our identity by showing 
something concerning physical needs, clarification of sexual identifica-
tion, of sex-appropriate roles and behavior. 22 However, this paper-
identity or clarification of physical needs, and sex-appropriate roles 
and behavior do not answer the question who this person really is as a 
person. Both a driver's license and physical needs tend to confirm that 
persons do not really know who they are, what they want to be, or how 
they feel about other people. That is why the situation of the 
alienated person has been stated as follows: 
Many young adults are all dressed up and don't know where to 
go; they have energy but no destination. The dilenuna is not 
just 'who am I?' but 'who am I going to be?'; not just 'where 
am I?' but 'where am I going?'.23 
A person is powerless when he is an object controlled and 
manipulated by other persons or by an impersonal system (such 
as technology), and when he cannot assert himself as a subject 
to change or modify this domination.24 
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Loss of self-identity means lack of direction and control in life. Lack 
of direction and control in life makes man powerless and subject to 
control and domination by others because such a man has already lost his 
subjectivity. Loss of self-identity creates an alienated person who is 
directed or dominated, rather than one who is self-directing. 
What is the solution to the crisis of self-identity? That is to 
say, how shall we characterize the persistence of a person through time 
and space? It is necessary to establish a definite, fixed identity--to 
recover a being of inherent dignity and incomparable value. The 
establishment of a self-identity means to restore self-directing, which 
means direction and control in life. How can we characterize this 
self-identity? William E. May states it as follows: 
It is intelligible to maintain .•• that every being, every 
entity, is a bearer of rights in a significant sense; every-
thing that is is a bearer of what might be termed ontic 
rights. These rights, of course, can be recognized and 
articulated only by special sorts of entities, namely those 
capable of intellectual knowledge, and they impose moral 
obligations only on these kind of entities.25 
What is the ontic property for the self-identity in a human being? 
It is the "nous" of Aristotle, "Jen" (mind) of Confucius, and "intel-
ligence" of Dewey. These three terms constitute and characterize the 
definite, fixed, circumscribed personality. They make a human being's 
value by distinguishing him from all other beings. A human being in 
Aristotle is a substance with a distinctive kind of soul, namely, an 
intellectual or rational soul. Confucius is acutely aware of the 
intrinsic worth of human actions by maintaining that human nature is 
good. What distinguishes man from other animals, Dewey thinks, is the 
fact that man has the ability .to engage in reflective thought and to 
solve complex problems. He insists that man has a mind because he has 
previously evolved a social potential. He describes it as follows: 
Mind is, so to speak, structural, substantial; a constant back-
ground and foreground; perceptive consciousness in process, a 
series of heres and nows. Mind is a constant luminosity; 
consciousness intermittent, a series of flashes of varying in-
tensities.26 
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The principle immanent in human beings, an antic property (rights), makes 
them to be what and who they are. 
The persistence of a person can be changed into the existential 
subject of a person. This existential subjective person can be charac-
terized as "the morally autonomous person." What are the characteristics 
of the morally autonomous person? John Rich indicates, "The morally 
autonomous person characteristically finds the locus of evaluation within 
himself, assumes responsibility for his acts, and is self-governing as he 
strives for freedom and mastery. 1127 The autonomous person is one in whom 
the locus of evaluation lies within himself rather than within the rules 
of society. To be autonomous means to develop morally the thinking 
ability as an individual rather than to follow the social rules, the 
public principles. Rich states further that the morally autonomous 
person in Education and Human Values " ••• would· find that the locus 
of evaluation lies within himself, and be inclined to appraise his ac-
i th b . f . f . . 1 1128 t ans on e asis o a consistent set o princip es. The existential 
subjective person is the morally autonomous person with freedom and 
control. Freedom is the state which allows a person to remove himself 
from those dominating situations that make him simply a reacting object. 
Control is more positive, suggesting the assertion of the self-directing 
subject. What is required for a morally grown person would be a 
"morale making" mastering of living, 29 rather than the inability to 
function meaningfully. A human being who has a morale-making mastery 
can put his own value system into practice. As self-mastery, autonomy 
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is a person's propensity to conform his behavior to his decisions about 
what to do. This is the goal that would change the situation of the 
alienated man and would restore his sense of self-identity. 
Having Few Independent Beliefs 
The second reason for understanding the concept of alienation can 
be explained in the social relationships of one person to another. For 
a human being to become a moral agent, it is necessary to exist within 
an environment that includes other human beings and their culture. 
Personality and society are separate, but interdependent and inter-
penetrating systems. Personality develops and exists in the context of, 
and in relation to, the personalities of others. An individual per-
sonality in this context has to be evaluated highly in regard to member-
ship in the human species. May states its significance as follows: 
••. the reason why a human being is a being of moral worth 
is rooted in his membership in the human species. • • • The 
thesis advanced here, moreover, holds that the ultimate 
reason why a human being can become a personal subject is 
rooted in his being human to begin with and is identical with 
what makes a human being to be a being of moral worth.JO 
A person ought to be valued as a participant in a meaningful 
heritage and community. The idea of society is, therefore, clearly an 
idea which assumes that the proper state of man. is one in which he is 
closely bound up with his fellows in intimate and significant relation-
ships. More specifically, his fellows are not instruments to be used 
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as means toward other ends, but are whole beings recognized as valuable 
because they are deserving of the respect and dignity reserved for 
one's self. The denial of determination over one's own human qualities, 
that is, to use another, is to impose a condition of alienation upon 
him. 
In the contemporary technological society there seems to be some-
thing amiss when a person, through a social structure, is denied a feel-
ing of integrity including the possession of his own soul and the 
ultimate determination over his physical being. He does not seem to 
determine what he shall do with himself as a physical being. What he 
does as a social being, is even more pervasively controlled by the com-
munity. This involves the struggle of social alienation. The fundamen-
tal problem in this kind of alienation is not simply man's internal 
mental life, but his relationships with others. What causes a human 
being to become alienated in the contemporary society? R. Blauner 
states its causes as follows: 
An industrial community also has a structure of norms, infor-
mal and formal rules, which guide the behavior of its mem-
bers •••• And the bureaucratic principle of the rational 
utilization of all resources to maximize organizational goals 
furthers the tendency to view employees as labor, as means 
to the ends of profit and company growth.31 
Main factors in social alienation are a structure of norms for the 
social community, and the organization to make more production through 
using people. 
Loss of self-identity goes together with alienation in a community. 
In the present, the processes that characterize life in industrial 
societies ultimately lead to alienation in all spheres of life. In The 
Sane Society, Fromm states the situation of alienati.on as follows: 
By alienation is meant a mode of experience in which the per-
son experiences as an alien. He has become, one might say, 
estranged from himself. He does not experience himself as 
the center of his world, as the creator of his own acts--but 
his acts and their consequences have become his masters, whom 
he obeys, or whom he may even worship. The alienated person 
is out of touch with himself as he is out of reach with any 
person. He, like the others, is experienced as things are 
experienced; with the sense and with common sense', but at the 
same time without being related to oneself and to the world 
outside productively.32 
The alienated can be characterized as one who experiences himself as 
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other; someone who is powerless; someone who does not even know what to 
do, where to go. Such a man has few independent beliefs about himself. 
For instance, Karl Marx suggested more than a century ago that the 
capitalist society alienates man from himself and other men. In his 
view, man, working within the capitalistic system, is deprived of 
control over the products which he creates with his labor. Human labor 
is thus "objectified" and turned into a mere commodity which destroys 
the essential quality of life (reason). As a result, man is "alienated," 
that is, separated from, and turned into an enemy of, himself and other 
men responsible for "exploiting" him. There are, thus, four forms of 
alienation: alienation of the worker from the process of his work; 
alienation of the worker from the product of his work; alienation of 
the worker from himself; and alienation of the worker from his fellows. 
In particular, the alienation of self-estrangement (loss of self-
identity) is to be equated with the notion of "other-directedness" made 
f b D .d R. 33 amous y avi iesman. The child, Riesman says, is conditioned to 
other-directedness when it learns that whatever it does must not be 
valued for itself, "but only for its effects on others." The "other-
directedness" means that an individual's actions are guided by others 
and even his feelings are determined by a psychic radar that gives him 
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signals from the people around him. The person who is "other-directed" 
becomes self-estranged because he enjoys nothing for its own sake, and 
bases his behavior upon anticipated future rewards. 
In this view alienation implies some kind of separation of man from 
other men in a sense of isolation, loneliness, or lack of personal 
relationship with a community of people. Nearly every formulation of 
the concept implies alienation as some kind of pathology and not as a 
healthy state of human existence. This is the contrary of the view 
that the personality system, in a normal state of identity, must be 
integrated into, or work in harmony with, the broader social systems. 
How can we handle the problem of the reconciliation between the 
two--individuality and the whole (society)? What is the best way for man 
to experience himself as the center of his world? The best way to avoid 
social alienation is for the person to bring about changes in the objec-
tive circumstances in which the person finds himself, i.e., in the social 
structure, in order to bring about a more meaningful subjective expe-
rience. What kinds of changes are necessary for this struggle? 
I would like to present two methods; to examine the way of a per-
son's social life and its relation to human nature; to examine the 
relation between an individual person and the society (community). 
I have observed that a man can be the subject of ontic rights 
that are to be recognized and protected by society. These ontic 
rights have been justified in the philosophical writings of three 
major philosophers: Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey. It will be 
necessary, and can be possible, to examine the way of living in a 
society, and its relation to human nature in each of these three 
philosophers' views. 
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"Mind" in Dewey is not simply some static or permanent entity 
within a man but also a function of reflective behavior. Insofar as 
that behavior is intelligent or related to mind, the individual behavior 
is displaying or achieving mind. In other words, Dewey insists that 
mind can only be known by inference from the behavior that results. 
The individual can define himself by what he does. Dewey's most in-
sightful remark about the mind is to say that grammatically it is best 
1 d b d "f" 34 emp oye not as a noun ut as a mo i ier. He meant by this to make 
more than the simple observation that the mind is related to the various 
ways people behave. His assertion is intended to have the force of a 
manifesto. 
Some similarities to Dewey can be discovered in Aristotle and 
Confucius. Aristotle says, 
There remains, then, an active life of the element that has 
a rational principle; of this, one part has such a principle 
in the sense of being obedient to one, the other in the sense 
of a possessing one and exercising thought.35 
For Aristotle, a soul is a principle differentiating a human being from 
a non-human being. The way of human life is not in nature as an 
accidental setting, but as a prerequisite for human existence and as a 
basis for its development. About this position, Henry B. Veatch says: 
Such, then, is what it takes if as men we are to live wisely 
and intelligently, realizing that the perfection and function 
of human beings consists precisely in our bringing our 
rational knowledge and understanding to bear directly upon 
the course of our daily lives.36 
For Confucius, the motives and intentions of human agents are of 
paramount significance in evaluating human actions. Confucius believes 
in the intrinsic worth of the action and its consequence with the motives 
(Jen) of the human being. He states it as follows: "Duke Ching of Chi 
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asked Confucius about government. Confucius replied, 'Let the ruler be 
a ruler, the minister be a minister, the father be a father, and the son 
be a son 1 • 1137 This means that a human action is the externalization of 
Jen. Human actions can be described morally as one dimension, which are 
integrated both inter- and intra-personally. Confucius asserts that 
following and cultivating Jen in all situations is the way of human 
life. 
From the philosophical view of these three philosophers, it can be 
concluded that the proper way of living is self-expressive and self-
actualizing for the human nature. On the basis of the ontic right, then, 
a person's activity cannot be a means to an end, but should be evaluated 
as the end in itself, which is actualizing the human nature. 
Secondly, in order to solve the problem of the reconciliation 
between the two--individuality and the whole (society)--we have to 
examine the relation between an individual person and the society 
(community). If the community is said to be superior to the individual, 
obedience to the authority of the community would be right, critical 
thinking would not be allowed, and t.here would be no right to refuse 
sacrifice of the individual. On the other hand, when individuals are 
asserted to be superior to the community, the value of particular 
individuality can be recognized, but harmony in the community could be 
destroyed. What is the method by which reconciliation of these two 
aspects can be accomplished? The characteristics of a society based on 
interpersonal values have to be considered. The society here means an 
organization in which members can be recognized as an individual person, 
as a member seeking a common goal for mutual cooperation. Mutual 
cooperation has to be established in the concept of "the whole" beyond 
35 
you and me, rather than in the simple relation between you and me. This 
is similar to the following case: after two persons get married, they 
say, "we are. ."This "we are •••• " is not just the simple connec-
tion between male and female, but should be interpreted as an inter-
personal value through a new, higher dimension of experience. The 
society of persons, similarly, should be an organization of persons 
sharing some common concerns and interests. The society can persist as 
long as there is a continuity of purposeful cooperative behavior and an 
awareness of inter-relationships and inter-dependence among the indi-
vidual members. Any society preserves its continuing existence and 
stability as a society for the reconciliation of the individual to the 
whole. 
This reconciliation is not the relation of instrument to end, not 
a causal relation. The relation is not accomplished by blind obedience 
to the authority of the society, but can be established through per-
sonal, autonomous, free choice. This can be put in the formula: "I can 
do as I wish." This assertion includes not only the absence of compul-
'· 
sion or constraints, but also the special relationship existing between 
a man's self and the conununity (other people). After the individual is 
"subjectively" related to the society, the society (other people) can be 
thought of as our society; otherwise the society is simply the object 
of research. The subjectively related situation can be no longer an 
object of inquiry; it becomes a living energy capable of being revealed 
through the actions of the agent. On the other hand, when a man stands 
in objective relations with the community, he is an inquirer--a third 
person--not a participant in it. There is no commitment, or no 
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obligation to act in accordance with the community. The subjective 
relationship, however, is not established through any external compul-
sion, but is formed through "being morally free." Being morally free 
means I could have acted differently if the circumstances had been dif-
ferent. To be morally free or to act with moral freedom is to act with 
a personal commitment; it is not acting because of fear or punishment. 
I 
To perform a morally free act is to act out of one's own moral convic-
tions not because of threats and danger. In the objective relationship 
with society a man may act to avoid punishment, but in the subjective 
relationship the man can achieve his fulfillment with (through) the help 
of the society participated in as his agent-self. Through the subjec-
tive relationship with the society, the society is no longer strange to 
him, but becomes the situation of "we" including both the man and the 
society. 
What is the best way for the alienated in an industrial community 
to extricate himself from his alienation? Such a man needs to bring 
about a more meaningful subjective experience through "being morally 
free." Experience through "being morally free" is based on an inherent 
sanctity of the human being and his personal commitment to the society 
through the way of living. 
The General Meaninglessness of Life 
Finally, inseparable from the problems of self-identity and of 
social alienation is the question of "meaning" in life. Even though the 
question "what is the meaning of life?" is n~toriously vague and 
abstract, it is still an impprtant question. An answer to the question 
depends on answers to two more distinct questions, as pointed out by 
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Paul Kurtz. 38 One may ask "Is life worthwhile?" or "Why ought I to 
live?". A second question is the quest for psychological stimulus and 
motivational appeal: Can people provide the substenance they seek on 
the desire for life? What is at issue here is whether we can find 
within life's experience its own reward. 
The question, "Is life worthwhile?" or "Why ought I to live?" 
depends on whether one finds the life of meaningful activities or not. 
For the life of meaningful activities, the essential activity of educa-
tion is the apprehension of significant meanings. This activity is not 
simply dependent on attending school for a knowledge, but also dependent 
on suggesting a knowledge which is helpful to the assessment of both 
actions and life styles. Education should be relevant to the question 
about the meaning of life. For instance, there is a difference between 
saying that two things are related and saying that something is relevant 
to something else. Consider the teacher who evaluates the student's 
essay. To do that, some of the norms have to be taken for granted: 
correct grammar, complete sentences. Other norms should be involved. 
That essay should have something to say, because a person's uttering 
something and meaning it occurs within the context of that person's 
attempting to communicate with others. In other words, a conversation 
between the teacher and the student can be carried on through the essay. 
Through the essay, the student can have a meaningful relation with the 
teacher. Otherwise, the student will lack qnderstanding of the co-
ordinated activity and a sense of purpose in his work. What is it that 
makes activities meaningful? Some people talk about satisfaction of 
b · d o b · d d" K 39 f d" asic nee s. ur asic nee s, accor ing to urtz, are o two imen-
sions: biogenic, that is, they have biological and psychological origins 
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and roots, and sociogenic, that is, they are made manifest in and are 
given through society and culture. 
In the question of meaning of life, W. D. Joske40 stipulates the 
significance of meaning in the following way: an activity is said to 
have "worth" if it has intrinsic merit; to have "point" if it is 
directed to the fulfillment of an end; it is not trivial if its point 
or purpose has sufficient worth to justify its performance; it is not 
futile if the world does not prevent the achievement of its end or 
point. If an action lacks all four elements (worth, point, aim, fruit) 
of the meaningful, it will be valueless or meaningless. What we want 
is a full life in which there is satisfaction, achievement, significance. 
The full life is related to the ideal of the full expression and further 
development of the individual's capacity for personality--or more 
accurately, ·for personality-in-community. The full life is not simply 
one of quiet contentment, but "the active display of my powers and of 
their development and expansion. 1141 Through this activity, a human 
being can find his meaningful way of life in a society. 
Loss of purpose or function in the way of living is meaningless-
ness wh.ich occurs when individual roles are perceived as lacking 
integration into the total system of goals of an organization. Some 
people lack understanding of co-ordinated activity and a sense of 
purpose in work and are thus alienated from self and from society. As 
such there is no meaning in their existence. In other words, individual 
roles may seem to lack meaningful connection with the whole structure. 
42 Like the hero in Albert Camus' The Stranger, the individual does not 
feel anything related to anyone or anything at all. An existential 
state like that of Camus' Stranger may be described as a feeling of 
"meaninglessness" or nothingness." This judgment of contemporary man 
has been confirmed by H. Richard Niebuhr in the following passage: 
Our situation is not one of conflict between great forces. It 
is better described as a situation of emptiness. Life for man 
becomes empty because it is without great purpose and great 
hopes and great commitments, without a sense of participation 
in great conflict of good and evil.43 
The concept of meaninglessness is usually used to describe the failure 
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to find certain circumstances which an individual feels should be avail-
able to him. It is the absence of certain events in the life of persons 
that ought to be encountered. 
In the contemporary society where man is presumably free, he alone 
does not determine what he shall do with himself as a person. In such 
circumstances, man has lost his function and his own controlling power. 
Man comes to be in a situation of the general meaninglessness of life, 
that is to say, in a situation of "inauthenticity," "existeQ.tial 
anxiety," and "ontological insecurity." 
What is the method to overcome these kinds of meaningless situa-
tions? We should observe that man is capable of something very dif-
ferent, in fact of social behavior and experience which deserves to be 
called distinctively human. What is the distinctive characteristic 
which makes man human? According to Philip H. Phenix, 44 human beings 
are essentially creatures who have the power to experience meaning. Man 
is a being that discovers, creates and expresses meaning. Experience of 
"meaning" is us~d to cover the entire range 1of ~onnotations of reason: 
symbolics, empirics, aesthetics, synnoetics, ethics, and synoptics. 45 
Reason here means not only rationality as ref~rring to the process of 
logical thinking, but also the life of feeling, conscience, imagination, 
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etc. This distinctive characteristic of experience, however, does not 
appear automatically by a process of natural growth and development; it 
is a product of deliberate nurture. It is not a gift of nature, but a 
creation of man's working. In other words, "meaninglessness" is the 
failure to develop the power to experience meaning, that is, reason. 
"Inauthenticity," "existential anxiety" in terms of "meaningless-
ness" refer to the "existential vacuum. 1146 Man within an existential 
vacuum does not have any "primary motivational force." This vacuum is 
manifested in a state of boredom, "Sunday neurosis," widespread 
h h 1 h 1 . d . ·1 d l" 47 p enomena sue as a co o ism, an JUVeni e e inquency. In order to 
restore meaningfulness to human beings the specific motivational force 
of a person's life should be given to him. By what means? Viktor 
Frankl suggests the following: 
Logotherapy ••• focuses on the meaning of hµman existence as 
well as on man's search for such a meaning.48 
Logotherapy tries to make the patient fully aware of his own 
responsibleness; therefore it must leave to him the option for 
what, to what or to whom he understands himself to be respon-
sible. 49 
A human being should be treated as "self-determining". 
In order to overcome the meaningless situation, we need to have a 
combination between the motivational force of a person's life and its 
phenomenon through experience. In other words, not only must there be 
the existence of reason as an ontical substance, but also the activ-
ities of reason should not be disregarded in a human being if the being 
is to become truly human. 
The search for the cause of behavior in motives, will, and 
entelechy has been done by Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey, and may 
provide an answer for how this needed combination can be actualized. 
Aristotle describes the way to determine what this combination is as 
follows: 
This might perhaps be given, if we could first ascertain the 
function of man. For just as for a flute-player, a sculptor, 
or any artist, and, in general, for all things that have func-
tion or activity, the good and the 'well' is thought to reside 
in the function, so would it seem to be for man, if he has a 
function. Have the carpenter, then, and the tanner certain 
functions or activities, and has man none? Is he born without 
a function?. • • Life seems to be common even to plants, but 
we are seeking what is peculiar to man. Let us exclude, 
therefore, the life of nutrition and growth. Next there would 
be a life of perception, but it also seems to be common even 
to the horse, the ox, and every animal. There remains, then, 
an active life of the element that has a rational principle; of 
this, one part has such a principle in the sense of being 
obedient to one, the other in the sense of possessing one and 
exercising thought.so 
Which human acts are moral acts from Confucius' perspective? This is 
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reinforced in the Analects 12:1, when Yen YUan asks how to achieve Jen, 
and the Master replies: submit yourself to following property (li) and 
you will achieve Jen. 
Yen YUan asked about humanity. Confucius said, 'to master 
oneself and return to propriety is humanity. If a man (the 
ruler) can for one day master himself and return to propriety, 
all under heaven will return to humanity. To · prac.tice 
humanity depends on oneself. Does it depend on others?' Yen 
YUan said, 'May I ask for the detailed items?' Confucius said, 
'Do not look at what is contrary to propriety, do not listen 
to what is contrary to propriety, and do not make any movement 
which is contrary to propriety.' Yen YUan said, 'Although I 
am not intelligent, may I put your saying into practice? 1 Sl 
For Dewey, growth in man is subject not only to impulse and habit but to 
the increasing employment of both by a wide-ranging intelligence. The 
term "intelligence" in Dewey is interpreted in the light of the experi-
mental method, not as traditionally related to abstract contemplation. 
Dewey says that education is "that reconstruction or reorganization of 
experience which adds to the meaning of experience, and which increases 
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the ability to direct the course of subsequent experience, 11 52 Dewey 
identifies "social efficiency" with "personal culture," and "moral" with 
"social." He justifies the worth of the individual by the cultivation 
of intelligence. 
In these three philosophers' views, it is important to discover a 
clear idea of human nature as an individual human being. This attitude 
implies a metaphysical discussion of the nature of a human being. This 
will also determine the shape of our living and influence the direction 
of future life through education. 
53 As indicated by Nikolai Berdyaev, we are moving in an inhuman 
world, a world of inhumanness, not only in fact but also in principle 
as well. In contemporary tendencies of dehumanization, man as a whole 
being, as a creature centered within himself, has already begun to 
disappear. The evidences that contemporary man is alienated have been 
described as the search for self-identity; the struggle against social 
alienation; and meaninglessness. The concept of the morally autonomous 
person was intro.duced as a pattern by which to restore something unique 
and irreplaceable, that is, personal identity. In order to attain self-
perfection, reconciliation to the whole should be accomplished through 
personal autonomous free choice. Finally, the existential vacuum can be 
filled up through experience of meaning. Meaningful experience is not 
given by the process of natural growth, but as a product of deliberate 
creation through the use of reason. 
What is the solution for the question of dehumanization? Stuart 
Hampshire suggests that reassessment of the person should be taken as 
the starting point: 
A human being has the power to reflect on what kind of person 
he wants to be, and to try to act accordingly, within the 
limits of his circumstances. His more considered practical 
choices, and the conflicts that accompany them, will show 
what he holds to be intrinsically worth pursuing 1 and will 
therefore reveal his fundamental moral beliefs.54 
In order to solve the problem of dehumanization, we need to develop 
this reflective power and encourage people to consider what they are, 
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and how this power of being human is related to the entirety of action. 
The external signs of human power (reason) are manifested in various 
ways of life: habits, manners, and behavior in accordance with men's 
moral ideas. But these signs are not enough to produce a true human 
being. We also need to discover how the rationality of human beings can 
be transformed into the ideal way of life. 
Rationality in a human being allows an individual not only to 
transcend present actions and beliefs determined by the particular im-
mediate impulses and perceptions of his current experiences, but also to 
consider his identity through his current experiences. There is the 
influence of the rational individual's concern for consistency and the 
avoidance of contradiction in the way of life (act). Under this circum-
stance, rationality in a human being functions as the active ground for 
an individual's beliefs and actions, and structures the continuum of 
virtue generated by the demands of consistency and relevance. These 
active grounds and the continuum of virtue are closely connected with 
the concept of a person that endures through time. That is why reason 
in an individual is related to consistency of virtue (the way of 
action). 
Now, we need to return to the original problem which we start~d 
with: "what is the solution for dehumanization?" The question of "what 
44 
kind of person one wants to be" must be answered as "how to act." The 
characteristics which enable us to call a being distinctively "human" 
can be translated into "how the man is living or acting." That is to 
say, the good life for man must be derived from and based on the es-
sential characteristics of "human nature," and should be practiced 
through "learning by practice based on reason." From this the question 
of what standards of action should be employed can be answered. This 
answer can be given primarily through the philosophies of Aristotle, 
Confucius and Dewey because the character of rationality in human nature 
according to their views, is itself regarded as the measure of good con-
duct. What is fundamental to man is not what his acts are, but whether 
the acts are an index to his essential characteristics. Defining the 
good life for man is not solely a function of the calculation of his 
performance, but is a function of the continuum of virtue connected with 
rationality (human nature). This continuity of virtue does exist in the 
process, and it is only realized through deliberate steps in "learning 
by practice" (education). All deliberation and planning by a human 
being makes the use of reason invaluable through education. 
Aristotle tries to find the idea of good through the acting 
process in itself, which is based on human nature. It seems to me 
that Aristotle correctly emphasizes the intelligent ability of man which 
is happiness by recognizing the first principle (reason) in the universe, 
and the ways for human actions which can be done concretely (virtue). 
I think that Aristotle exhibits the autonomy of reason, its respon-
sibility, social connection and self-actualiz~tion for the dignity 
of the human individual. According to Richard J. Bernstein's comments55 
on Dewey, Dewey had perceived long ago that the great danger of a modern 
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technological society was that to shape a more passive, mechanical, 
adaptable creature, who is alienated from the community and from him-
self, man would become dehumanized. How can the human being be pro-
tected from dehumanization? According to Dewey, only through continually 
attempting to make the idea of freedom and intelligence a concrete 
reality (virtue). Work without these characteristics limits the develop-
ment of personal self-actualization and is therefore to be negatively 
valued. Jen generally has been considered the most important concept in 
Confucius as a principle of human nature as well as an ideal of human 
perfection through human conduct. Human perfection here means how to 
become fully realized as an authentic human being. 
Let's return to the problem with which we started: the situation 
of dehumanization in a contemporary society. How can such a problem of 
dehumanization be solved? Through combining "knowing about human nature" 
and "human conduct" in order to be a morally autonomous person. Thus 
the problem of the relation between human nature and virtue in the 
process of becoming a person will be the focus of the remaining chapters. 
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CHAPTER III 
HUMAN NATURE 
To overcome the dehumanized situation described in the preceding 
chapter, everybody should be educated as a person with independent con-
victions about himself. Two interrelated assumptions can be considered. 
One is that although man has always been influenced by a given structure 
external to him, the ultimate ground of self-realization lies within 
his own nature. Man has the inner strength to actualize the potential 
of his distinctive being. This distinguishing mark of man is called 
"soul" by Aristotle, "mind" by Confucius, and "intelligence" by John 
Dewey. Man, therefore, can be thought of not simply as a creature, but 
as a creative agent who gives significant relation to everything. The 
second assumption is that, despite his ontical self-sufficiency, for a 
man to become a fully actualized person, he must constantly engage in 
the process of "learning by experience." It should be remarked that 
the process of learning to become a person does not take the form of 
linear progression, but gradual integration. Man authenticates his own 
being not by detaching himself from the world of human relations, but by 
making sincere attempts to harmonize his relationships with others. A 
harmonious relation with others can be accomplished for Aristotle through 
"practical wisdom," for Confucius through "the,principle of rectifica-
tion," for Dewey through "practical judgment." By emphasizing the 
essence of human nature, one may answer the question of how to become a 
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person, or how to become fully realized as a human being in contemporary 
society. 
Aristotle's, Confucius' and Dewey's whole systems of philosophy 
seem to have been based on a consideration of the nature of the human 
being and how human nature is related to concrete Situations. Therefore 
it is necessary to examine their observations on human nature. In each, 
what makes man different in nature from non-human beings is "reason," 
by which man thinks, knows, wills and decides, and by which man can cor-
rect his mistaken actions and control himself. Aristotle, Confucius and 
Dewey all proclaim the power of human reason and its autonomy, even 
though they use different terms to express this idea. "Soul" is 
Aristotle's term, "mind" is Confucius' and. "intelligence" is Dewey's. 
For all, however, there is: a rational mind which distinguishes man 
from non-human beings; a reason which overcomes desire and passions, an 
urge to seek knowledge; and cardinal virtues which furnish a foundation 
for self-actualization and for the structure of education. 
Four principal approaches to the concept of "human nature" have 
been described by Dewey in Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences. 1 (1) 
The term is used to designate an alleged original and native constitu-
tion, which is "instinctive instead of acquired." (2) Human nature is 
defined in terms of psychological powers or faculties. (3) Human 
nature is in itself empty and formless like John Locke's tabula~· 
(4) Human nature can be known only through its great institutional 
products--language, religion, law and the state, and the arts. Accord-
ing to Dewey's indication, this fourth approach can be supported from 
the teachings of Aristotle. 
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Aristotle starts to explain "what the nature of the good life for 
man is" and has to begin by describing his view of human nature. He 
observes that eudaimonia (happiness) is something that we choose only 
for itself and never anything else, and it is this which characterizes 
man's function. 2 This function is what distinguishes human nature from 
non-human beings. The fulfillment of man's function is "how to live 
well" as a being who seeks "to be happy." 
For Dewey, what makes human beings differ fundamentally from other 
living things is that man is unique because he has a mind (an intel-
ligence) and thus the ability to think. As the plant takes in the soil, 
the mind assimilates the energies of the body. 3 Mind is expressed as a 
satiable substance capable of absorbing and retaining, but also as a 
function of what we discern in relationships of means to ends. In this 
sense we equate having a mind with having intellectual foresight. We 
regard a man who is determined by emotions, guesswork and hunch as 
stupid, unintelligent, lacking in mind. To have foresight is to base 
conduct on well weighted calculations. 4 
Confucius insists that human nature is good. This essence of human 
nature may be said to be Jen, which is love, beginning with filial 
piety, and flowing out as universal love to all the men with whom we 
have definite ethical relations. From the thesis that human nature is 
good the principle of actualization is seen to be immanent in human 
nature. The man who has fully realized his nature is the wise man. It 
can be assured that everyone can be the wise man, because sagehood is 
nothing more than his own nature, Jen, wholly realized. 
These three philosophers describe human nature in the sense of a 
metaphysical ground that underlies worldly events. This aspect leads us 
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to find and formulate some ideas held in corrunon: What is human nature 
in their perspective? How do they describe human nature, especially in 
order that man may become fully realized as a human being? These ques-
tions will be answered through this chapter by comparing these three 
philosophers: Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey. It was observed in 
Chapter II that the principle immanent in human beings, an antic 
property, makes them know what and who they are, and also that this 
principle as the ontical property of a person can be identified with 
the function of self-identity. To describe this antic property of a 
person will in turn raise the question--how is human nature related to 
concrete situations? 
•isoul" in Aristotle's View 
What Aristotle is seeking is the essence of the human being's life. 
5 He speaks of this essence as the "soul," the form or actuality of the 
body. He observes that the distinctive mark of a human being is "an 
active life of the element that has a rational principle. 116 Further he 
states that "all men by nature desire to know. 117 "By nature" means hav-
i~g in itself the source of its own production. 8 In other words, the 
intelligent ability in human nature is self-productive, not created by 
another. Again he says, "It is owing to their wonder that men both now 
begin and at first began to philosophize; they wondered originally at 
the obvious difficulties. • 119 Philosophizing here obviously begins 
with the mind, that is, with thought. For Aristotle, man has the 
culminating power of thought which distinguishes him from all non-human 
beings. Human nature is rational power and intelligent fulfillment and 
is attributed to all members of the human species as a defining 
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characteristic. Reason in Aristotle contains "autonomy" and "thinking." 
How is human nature employed in Aristotle's philosophy? His 
answer is: 
At present we must confine ourselves to saying that soul is 
the source of these phenomena and is characterized by them, 
viz. by the powers of self-nutrition, sensation, thinking 
and motivity.10 
Thus in the human soul, there are vegetative functions, such as nutri-
tion, growth, and reproduction; animalistic functions, such as sensa-
tion, desire and movement; and besides these there is also the pure 
human function of reason. Nourishment and desire, so-called irrational 
functions, belong to a human being only in so far as man is an animal 
(non-human being) and not in so far as he is a rational being. What is 
the distinctive function of man? 11 As "sight is the soul of eyes" and 
the ergon (translated as "function1112 ) of vegetables is "to reproduce 
and feed, 1113 the ergon of a human being is "an active life of the 
1 h h . 1 . . 1 1114 e ement t at as a rat1ona pr1nc1p e. Human nature in Aristotle's 
view, then, consists of the capacity of a practical operation based on 
reason (logos). This is expressed as "the good life," "living well" 
(eudaimonia). The good life for man will be determined in relation to 
the nature of the human being. To discover the good at which a man 
should aim we must discover the distinctive function (ergon) of human 
nature, a function different from activities such as vocational skills, 
as well as from the irrational functions in man, because these may be 
animalistic functions. He formulates as follows the idea that there is 
a "good for man." 
If, then, there is some end of the things we do, which we 
desire for its own sake, (everything else being desired for 
the sake of this), and if we do not choose everything for 
the sake of something else (for at that rate the process would 
go on to infinity, so that our desire would be empty and 
vain), clearly this must be the good and the chief good. Will 
not the knowledge of it, then, have a great influence on life? 
Shall we not, like archers who have a mark to aim at, be more 
likely to hit upon what is right?15 
The good life for man is not only something that "we choose only for 
itself and never for the sake of something else1116 but also something 
in which the function of man (reason) is fulfilled. He points out, 
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"Happiness is something final and self-sufficient, and is the end of ac-
tion.1117 From this it can be argued that to live as a tool, a channel 
for another life, is not really to live oneself as an active life based 
on the rational principle. "Hence we see what is the nature and office 
of a slave; he who is by nature not his own but another's man, is by 
nature a slave." 18 A 1 . . f f h' 19 s ave is in a way o a part o is master. But 
he who is a man by his own nature (reason) cannot be a tool. What is 
characteristic of the human is to be free, to show the autonomy of 
reason. 
Ev,idently then we do not seek it (i.e. wisdom) for the sake of 
any other advantage; but as the man is free, we say, who 
exists for his own sake and not for another's, so we pursue 
this as the only free science, for it alone exists.for its own 
sake. 2 
What do we simply in living is "to grow," "to reproduce," and "to 
perceive." What else do we do? "Practical activity of what has logos." 
This is what makes a man happy, but it also allows him to become an 
authentic (real) person. 
Aristotle states the autonomy of reason as follows: "When mind is 
set free from its present conditions it appears as just what it is and 
nothing more: this alone is immortal and eternaL •• , and without it 
nothing thinks. 1121 He also states the divinity of reason as follows: 
Whether it be reason or something else that is this element 
which is thought to be our naturai ruler and guide and to 
take thought of things noble and divine, whether it be it-
self also divine or only the most divine element in us, the 
activity of this in accordance with its proper virtue will 
be perfect happiness.22 
But such a life would be too high for man; for it is not in so 
far as he is man that he will live so, but in so far as some-
thing divine is present in him. . • . If reason is divine, 
then, in comparison with man, the life according to it is 
divine in comparison with human life,23 
Reason, therefore, is not only a faculty influenced by environmental 
variables, but is also transcendent, divine. Human reason is one with 
divine reason, exercising a faculty which is external. To Aristotle, 
divinity is not absolutely opposed to humanity: "Something divine is 
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present in him (man)." Something divine means God, a pure metaphysical 
principle. He says that God is reason or that His act is "thinking. 1124 
This reason is not like human reason, the reason of a finite being who 
25 
"sometimes thinks and sometimes does not," but is an eternal thinking. 
Such an eternal thinking is not possible for a reason which is concerned 
with an object other than thinking itself, because such a reason is 
26 passive and conditioned by an objective form. 
How is the divine related to human reason? The ·answer to the ques-
tion is explained by reference to the four kinds of cause: the material, 
27 the formal, the efficient and the final cause. First of all, human 
reason is both passive and active. The pa~sive reason is the material 
cause from which actual knowledge is formed, just as a product is formed 
from its material. This can then be ch~nged into the understanding--
power of reason. The passive reason is the mere capacity for receiving 
ideas. The active reason, however, as the agent, the producer that 
makes all things, is the efficient cause of thought: "a cause which is 
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productive in the sense that it makes them all. 1128 Aristotle continues, 
"And in fact mind (reason) .•. is what it is by virtue of becoming all 
things, while there is another which is what it is by virtue of making 
all things. 1129 If we equate passive reason with the eye, active reason 
with light, and the object of thought with color, there ensues a complete 
analogy in the phenomena. The object of thought is received by passive 
reason through active reason, and thereby the form of the object is 
realized in passive reason. As for the formal cause, the object of 
thought is considered to be the conceptual form which gives an actual 
form to passive reason. L:i!ght makes the eye become convinced of its 
activity. Reason in the act of becoming 1 self-conscious is the active 
reason, the constructive reason, the "poietic reason. 1130 This active 
reason is not identical with human reason (understanding) which means 
"sometimes thinks and sometimes does not;" active reason is self-
conscious personality as a subjective faculty. It should be distin-
guished as imperishable and immortal. It is both transcendent and 
immanent, divine as well as human. The passive reason is mortal and 
. bl f h b d b h . 1 d . 1 31 1nsepara e rom t e o y, ut t e active reason, eterna an 1mmorta • 
I 
If it is right to explain constructive reason as rational self-
consciousness in a human being, this would be equivalent to a decision 
in favor of human immortality. To Aristotle, divinity is not absolutely 
d h . 32 oppose to umanity. Human reason is one with divine reason, exer!=-is-
ing a faculty which is eternal. Man do~s not reflect his own dignity 
as far as his thinking is concerned with outside objects. In such a 
condition, he is not yet man as <il person. He becomes a real man only 
through knowing himself. This means that when he turns his eyes from 
the object to himself, he is able to find the self as the subject of 
57 
thinking. Man is connected with God33 only through manifesting active 
reason. In other words, personality alone has that unbroken life which 
is constituted by the absolute and eternal self-thinking of God. The 
active and divine reason makes a human being a valuable being. The 
subject thinking with autonomy constitutes the ontic property of self-
identity in a human being. 
Man is by nature able to think. Reason is the distinctive nature of 
man. On its passive level it is merely the latent but unexercised 
capacity for conceptual thought; but active reason is thought itself; 
that supreme faculty by which man apprehends truth, i.e., enters into the 
universal realm of relationship, essence, quality, and form. In speaking 
of the active reason as the divine and immortal in man he says: 
Mind in this sense of it is separable, impassive, unmixed, 
since it is in its essential nature activity (for always the 
active is superior to the passive factor, the originating 
force to the matter which it forms).34 
How can an actual thinking be developed? Through a habitual knowl-
edge which is acquired or exercised through learning. It is developed 
through education by those who have acquired or exercised knowledge by 
means of actual thinking. Here learning means, first, the regulation, 
in the direction of the mean, of man's natural feelings and dispositions 
(the appetitive elements of the soul) and next, the contemplation of 
truth by the active reason (the rational element of the soul). Man does 
have a distinctive function, that of exercise of his reason. Thus man's 
distinctive function is an activity of the soul in conformity with 
rational principle. Only those who are educated and learned can think 
for themselves35 and thus be happy. "For man, therefore, the life 
according to reason is best and pleasantest, since reason more than 
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anything else is man. This life therefore is also the happiest. 1136 
"Jen" in Confucius' View 
To Confucius, too, like Aristotle, the good life for man is to 
cultivate his own mind. The phenomena of living are the same as the 
objectification or manifestation of human nature. He bases his ethics 
upon the nature of man and of society through an explanation of human 
nature. He teaches in the Analects that the goal for the individual is 
the development of personality until the ideal of a perfect man, a true 
gentleman (the superior man), is reached. The ultimate ground of man's 
self-realization lies within his own nature. Man has the inner 
strength to actualize the full potential of his being, and his creativity 
is inherent in his humanness. Man, therefore, is not a creature but a 
creative agent who gives meaning to "Heaven, Earth and the myriad 
things." Confucius says: 
The man of wisdom delights in water; the man of humanity de-
lights in mountains. The man of wisdom is active; the man of 
humanity is tranquil. The man of wisdom enjoys happiness; 
the man of humanity enjoys long life.37 
In Confucius' philosophy, the individual self is no longer conceived as 
an object in the world, but rather as a subject capable of achieving an 
ideal of perfection independent of the contingencies and limitations of 
the empirical world. 
What is inner human nature? Confucius never systematized his 
teaching (sayings), but he once remarked that "there is one thread that 
runs through my doctrines. 1138 Even though he himself does not specify 
what this thread is, it is not difficult for us to identify it as Jen, 
popularly translated into English as "humanity" and "human-hearted-
ness. 1139 In the Analects Confucius says, 
A superior man (the perfect man) never abandons humanity 
even for the lapse of a single meal. In moments of haste, 
he acts according to it. In times of difficulty or con-
fusion, he acts according to it.40 
Confucius said, 'the way of the superior man is threefold, 
but I have not been able to attain it. The man of wisdom 
has no perplexities; the man of humanity has no worry; the 
man of courage has no fear. ,41 
Simply stated, his philosophy is a philosophy of the Jen (humanity) of 
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man. All his teachings have to do with the explication and realization 
of the Jen in man. In other words, it can be said that he exposes the 
Jen of man as found in man's inner nature in much the same way as 
Aristotle actualizes the inner function (ergon) of human nature, that 
is, reason. Although Confucius talked a great deal about Jen, he never 
attempted to give a formal definition of it, and also was not even con-
scious of the methodological problems that still occopy the minds of 
modern moral philosophers on the topic. According to C. Hansen, 42 the 
antithesis of the Confucian approach is that of the legalists and 
formalism. Confucianism, however, rejects the formulation of abstract 
rules and the application of specific prescriptive rules of conduct. 
The philosophy of Jen is not a system of lofty principles, but instead 
is organized around an important class of qualities of man as revealed 
in the encounter of the individual with others and the world. 
What is it which contains those potential qualities of man? It is 
Jen, human-heartedness, man-to-man-ness. The mind is Jen as a human 
nature. There is a great potentiality for self-development in each man, 
and to develop it to the fullest extent is Jen. The following statement 
in the Analects enables us to understand what this really means: 
a resolute scholar and a man of humanity will never seek to 
live at the expense of injuring humanity. He (a man of 
humanity) would rather sacrifice his life in order to realize 
humanity.43 
How should the word "Jen" be defined or described for Confucius' 
thought? It signifies literally the proper intersubjective relations 
among people. Jen '1~, humanity) is defined as Jen (/.., man: the 
Chinese word for "man" is also pronounced Jen). Confucius says, 
"Becoming Jen originates from oneself. 1144 Jen therefore signifies the 
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inner reality of man as situated in society. It distinguishes man from 
other animals. The following statements in the Analects show us how he 
dealt with it: 
A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, 
also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be 
prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent.45 
Confucius said, 'One who is not a man of humanity cannot en-
dure adversity for long, nor can he enjoy prosperity for 
long. The man of humanity is naturally at ease with human-
ity. The man of wisdom cultivates humanity for its advan-
tage. t46 
Confucius said, 'Only the man of humanity knows how to love 
people and hate people. ,47 
Confucius said, 'If Sou set your mind on humanity, you will 
be free from evil. ,4 
The mind in man is Jen as a human nature. Jen is not a state in life, 
nor does it modify any perfect faculty of man, but Jen signifies man's 
total nature. Jen (.-1::) is basically close to Jen (A) by nature. Man's 
total nature means a totality which exhibits itself in a will to good-
ness as well as in feelings of love and natural inclinations to do 
good. Again, Jen, the ideal relationship among human beings, is the 
perfect virtue of men. Jen as the supreme human virtue has the power 
to enable man to live a life of peace. It is the only road to the peace 
and harmony of a society. 
Confucius does not deny that man is limited and determined in many 
ways by external conditions, 49 i.e., by the inevitability of death, 
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temporality of human existence, and the burden of irrationality. But he 
recognizes also the positive element of man as a subject capable of 
controlling, disciplining, and perfecting himself. This element is 
naturally obtained in the nature of the human being in itself and in an 
' 
understanding of his ontological ground (Jen). Jen becomes a source of 
I 
man's freedom and power only through constant effort to reflect on 
(investigate) his own human nature. What is meant by saying that "Jen 
(.-{:.) is Jen (A) ?1150 It means that man has for his self-identity a 
metaphysical principle of his existence: that man has a freedom inherent 
in his existence, a freedom which is constant in perceiving and giving 
meaning to his behavior; that by the process of cultivating the essence 
of Jen, man is able to transcend the limitations and objective determina-
tions imposed by environmental variables and therefore will transform 
them into something positive and meaningful to himself. 
How is human nature employed in this philosophy? The answer to this 
question can be derived from the following: 
Tzu-Kung said, 'we can hear our Master's (view) on culture and 
its manifestation, but we cannot hear his views on human nature 
and the Way of Heaven. 1 51 
52 Man is born with uprightness •••• 
By nature men are alike. Through practice they have become 
far apart.53 
Instead of finding a formal definition of Jen as human nature, we can 
only discover descriptions of concrete examples of it in the Analects 
through its manifestations. Dewey, in the article "Human Nature," has 
maintained that knowing human nature through its great institutional 
54 products is basically an Aristotelian concept. This could also be 
said of the Confucian concept of Jen. How can we know the character of 
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Jen? Only through its manifestation: "Confucius said, 'Is humanity far 
away? A I • h • • . h b I 1155 s soon as want it, t ere it is rig t y me. How can Jen 
be manifested (be the way of living)? His explanation is: (1) Jen is 
manifested in Li, it is man's affirmation of cosmic harmony; (2) it is 
found in man's inner nature -as the intersubjective love that reigns in 
society; (3) it is fidelity, man's interiorization of self through 
being-true-to-self. In other words, to attain perfect Jen a man has to 
fulfill his nature totally; but this is not possible to man in his 
existential state. It is therefore a moral ideal to be sought by all 
men; but it is not a rule of specific conduct. To follow Tao, as the 
general rule of good conduct, requires self-examination, self-delibera-
tion, and self-control as stated by Confucius: "Set your will on the 
Way. Have a firm grasp on virtue. Rely on humanity. Find recreations 
in the arts. 1156 
From ancient times, the Chinese view has been that reason and 
desire (the function of the animal) oppose each other. Chinese 
philosophers have repeatedly stressed that one should not indulge one-
self in gratifying desires, but should put desire under the control of 
reason. According to Aristotle, the soul consists of three parts: the 
rational, the spirited, and the appetitive. The first part is the 
highest and noblest. It leads to the intellect, knowledge, and truth, 
while the other two parts give rise to desires, greediness, and violence. 
To keep these three parts in harmony and in balance is the work of the 
care of the soul. Aristotle holds that a man is a soul using a body and 
that a soul should be in a good and healthy state. But in Confucian 
philosophy, the advice for curing the disease of a soul is self-
control or moderation. It is part of the Chinese tradition that a 
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philosopher should seek knowledge, including self-examination, medita-
tion and self-perfection. This is the way to nourish the mind. In other 
words, the care of the mind in Confucius' thought is based upon three 
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rules: (1) "knowing the root," which means to have the realization of 
knowledge by the examination of things; (2) "making the will sincere," 
which means not to allow self-deception; (3) "rectifying the mind." As 
the aim of investigating the nature of things was primarily "making 
thought sincere" and "rectifying the mind," this theory dwells upon the 
necessity for action after the acquiring of knowledge. Any and all 
knowledge is worthwhile only when it is applicable in action in daily 
life with goodness as its result. 
If Jen is so important, what are the methods suggested by Confucius 
for its attainment? He teaches that only by strenuous moral effort can 
one hope to increase in Jen, and such moral effort involves self-
cultivation and the continued practice of goodness (Jen). All men act 
according to their nature. He knows very well that virtue grows not in 
a vacuum but in the practical affairs of everyday life. The basic 
concern in his philosophy is how to become the superior man (or a 
sage). Such a concern seems to involve a method (how), a process (be-
coming), and an end (sagehood). Since the attainment of Confucius sage-
hood (being an autonomous person) is predicated on the belief that man 
becomes perfect by self-effort, the method in question is not an 
acquired technique but is self-cultivation through "learning and 
practice." The process, similarly, is not an external procedure but is 
self-transformation. And the end is not an objectifiable goal but is 
self-realization. 
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"Intelligence" in Dewey's View 
The human being in Dewey's philosophy lives within an environment 
and by means of it. "Experience" is the result of two interacting or 
interpenetrating influences--experiencer and experienced--in environ-
mental variables. The important thing in understanding Dewey's 
philosophy, therefore, is the origin and content of experience. These 
basic philosophical postulates on the nature of "experience" are 
fundamental to an understanding of his ideas on the problem of human 
nature and its relation to value and education. 
In experience there is not an antecedently given subject and an 
antecedent object; nor can subject-object be separated from each other. 
The nature of each is determined by the relation which each sustains to 
the other in a situation. In experience there is no separate subject 
and no separate object. The distinction between subject and object can 
only be perceived by deliberate analysis and is not found in immediate 
experience itself. Thus experience is the internal relation which 
determines the nature of the subject as experiencer and the object as 
experienced. Experience, therefore, is the quality of consequences of 
organically united processes between experiencer and experienced. If 
this view of experience is correct, the following is implied: experience 
is not simply an event going on inside somebody's mind, but an event in 
which transformation in Nature (the world) results. 
Experience is of as well as in Nature. It is not experience 
which is experienced. . • • Things interacting in certain 
ways are experience; they are what is experienced. Linked in 
certain other ways with another natural object--the human 
organism--they are how things are experienced as well. 58 
Experiences also have a prevading quality which unifies them and makes 
them unique as a whole. If we ask "How does a quality prevade expe-
riences?", we could get a clue from the following illustration. 
A painting is said to have quality, or a particular painting 
to have a Titian or Rembrandt quality. The word thus used 
most certainly does not refer to any particular line, color 
or part of the painting. It is something that affects and 
unifies all the constituents of the picture and all their 
relations. It is not anything that can be expressed in 
words for it is something that must be had. Discourse may, 
however, point out the qualities, lines and relations by 59 
means of which pervasive and unifying quality is achieved. 
The uniqueness of what is directly experienced in the painting is 
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something as an intellectual projection of a subjective mind on a color-
ful objective reality. 
The primary nature of the relation between experience and the mind 
60 is "like the wheat and tares of the parable." This situation is said 
to be "a scene of risk, 1161 which is uncertain, unstable. Dewey does not 
mean to formulate a negative (or pessimistic) attitude to life in 
emphasizing the indeterminate aspect in experience, but rather he urges 
us to concentrate on the activity of man's faculty (mind). In other 
words, the mind cannot operate simply as a passive spectator of independ-
ent events and occurrences. Instead, he argues that the e~istence of 
mental activity is contingent on active participation in environmental 
affairs. Here is the significance for man's faculty of the mind: the 
activity of inquiry in man can change the indeterminate situation into 
a cognitively meaningful one. Here is th.e significance for what makes 
man differ fundamentally from other living things. Dewey believes that 
man is unique because he has a mind (an intell'igence) and thus the 
ability to identify or discriminate. He says, "the activity of intelli-
gence consists in identifying the apparently unlike, and in 
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discriminating the apparently like. 
indispensable to intelligence. 1162 
Each relation is, therefore, 
Dewey's critical analysis of experience shows some intellectual 
affinities to Aristotle. Intelligence, according to him, is an operative 
factor within nature; it is active and effective in transforming and 
modifying experience. For intelligence to play an effective role in the 
world there must be real conflict and indeterminancy, precariousness and 
uncertainty in experience. To him experience is a process where every-
thing is changing temporally. There is no absolute beginning nor any 
predetermined end for the things in nature. In order to "transform 
confusion, ambiguity and discrepancy into illumination, definiteness and 
. 
1163 h . d . . . d d h k h . consistency, t e in eterminate situation eman s t at we ma e a c oice 
for each situation through the faculty of identity and discrimination. 
Some particular way of acting must be selected. This distinctive feature 
of human choice means that man can anticipate and deliberately select 
among alternative preferences. "The present experience is comprehended, 
and the past experience grows into richer forms. 1164 In other words, man 
can evaluate future possibilities from the present circumstances, and 
enlighten intelligently his choices. In the course of his selective 
adjustment to the environment, thus, man can exercise genuine choice to 
resolve the indeterminancy inherent in experience. This also means that 
the goal of intelligence is not predetermined by certain fixed ends. 
Thinking makes a difference in our relation to the environment, and thus 
he believes that intelligence can actually get things done. He further 
believes that through the exercise of intelligence and effort, man is 
capable of shaping his own future. Man's choice must be intelligently 
reformed. To say that man determines his choices intelligently is the 
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same as saying that man has freedom in his nature. That is why man's 
nature for Dewey is neither good nor bad--contrary to what Confucius 
was concerned about--and the crucial issue for man is what he does with 
choice. 
What is the precise function of intelligence? How is the notion 
of intelligence employed in his theory of human nature? In earlier 
writings, Dewey seems to follow closely the Darwinean formula: 
The process of biology has accustomed our minds to the notion 
that intelligence is not an outside power presiding supremely 
but statically over the desires and efforts of man but is a 
method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within 
specific situations.65 
But in his subsequent writings, he does not seem to stick strictly to 
this description. For he develops not only the conception of intel-
ligence as a method of biological adjustment but also a novelty of in-
telligence and its creative power. He writes: 
•.• the pragmatic theory of intelligence means that the func-
tion of mind is to project new and more complex ends--to free 
experience from routine and from caprice. Not the use of 
thought to accomplish purposes already given either in the 
m~chanism of the body or in that of the existent state of 
society, but the use of intelligence to liberate and liberal-
ize action, is the pragmatic lesson.66 
The notion of intelligence as "creative" becomes clearly dominating in 
his later writings whenever he talks about the aim and function of 
philosophical problems. For instance, in discussing the necessity of 
guiding desires and impulses by intelligence: "What intelligence has 
to do in the service of impulse is to act not as its obedient servant 
but as its clarifier and liberator. 1167 Similarly, in explaining the 
place of active and planning thought within the processes of experience 
he writes: 
To ... suggestions used in constructive fashion for new ends 
the name intelligence is given. It liberates' man from the 
bondage of the past, due to ignorance and accident hardened 
into custom. It ~rojects a better future and assists man in 
its realization.6 
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Dewey has two different accounts of intelligence: intelligence as 
a method of adjustment of capacities and conditions within specific 
situations, and intelligence as a creative novelty projecting new ends 
and assisting in the realization of those ends. He does not, however, 
treat these two accounts as two separate notions, but rather he empha-
sizes the continuous process accomplished by the "going-on" activity in 
the organic unity between subject and object. He is not actually con-
cerned with the changeless state. For instance, knowledge for him does 
not mean a state of consciousness, but a way of acting, a way of con-
tinuous readjustment of ourselves to circumstances always new. "To re-
adjust" requires knowing the characterization of the problematic 
circumstance, considering deliberately how to act, and finally making a 
choice. Thinking, according to him, "is seen to be a specific event in 
the movement of experienced things, having its own specific occasion or 
demand and its own specific place. 1169 In Dewey's view "a thought is crea-
tive,--an incursion into the novel. It involves some inventiveness. 1170 
This means that "thinking is originally in a projection of considerations 
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which have not been previously apprehended." Human intelligence mani-
fests itself in creative thinking. Creative thinking points out the need 
of new ideas, and has creative possibilities. Creative thinking implies 
dissatisfaction with routine solutions, and also lets man become a sub-
ject capable of controlling the methods for solutions. 
Knowing is something that happens to persons in the process of their 
career. Knowing is nothing but a series of acts. Knowledge does not 
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depend for its value upon any consistent consequences taken as ready-made 
structures of thought. Its value exists in serving to clarify a program 
of action in problematic situations. Knowledge has the role of criticiz-
ing, determining the circumstances. The value of knowledge is not 
established by verifying any kind of satisfaction or conformity with the 
given situation, but is established through functioning to produce a 
better organization of activity moving to the direction of the future. 
Man is not a passive, inert spectator of a neutral world. He is an 
organism plunged into an environment that infiltrates at every point his 
own nature. Habits are the functions by which men normally make the 
necessary adjustments. But since the environment is immensely complex 
and anything but static, these habitual adjustments constantly require 
modification. This modification is the work of intelligence as described 
above. According to Dewey, intelligence itself is a mode of behavior; 
it is the specific way in which a living organism interacts with its 
environment, pursuing ends and choosing means to attain ends. His con-
cern with human nature is associated with the course of intelligent 
deliberation. 
Human nature for Dewey "exists and operates in an environment, but 
it is not in that environment as coins are in a box, but as a plant is 
in the sunlight and soil. 1172 He speaks of man in the concrete, that is, 
not of abstract man or of abstract city, but of people as persons and of 
persons in association. He points out that original human nature is a 
complex of impulses and pattern that manifest themselves in blind, 
chaotic activity. But since each individual is born within a group with 
already established ways of acting, this intellectual activity is 
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immediately guided into channels set by the group's demands and customs. 
Such channeling results in habits of conduct and of disposition in the 
individual, helping to make him the kind of person he is. Habits, how-
ever, are constantly challenged, or confronted with a problematic situa-
tion in which they do not work. To avoid this conflict, intelligence 
intervenes to mediate impulse and habit. Thus life may be said to be a 
process in which impulse, habit and intelligence play continuing roles 
in modifying or reinforcing each other to bring about a widening and 
deepening harmony among themselves. 
Conclusion 
Man in the present technological society has been described as a 
person who "transferred his ownership to another" and who "has little 
idea of who he is or where he is going." Such a man was described as 
one who has lost his own self-identity and his own personal dignity. 
Is there any way to recover a being of inherent value and to keep the 
ground of self-identity? What basis do we have for assuming that there 
is a continuous and unified existence behind the phenomena of our liv-
ing? This is an ontological question--it is about the nature and the 
real existence of man. The answer to these questions will help us to 
realize the intrinsic worthwhileness of a human being, and also to 
emphasize his ontological ground. That is why the essence of human 
nature in Aristotle's, Confucius' and Dewey's views has been described 
through this chapter. 
(1) They all contend that the.essence of man by his nature is 
rationality, a trait not possessed by any of the lower animals: "soul" 
in Aristotle, "Jen" in Confucius, and "intelligence" in Dewey. This 
peculiar nature of man enables him not only to be unique, but also it 
provides the ontological ground for his existence. Rationality makes 
a human being valuable. 
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(2) The activities of human nature according to these three 
philosophers provide the reason why man should be treated as a being of 
moral worth or as a morally autonomous person. The activities of human 
nature have been divided into two aspects by each of these philosophers: 
the active and the passive in Aristotle's philosophy; rationality in or 
of mind and rationality as the order of nature in Confucius' thought; 
intelligence as a creative novelty for a new plan and as a method of 
adjustment to environment in Dewey's philosophy. Aristotle agrees with 
Confucius that the active rationality of mind is divine, a substantial 
principle in man which is a priori and universal to all human beings. 
This principle is an eternal "thinking" which has freedom inherent in its 
power. For Aristotle and Confucius that there are universal and in-
alienated essences of human nature is certain because they regard meta-
physical premises as admissible. Dewey rules out all metaphysical 
premises that cannot be interpreted pragmatically in experience. The 
active, creative intelligence in man for him is based on man's expe-
rience; it has to be acquired and exercised for self-control in man. 
This activity for Dewey characterizes man as a self-conscious personal-
ity. Intelligence is empirical, not-universal, but determines 
deliberately man's actions. Intelligence works by itself but constructs 
the coherent uniqueness of experiences for what is valuable in human 
life. Here Dewey agrees with Aristotle and Confucius that man's freedom 
depends upon his nature. 
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(3) On the basis of man's freedom, Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey 
all assert man's responsibility for his life. For Confucius, when he 
says that one is responsible for X, it means that this is his duty or 
that the task has already been assigned to him. Man, according to 
Dewey, can choose and act on the basis of intelligent decision. Intel-
ligence consists both in the ability to find commonalities and in 
discriminating what appears to be identical. No one is morally respon-
sible for X except the agent who decides, chooses and acts. Aristotle 
asserts that man is morally responsible for developing his moral charac-
ter. Such a development is regarded as the highest development of a 
person, a prudential obligation. Man is morally responsible for 
prudential obligations. Although these three philosophers differ from 
each other, the point common to them is: man must be responsible for 
his life because the way of living itself is a product of the essence 
of human nature. 
(4) The fourth point about human nature is whether it is good or 
bad. Confucius holds that human nature is fundamentally good. He in-
sists that if there is evil in man's conduct, it is because his original 
nature is not completely developed or is obscured. For Aristotle the 
rational goodness of human nature is discounted in the excellent activ-
ities of reason as intrinsically worthwhile. He recognizes that doing 
evil is due to ignorance. Dewey shows how "good" and "bad," "right" and 
"wrong" emerge naturally out of human life-situations. Valuf:!s are not 
predetermined by an Absolute mind (as in Confucius' case) but are either 
discovered in situations or created by man himself when he struggles to 
adapt himself to the world in which he lives. Dewey accepts an evolution 
of value, and rejects the essential superiorities in the Aristotelian 
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view, and the intrinsic nature of goodness in the Confucian sense. But 
no matter how the good is interpreted by these three philosophers, they 
provide a common concept that the goodness of man is a totality which 
involves a deep awareness of reality as a source of freedom and power 
and also a natural and spontaneous expressiveness for actualization of 
the self in the world. Human goodness is the basis of man's being a 
morally autonomous person. This makes him an existential, subjective 
person with freedom and control, able to avoid dehumanization. Here is 
the significance of asserting the subject of inalienable rights in man 
which has been dealt with in Chapter II. 
(5) Finally, human nature for these three philosophers involves a 
sense of community in the sense that human nature is revealed or mani-
fested as the way of living. Aristotle states that the practical func-
tion of reason is necessary for the social well-being of the human 
being. The activity of reason is clearly revealed in society as the way 
of living. Jen, for Confucius, signifies the proper intersubjective 
relations among human beings; Jen points out the inseparability of man 
himself and his co-humanity. Intelligence for Dewey manifests itself 
in various forms and functions. One function of human intelligence is 
to seek new meanings in experienced objects and initiate responses to 
these meanings. In some sense, these three philosophers believe that 
"knowing" human nature must be its actualization and its activity in 
a life; that "knowing" human nature cannot be separated from "living in 
a society." Even though the question "what is human nature?" is a 
metaphysical question, we know the answer thr'ough observing man's 
external activities. 
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But there is another problem for our consideration. The subjective 
element of a human being is the actualizing power of an autonomous 
agent, while'the objective element of human existence is the unlimited 
and the indeterminate context in his environment. How can these two 
aspects be reconciled in man's life? How can one regard human nature as 
a starting point for a process of transforming the subjective into the 
objective and the individual into the universal? These questions will 
.. be taken up in the next chapter. 
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Aristotle's View 
According to Aristotle, the full development of man's essential 
nature is called "arete," translated in English as "virtue" or "excel-
lence." The virtue of each person seems to lie in the full efficiency 
of his peculiar function. He says: II •• every virtue or excellence 
both brings into good condition the thing of which it is the excellence 
and makes the work of that thing be done well. 111 For him any thing 
is virtuous which is performing its function in the best and most 
2 
complete way. Man's function is what he alone has or does best, his 
distinctive mode of activity in which his nature is most clearly seen. 
Arete is the way in which man's conduct and character could be revealed. 
Arete thus is the way of living. 
We need to know how to live well, or how to do well. Before we can 
know how to live well, we must know what it is we do simply in living. 
For Aristotle, human nature consists not simply in rationality, i.e., 
the intellectual function, but in the full range of activities identified 
by the vegetative, sensitive or appetitive and the rational soul. Man 
grows, digests, reproduces, perceives, and moves, and there is no dif-
ficulty in deciding what it is to do these things well. But what else 
does man do in living? His activity, according to Aristotle, is a 
practical activity of what has logos, 3 which means an activity in 
accordance with his proper nature, reason. This means that virtue is 
not a psychological state, but an activity of reason. What is virtue? 
It consists in activity of soul in accordance with reason, in accordance 
with the best and most complete function of man. 
Man, according to Aristotle, consists of a rational aspect, or part, 
a~d an irrational part. In between comes the area of desire and 
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appetites, which belongs to the rational to the extent that desires 
conform to reason, and to the irrational, to the extent that they do 
not. The presence of both rational and irrational powers in the soul 
accounts not only for moral contrariety but also for the two-fold 
division of the concept of virtue. He states this division as follows: 
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, 
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its 
growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience 
and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of 
habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by 
a slight variation from the word ethos (habit).4 
"Intellectual virtue" is the function of the completely rational part of 
the soul; and "moral virtue" has as its province the rational control 
of desire. Moral virtue is promoted by habituation but consists in a 
disposition to make right choices in action. What makes an outcome 
moral in its effect is not nutritive or sensitive but appetitive intel-
ligence, which, in fact, is identical with deliberate choice. 5 Moral 
virtue is to be attained by an energy (exercise) of the soul according 
to the aid of well-considered habits of choosing. 
However, here a problem arises. Aristotle says in "On the Soul," 
Hence appetite contains no deliberate element. Sometimes it 
overpowers [rational] wish and sets it in movement: at times, 
[rational] wish acts thus upon appetite, .•• or appetite 
acts thus upon appetite, i.e., in the condition of moral weak-
ness ..•• 6 
Because man is defined rationally, it could be thought that human 
behavior should be spontaneously ethical, that is, that there is an 
automatic progressive development in accordance with the demand that all 
impulses and desires, namely, the irrational parts, are subordinated to 
the principle of intelligence. But there is conflict between the 
rational and the irrational soul. 7 The irrational function overpowers 
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the rational to fulfill its own purpose, something incompatible with 
rationality. Aristotle tries to resolve this conflict by appeal to the 
functional interrelation of those faculties 9nd their independent 
development. This means that the overcoming of this conflict and the 
cumulative maintenance of the harmony of the faculties becomes essential 
to moral development. The virtuous disposition always lies between two 
extremes, that of going too far (excess) and that of not going far 
enough (defect). Moral virtue is a disposition to choose the golden 
mean with respect to action and feeling. Moral virtue, for Aristotle, 
may be characterized in the right degree, the right time, the right 
occasion, the right recipients, the right purpose, and the right manner 
as what is involved in the "mean and in the best. 118 
The mean in Aristotle's sense of virtue is not an arithmetical 
mean. It cannot be arithmetically determined. For instance, the proper 
amount of food for football players would be too much for business men. 
The athlete's fitness is maintained by the proper amount of food, 
neither too much nor too little. Courage is a mean between rashness (to 
fear nothing) and cowardice (to fear everything); temperance, a mean 
between self-indulgence (to abstain from no pleasure) and insensibility 
(to abstain from all). Liberality is the golden mean between stinginess 
and prodigality; magnificence, between ostentatious display and 
niggardly living. Applying this analogy to attitudes, emotions, and con-
duct, Aristotle develops a rational ethics which is not yet relativistic. 
Though the mean is variable, since some means lie nearer one or the other 
extreme, there is a mean for all situations--actually that middle course 
recognized with choice and intention. Therefore virtue is a disposition 
of choice. He says, "Virtue is a state of character concerned with 
choice, lying in a mean, i.e., the mean relative to us, this being 
determined by a rational principle. 119 The mean is emphasized as the 
standard of moral virtue in human action. This means that one is 
virtuous only when one's desires are controlled by reason, because 
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reason judges the worth of objects and discovers the means of obtaining 
them. Thus, moral virtue requires the cooperation of the desiderative 
and the rational parts of the soul. Moral virtue is a disposition dis-
playing purpose, in a mean relative to the agent and determined by a 
1 h b . ld d . . lO ru e were y a wise man wou eterm1ne 1t. 
In the case of all moral virtues, the virtuous man conforms to the 
mean, avoids excess and defect, in respect to both passions and actions. 
By "relative to us," Aristotle mean.s "that which is neither too much 
nor too little and it is not one, nor the same for all. 1111 This does 
not imply the complete negation or rejection of natural capacities or 
irrational functions. 12 Moral virtue is between two vices, and a mean 
the vices "respectively fall short of or exceed what is right in both 
passions and actions. ,,13 Virtue lies in feeling or acting rightly in 
relation to time, objects, people, motives and manner. Aristotle says, 
In everything that is continuous and divisible it is possible 
to take more, less or an equal amount, and that either in 
terms of the thing itself or relatively to us; and the equal 
is an intermediate between excess and defect.14 
"Equal" here is not explained enough for us to understand what he really 
means. Equal to what? There can be no answer except "equal to the 
amount which is right." 
How is it possible to recognize "an equal to the amount which is 
right?" A man must find exactly what "right mean" is. How can it be 
discovered? There are some rules through which moral virtue is developed 
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as "a habit or trained faculty. 1115 These are: (1) the agent (a human 
being) desires an end; (2) the agent deliberates, seeing that B is the 
means to A (the end to be obtained), C the means to B, and so on, until 
(3) he perceives that some particular means near to the end or remote 
from it (as the case may be), is something that he can do here and now; 
(4) the agent chooses this means that presents itself to him as 
practicable; and (5) does the action in question. All moral virtues 
have to be learned and practiced with deliberative choice. Through 
"learning and practicing" by steps of moral process the mean can be 
determined in all moral situations. Moral virtue is the result of 
habit or custom, and this is developed by training. Aristotle says, 
"we become just by doing just acts, temperate by doing temperate acts, 
16 brave by doing brave acts." In other words, a man cannot evaluate 
his own action as being honest unless he believes "a person must be 
honest." And if he knows what he is doing and he acts with a result of 
continuous character for the sake of rational action in itself, then he 
becomes honest through trained, repeated behavior. Belief and habit 
are interrelated with moral virtue. The function of habit in moral ac-
tion is stressed as follows: 
••• it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in 
us by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a 
habit contrary to its nature. • • . Neither by nature, then, 
nor contrary to nature do the virtues arise in us; rather we 
are adapted by nature to receive them, and are made perfect by 
habit.17 
Moral virtues involve choice; choice presupposes right desire and a 
true reasoning-process. The man who has the rule of moral virtues has a 
standard which determines the mean, i.e., what is intermediate between 
excess and defect. But there is no simple way for the wise man to use 
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the rule of moral virtues. How could there be when there are so many 
variables? What is needed is intellectual virtue as well as moral 
virtue. So we have to consider Aristotle's account of the intellectual 
virtues. He held that intellect (reason in pursuit of truth and 
reason as an agent of thinking) is proper to man, indicating that all 
men by nature desire to know. To solve the problem raised above in 
regard to moral virtues, Aristotle brings in the function of intellectual 
virtue. Why did he do that? 18 There are two reasons: (1) the virtuous 
man has been defined as acting in accordance with the "right rule"; 19 
(2) well-being has been defined as "activity of soul in accordance with 
20 
virtue ... , in accordance with the best and most complete." In the 
stable continuity of human virtuous conduct as a process, virtue is the 
ideal intelligent response to the alternatives of action. And in order 
to have perfect moral virtue the habits of right choice, right thinking, 
and right decision should be developed. 
The intellectual virtues differ from the moral in that they are 
acquired by instruction rather than habituation. Whenever one excels in 
a particular type of reasoning, he may be said to have the corresponding 
virtue. When one is "able to deliberate well about what is good or 
expedient for himself, 1121 he is said to be a man of practical wisdom 
(phronesis). 22 Art (techne), the reasoned capacity to make things well, 
is the virtue of the productive reason. A man skilled in demonstration 
possesses scientific knowledge (episteme). 23 The person who is able to 
grasp first principles, from which all demonstrations follow, has 
intuitive reason (nous). Wisdom (sophia) is found in the man who com-
bines scientific knowledge with intuitive reason. Practical wisdom is 
the power of good deliberation about how particular things are to be 
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made, or particular states are to be brought into existence. Practical 
reasoning is always connected with the faculty of desire, and its 
exercise is always directed toward a specific end involving an activity. 
Thus, a virtuous man must have a variety of intellectual abilities; the 
capacity for deliberation as well as the capacity to choose good ends; 
practical wisdom, the temper of mind which selects ends wisely, must 
supplement understanding, good sense, and cleverness. 24 
M 1 . 25 . 1 d . 1 d f t' h ora virtues are practica an instrumenta an unc ion as t e 
conditions and principles of prudent action that lead to the chief Good 
by helping man develop intellectual virtue. Moral virtues are disposi-
tions to choose according to a certain rule and are an instrumental 
ground to establish the chief Good. Having said that all actions aim 
toward an end, Aristotle wants to distinguish between two major kinds of 
ends: instrumental ends (which become means for other ends), and 
intrinsic ends (which are for their own sake). The criteria of 
intrinsic ends are finality and self-sufficiency, which means to leave 
nothing to be desired. Intrinsic ends will be the chief Good as happi-
ness. Other ends are desired as an instrument for the sake of the chief 
Good, and when the instrumental function is fulfilled completely it may 
be called good, but not the chief Good. How does the soul attain 
happiness? The general rule of moral virtue is "to act in accordance 
with right reason." In other words, what makes an outcome moral in its 
effect is not nutritive or sensitive action, but intelligence which is 
identical with deliberate choice. 26 Consequently there is a certain 
type of action through which man becomes positively moral. This type 
of action stems from the distinctively human faculty of intelligence. 
A human being not only thinks and uses reason to discover the truth 
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about things, but also acts and uses reason to choose among the 
alternatives open to him. Thus Aristotle distinguishes between reason 
as a cognitive faculty and reason as a practical faculty. John P. Anton 
describes the point of this distinction as follows: 
The powers of the soul at the end should come under the intel-
ligent control and guidance of prudence so that the in-
determinacy of their vast contrarieties (a disposition to 
choose between extremes, excess and defect) may become deter-
minate and channelled behavior with charity in order and suc-
cinctness in expression.27 
For Aristotle, an ethical (moral) virtue, therefore, is something more 
than a natural disposition, that is, its essence is more reason or intel-
lect, not something which follows social custom or culture. 
Ethical virtue is the habital character which is fostered through 
lawful conduct and does not need the consciousness of duty. It is a 
moral accomplishment that one becomes free from the consciousness of 
28 duty. For Aristotle the complete reality of ethical virtue is 
practical wisdom. Aristotle does not accept that virtue can be iden-
tified with practical wisdom or that virtue is defined as a habit in 
accordance with reason. But he himself characterizes virtue with the 
29 
expression, "habit accompanied by reason." "In accordance with 
reason" means conforming to law, but "accompanied by reason" is applied 
to the expression of a rational character which is acquired completely. 
To be morally good, one must act through practical consideration and 
resolution. 
The moral value of conduct is sustained by the calculation of 
values. For this reason an act motivated by passion is inferior to one 
which is accompanied by rational insight into value. What ensures 
30 
constant morality is a steady character regulated by reason. One who 
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acts with passion may succeed through a lucky chance, but his action 
cannot be well done in a moral sense. Aristotle does not agree with 
the way of living following a lucky chance. He rather assumes a happy 
man to be one who has a constant character such that he can endure even 
f f . h f 'd 31 an un ortunate ate wit con i ence. The man whose faculties ar.e all 
regulated by reason--who maintains a complete harmony of reason and 
desire in himself--is called a wise person. 
Confucius' View 
In answering his disciples' questions on the existence and function 
of Jen Confucius stresses the importance not only of internalizing the 
principle of Jen as man's natural disposition, but also of putting it 
into daily practice. In the Analects, "daily practice" is given an 
ethical connotation. It is the "way" (tao) a man ought to travel 
because it is by Heaven that he should walk in it. It is, fundamentally, 
"the Way of Heaven" and only becomes "the Way of man" because all wise 
and good men follow it, seeking to conform their conduct to the Way of 
Heaven. To follow Tao (the Way) is to practice Jen. The essence of 
Jen is the way of living (virtue) humanized, Jen (humanness), thus, has 
to be conceived as an externalization of Jen (human nature) in a con-
crete situation. 
Confucius does not employ a systematic method of developing his 
theory of Jen, but he demonstrates and illustrates directly the 
factual examples of Jen through his conversations with disciples. For 
instance, he recognizes this point when he says, "The common people 
may be made to follow it (the Way), but may not be made to understand 
't 1132 l • And Tzu-hsia quotes him as stating that "If a superior man is 
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reverential (or serious) without fail, and is respectful in dealing 
with others and follows the rules of propriety, then all within the four 
seas (the world) are brothers. 1133 It can be derived from Confucius' 
conversations that the phenomenon of living is the same as the objec-
tirication or manifestation of Jen (human nature). The good life, for 
man is to cultivate his own mind, Jen. What are the methods suggested 
by Confucius for its attainment? He teaches that only by strenuous 
moral effort can one hope to increase in Jen, and such moral effort 
involves self-cultivation and continuous "practice." He knows that the 
way of living grows not in a vacuum but in the practical affairs of 
everyday life. All men have to act by their nature. The proper way of 
living is the manifestation of Jen, being morally virtuous. 
J . . 'f d . h 34 en is man1 este in t ree ways: (1) through ·personal morality 
by just being compassionate, concerned with personal relationships; 
(2) through speech-acts in which language is used persuasively and 
prescriptively; and (3) in a more "theoretical" sense through connec-
tions and relationships between specific and particular modes of 
action, the sense in which he speaks of the "one thread that runs 
through my doctrines." Confucius believes that cultivation of sy~pathy 
and affection for others is essential for a moral society to exist, and 
then requires us to master his specific virtues: propriety (li), 
righteousness (!_), altruism (shu), loyalty (chung) and filial piety 
(hsiao). On the other hand, Confucius uses the more committed and pre-
35 
scriptive attitude to his disciplines in the "performative speech-act" 
as a standard for action: "Do not do to others what you do not want 
them to do to you." A "performative speec-act" is neither a descriptive 
statement nor a logical analysis of what an obligatory action consists 
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in. 36 It is rather to love men, and to know men. Finally he wants to 
unify the whole into one virtue; Jen comprehends specific virtues when 
it is stated that "Jen (~::.) is Jen (A)." Thus the term Jen is used in 
Confucius' thought both in reference to factual, specific human action 
and at an evaluative level where it refers to a virtue that the id~al, 
perfectly good, complete man realized. 
To say that Jen is the standard-bearer and consummation of all 
human relationships is not to ignore other human virtues and relation-
ships. For instance, the term "li" (propriety) was originally used for 
religious rites, including ethico-religious connotations, but the term 
"1·1137 
_i , as pointed out by Fung Yu-Lan, is very widely used for the 
present definition of "politeness" or "courtesy" as well as for the 
b d f d 1 . . 1 d . 1 . . . 38 entire o y o usages an customs, po 1t1ca an soc1a 1nst1tut1ons. 
In a slightly different context, the term "li" may also be understood 
as "harmonizing" the directions of other important virtues in 
Confucianism. Li connotes the order and harmony in which nature func-
tions. The moral order of man is taken from the natural order of the 
cosmos. Natural necessity becomes moral necessity. In the Confucian 
universe, li, therefore, is the order, the law by which all things 
evolve. Li can be conceived of as an externalization of Jen (the inner 
nature of the human being) in a concrete social situation. When 
Confucius was asked how to cultivate the virtue of Jen (reverential 
love), the master said, 
Do not look at what is contrary to propriety, do not listen 
to what is contrary to propriety, do not speak what is con-
trary to propriety, and do not make any movement which is 
contrary to propriety.39 
Li can be again defined as the debitum (what is due or proper) or 
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"becoming." 40 Its origin, as The Book of Rites says, comes from the 
primordial one, is manifested in the cosmos, transformed as Yin-Yang, 
changing as the four seasons, exhibited as intelligence. This concept 
of li as an externalization of Jen really is the self-realization of 
human nature. Confucius said_, "The superior man (the perfect man) ex-
pensively studies literature (wen) and restrains himself with the rules 
of propriety (li). Thus he will not violate the Way. 1141 Li as a 
process of ritualization refers in this particular context to the process 
of humanization, becoming the superior man, or becoming fully realized 
as an authentic human being. Wei-Ming Tu believes that Jen is "basically 
linked with the self-reviving, self-perfecting, and self-fulfilling 
process of an individual. 1142 In another article43 he also conceives Jen 
as a process of humanization in a dehumanized society. For man to 
attain his personal authenticity, he must undergo a process of self-
transformation. This self-transformation in the Confucian sense must 
be manifested in the context of human relations. The term "li" thus 
implies the existence of an "other." To dwell in li is not to remain 
isolated. In other words, li, as a body of ritual rules, functions as 
a restraining arbiter of moral actions. 
Of another virtue Confucius says: 
The superior man (Chlin Tzu) regards righteousness (l) as the 
substance of everything. He practices it according to the 
principles of propriety. He brings it forth in modesty. And 
he carries it to its conclusion with faithfulness. He is 
indeed a superior man.44 
Righteousness is a principle which belongs to man's nature. It is the 
fundamental principle of morality that confers qualities of right and 
wrong on human actions and what produces a situation which intrinsically 
satisfies us as moral agents. Righteousness is a principle which 
relates to the character of the superior man and therefore relates to 
every virtue which relates to the character of the superior man. This 
role of righteousness is indicated in the following: 
The superior man (Chtin Tzu) considers righteousness (i) as 
----the most important. When the superior man has courage but 
no righteousness, he becomes turbulent. When the inferior 
man has courage but no righteousness, he becomes a thief.45 
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Righteousness determines the total significance of one's life and activ-
ities. That is what makes justification according to a norm possible 
and constitutes the normativeness of an action so justified. Confucius 
never refers to a fixed or unchangeable law, but righteousness does 
represent a unity which penetrates into a variety of cases of action, 
because righteousness is a quality motivated by Jen and displayed in 
conduct. This unity of human conduct comes from within, rather than from 
without, as reported in the Analects: "A superior man in dealing with 
the world is not for anything or against anything. He follows righteous-
46 
ness as the standard." This means that with regard to material gains 
and all life activities the lack of righteousness (i) causes their 
meaninglessness and yet their value is not found in the activities and 
gains themselves. 
How ought we, as human beings, to act in a particular situation? 
What kinds of action are manifestations of righteousness? There is a 
conversation between Duke Ching of Chi and Confucius which gives some 
insight on this: 
Duke Ching of Chi asked Confucius about government. Confucius 
replied, 'Let the ruler be a ruler, the minister be a minister, 
the father be a father, and the son be a son.' The Duke said, 
'Excellent! Indeed when the ruler is not a ruler, the minister 
not a minister, the father not a father, and the son not a son1 
although I may have all the grain, shall I ever get to eat it?47 
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Proper action imposes a task of intellectual reorganization. Its object 
is to make the names stand for what they ought to stand for, and then 
to so reorganize the social and political relations and institutions as 
48 to make them what their names indicate they ought to be. 
Confucius believes in an intellectual reorganization of society by 
means of "names" and "judgments." Words are to express the "ideas" or 
"ideals" (what things ought to be). That is why the main focus of 
Confucian philosophical attention is on moral psychology--a doctrine of 
human nature--and not on the development of traditional codes of 
behavior. When Chi Kang Tzu, who exercised the real power in the state 
of Lu, asked Confucius about government, Confucius replied, 
If you (Chi Kang Tzu) desire what is good, the people will at 
once be good. The virtue of a ruler is like the wind. The 
virtue of people is like grass. When the wind passes over it, 
it cannot but bend.49 
This indicates explicitly and implicitly that life is a total sum of 
social and political relations; and these interwoven social and 
political relations are implied in and defined by the names of man which 
identify his proper works or functions. But Confucius also notes what 
will happen to the society when the principle of rectification fails: 
"To allow people to go to war without first instructing them is to 
50 betray them." The inevitable result of a state of intellectual dis-
organization is the breakdown of all rights and duties, the obliteration 
' 
of all relationships and obligations proper to the various strata or 
classes of society and the state. 
We may say that while Jen gives substance.to human virtues by way 
of extending oneself to others in terms of one 1·s concern and love for 
others, righteousness (!) gives meaning to human virtues by way of 
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defining oneself in understanding one's end and the relation of oneself 
to the totality of all men. Similarly, while li (rite) actually exhibits 
virtues of human behavior and formulates rules by which human virtues 
can be stabilized and harmonized, righteousness confers on li the sane-
tion of being relevant to the realization of Jen and an awareness of 
self-realization and self-justification. Thus, righteoµ,sness is the 
r 
principle which mediates the universal and the particular as well as the 
understanding of the universal and the understanding of the particular. 
Here is a question which should be considered. Is the moral 
principle (Jen) absolute and universally applicable or relative and con-
fined to a particular situation? The classic case of such a conflict 
is the following passage in the Analects: 
The Duke of She told Confucius, 'In my country there is an 
upright man named Kung. When his father stole a sheep, he 
bore witness against him.' Confucius said, 'The upright men 
in my community are different from this. The father conceals 
the misconduct of the son and the son conceals the misconduct 
of the father. Uprightness is to be found in this. ,51 
From Confucius' answer it can be known that although the moral principle 
is absolute and universally applicable, moral rules are relative and 
confined to particular situations. This distinction may help to 
clarify some of the issues we are facing now. Jen, for instance, would 
be a moral principle, whereas the manifestations of Jen would be moral 
rules (maxims). Moral maxims give definite, concrete instructions, 
while the moral principle points only to general directions. Principle 
is one, the manifestations are many. It is in this way that man has 
been able to combine a highly situational ethics with an ethics which 
upholds a universal moral principle (Jen). I~ answering his disciple's 
questions on the existence and functions of Jen, Confucius stresses the 
importance not only of internalizing the principle of Jen to make it a 
part of one's natural disposition, but also of putting it into daily 
practice. 
The cultivation of the person is to be done through the Way, 
and the cultivation of the Way is to be done through humanity. 
Humanity (Jen) is (the distinguishing characteristic of) man, 
and the greatest a~plication of it is in being affectionate 
toward relatives,5 
Confucius seems to be concerned about factors of time and change in 
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human history. In other words, no system, no matter how perfect it may 
be, can be simply put into different concrete situations. Moral 
behavior in Confucius does not consist of a short of Kantian "respect 
for the moral law," or in acting in accordance with moral law without 
benefit of any natural inclination. But the means-end dichotomy is also 
inadequate to express the basic principle of the application of Jen to 
concrete situations, because strictly speaking the attainment of the 
superior man should not be conceived as something external to the 
structure of man. Rather, it is a manifestation of that which consti-
tutes true humanity. It is a misunderstanding to argue that since the 
perfection of the superior man is inherent in the nature of man, its 
attainment requires nothing more than a process of inner transformation, 
independent of society at large. Why? Despite his ontological self-
sufficiency, for man to become a fully actualized human being he must 
constantly engage in the process of learning to be a sage (the highest 
form of authentic humanity). It should be remarked that the process of 
learning does not take the form of linear progression but that 0f gradual 
integration. Specifically man authenticates his being not by detaching 
himself from the world of human relations but by making sincere attempts 
to harmonize his relationship with others. This is the function 
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contained in the Confucian doctrine of the mean. 
How can the universal principle of Jen be applied to concrete 
situations? Through the doctrine of the mean. It underlies the 
immediacy of moral judgment. Confucius states: "Study it (the way to 
be sincere) extensively, inquire into it accurately, think it over care-
fully, sift it clearly, and practice it earnestly."S3 To apply the 
universal principle of Jen to concrete situations, we need the learning 
process which consists of the five steps which could have come from John 
S4 Dewey study, inquiry, thinking, sifting, and practice. 
The emphasis on experience known in the West is not totally alien 
to the Chinese mind.SS In the scheme of The Great LearningS 6 the student 
is asked first to study all things. The main idea in this book is summed 
up in the following passage: 
When things are investigated, knowledge is extended; when 
knowledge is extended, the will becomes sincere; when the will 
is sincere, the mind is rectified; when the mind is rectified, 
the personal life is cultivated; when the personal life is 
cultivated, the family will be regulated; when the family is 
regulated, the state will be in order; when the state is in 
order, there will be peace throughout the world.S7 
The most important part of this statement consists of the three opening 
clauses. "To investigate things" means to find out the reason for 
particular things. The saying that the extension of knowledge depends 
on the investigation of things means that in order to extend our 
knowledge we must study everything, including experience, and find out 
exhaustively its reason. For in every human soul there is knowledge 
(the intuitive knowledge of the mind), and in everything there is a 
reason. It is only because we have not sufficiently inquired into the 
reason of things that our knowledge is so imperfect. The following 
passage tells us how to investigate everything thoroughly, 
There is a way to be sincere with oneself: If one does not 
understand what is good, he will not be sincere with himself. 
Sincerity is the Way of Heaven. To think how to be sincere 
is the way of man .•.• He is naturally and easily in harmony 
with the Way. Such a man is a sage (the superior man). He 
who tries to be sincere is one who chooses the good and holds 
fast to it. 58 
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To investigate everything thoroughly we must apply the principle of ~ 
to concrete situations by exploring the situation through the intuitive 
knowledge of the mind. In other words, man's behavior, based on the 
doctrine of the mean, is connected to a knowledge of the reason con-
tained in everything and every situation. This knowledge thus is not 
only intellectual but practical, because it knows not only what is but 
also what is right. This is, strictly speaking, wisdom--one of the 
three cardinal virtues of the perfected sage in Confucius' philosophy. 
The three virtues--goodness, wisdom and courage were considered by 
Confucius to be most important for the perfection of personality. 
The way of the superior man is threefold but I have not been 
able to attain it. The man of wisdom has no perplexities; 
the man of humanity has no worry; the man of courage has no 
fear.59 
The doctrine of the mean includes two elements: rationality and 
intuition. Rationality is having a knowledge-seeking attitude based on 
experience, and intuition is the process of knowing by direct apprehen-
sion, not by logical inference or experimentation. Confucius emphasized 
"learning," while at the same time he stressed "inner reflection" for 
the behavior of the perfected sage. Once this preparatory knowledge was 
mastered, comprehensive understanding or sudden awakening could occur 
and a new truth could be unfolded. Through this combined process of 
the mean we can answer the given question: "ls the moral principle (Jen) 
absolute, and universally applicable or relative and confined to 
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particular situations?" The answer is "yes," to both parts. Jen is the 
moral universal principle, but it can be externally manifested as the 
maxim relative to particular situations. Confucius said, "The superior 
man is broadminded but not partisan; the inferior man is partisan but 
not broadminded. 1160 
Dewey's View 
In his "Theory of Valuation," Dewey begins an account of evaluative 
propositions by indicating that "good sense in practical affairs is 
generally identified with a sense of relative values. 1161 By "relative 
values" is meant that for an action to be judged as having value, the 
action must sustain to something else the relation of means and end (or 
consequences) in experience. It can thus be asserted that what Dewey 
deals with--preferences, moral judgments (good, bad), as well as the 
objects of such preferences--are products of human attitudes toward 
experience. In other words the problem of valuation is closely 
associated with two diverse accounts of the relation between the activ-
ities of individuals--habits, impulse, and deliberation--and the objec-
tive situation which constitutes the environment and the setting of 
these human activities. 
Valuation for Dewey is not simply located in a subject or an 
object; it is "in" a situation which cuts across the subject-object 
distinction. Value can be pervasive and exert a regulative influence 
on the development of a situation. Value is not internal and psychic; 
it is objective and factual. The problem for Dewey is not to find the 
good, but to construct it. The good is not, strictly speaking, the 
object of knowledge, but must be directly experienced or had. The 
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human being is not isolated from nature. "We live mentally and 
h . 11 1 . d b f . 1162 p ysica y on y in an ecause o our environment. This experience 
of contact with environment gives meaning and value to man's activities. 
Values (the good) are ultimately grounded in human attitudes toward 
nature. 
To explain how values are constructed, in Dewey's view, it is neces-
sary to introduce the distinction he makes between direct experience and 
knowledge--what he calls the difference between the enjoyed and the 
enjoyable,, the desired and the desirable, the satisfying ·and satisfac-
63 tory. He points out that to say something is enjoyed, desired, or 
satisfying is to "make a statement about a fact, something already in 
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existence." Such a statement is not different from one which says 
something is sweet or sour, white or red; as a statement of fact it is 
an assertion of matter existing in a situation. But to assert that a 
thing is enjoyable or desirable or satisfactory is, 
to define it in its connections and interactions. 
To declare something satisfactory is to assert that it meets 
specifiable conditions. It is, in effect,. a judgment that 
the thing 'will do'. It involves a prediction; it con-
templates a future in which the thing will continue to 
serve; it will do. It asserts a consequence the thing will 
actively institute; it will do. That it is satisfying is 
the content of a proposition .of fact, that it is satisfac-
tory is a judgment, an estimate, an appraisal. It denotes 
an attitude to be taken, that of striving to perpetuate and 
to make secure.65 
Direct experience, as he states in Experience~ Nature, 66 denotes 
what is experienced, the world of events and persons, and it denotes 
that world caught up into experiencing, the career of mankind. Direct 
experiences are also, 
mixed not mechanically but vitally like the wheat and tares of 
the parable. We may recognize them separately but we cannot 
divide them for unlike wheat and tares they grow from the same 
sort.67 
100 
There is a crucial point, indicated by Dewey, which is involved in 
direct experiences as the "uncertain, unsettled, disturbed" situation. 
While the precarious nature of existence (direct experience) 
is indeed the source of all trouble, it is also an indispen-
sable condition of ideality, becoming a sufficient condition 
when conjoined with the regular and assured.68 
This introduces the need to determine how the decision-making process 
operates in knowledge. How does one apply intelligence to human af-
fairs? The chapter on "Experience and Thinking" in Democracy and Educa-
tion sets forth the general features of a reflective experience as 
d . h . 1 d b h . 69 d P Th f H contraste wit tria an error e avior, an art ree o uman 
N d C d h 1 f . 11" . d 70 ature an on uct treats t e p ace o inte igence in con uct. Much 
of The Quest for Certainty is devoted to the role of intelligence in 
h ff i d h f . 1 k . 71 uman a a rs an t e pattern o experimenta nowing. 
In order to transform an indet.erminate situation into a determinate 
one, we should analyze direct experience through the five steps of 
thinking: (1) a felt difficulty; (2) its location and definition; (3) 
suggestion of a possible solution; (4) development by reasoning of the 
bearing of the suggestion; (5) further observation and experiment lead-
ing to its acceptance or rejection. 72 The process of observing and 
collecting facts from which hypotheses are formed, and subjecting these 
hypotheses to empirical verification constitutes what Dewey calls the 
process of inquiry. Inquiry thus produces the unified whole of expe-
riencer and experienced. The inquiry process has both a theoretical 
and a practical phase. The theoretical phase involves the settlement 
of an issue in a problematic sit9ation; the practical phase involves a 
means of control which is "instrumental." For Dewey, "to inquire" is 
to act in a certain way when confronted with a problematic situation. 
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Experience analyzed through inquiry results in man choosing to act in a 
specific way. The way selected is "a judgment, an estimate, an 
appraisal" which states "a rule for determination of an act to be per-
formed, its reference being to the future and not to something already 
accomplished or done. 1173 The judgment thus is not merely an outcome of 
inquiry, but it also serves to direct future actions. To make such a 
selection implies the evaluation of several alternative ways, and then 
saying "such and such a way is valuable;" the selected way of acting 
not only settles an issue, but also commits one to an organized activ-
ity moving in the direction of the future. 
Values are not predetermined by an Absolute mind but are either 
discovered in reality or created by man himself as he struggles to 
adapt himself to the world in·which he lives. Values and ideals are 
reformed in the course of inteliigent deliberation. In other words, 
intelligent deliberation is a mode of behavior; it is the specific ways 
in which a man interacts with environments, pursuing ends and choosing 
means to attain them. Dewey basically denies the objective reality 
of values, and value comes to be characterized as consisting of expe-
rience and the man's attitude to it through intelligent choice. This 
choice is just the practical, social living of life. 
In "Theory of Valuation~" Dewey distinguishes two uses of the term 
"value": value as prizing, and value as appraising; "prizing" in the 
sense of ho-lding dear or precious, and "appraising" in the sense of 
putting a value upon, assigning value as dear or precious. Prizing is 
a preference which is non-judgmental and constitutes an emotional 
response, but appraising is characterized by a judging process, an 
intellectual activity which involves the relation between a means and 
its consequence. 
There is present an intellectual factor--a factor of inquiry--
whenever there is valuation, for the end-in-view is formed and 
projected as that which, if acted upon, will supply the exist-
ing need or lack and resolve the existing conflict.74 
Judgments of appraisal occur through a relation between means and end 
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as empirically ascertained and tested. Values, therefore, are seen as 
tools or instruments by which man decides what to do. In other words, 
the determination of an act is based on the considered relation between 
the means and the end. The particular consequence anticipated is ex-
pected to ensure against undertaking a certain course of action. The 
end-in-view is the valuable action which is expected to unify the 
operative elements of the situation, but it is not itself the unifica-
tion. In other words, an end in Dewey's contention is never intrinsic 
or ultimate but always an end-in-view since it represents the solution 
to a specific problem; and the end-in-view is also never separated from 
the means of the series of predictable events which lead up to it. 
According to this viewpoint, Dewey seems to think that empirical methods 
can directly confirm all kinds of value judgments including ethical 
judgments. He says, 
Ends-in-view are appraised as good or bad on the ground of 
their serviceability in the direction of behavior dealing 
with states of affairs found to be objectionable because of 
some lack or conflict in them. They are appraised as fit or 
unfit, proper or improper, right or wrong on the ground of 
their requiredness in accompanying this end.75 
Goals and ends remote from present activities do not absorb and concen-
trate in themselves the meaning of present activities because present 
activities should be subordinated to future ends and enjoyments. Dewey, 
thus, emphasizes the significance of activity in a problematic situation 
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rather than an objective situation. Values are not simply located in a 
subject or an object, but they are within a peculiar relation between an 
object and a human attitude to it in order to solve a problematic situa-
tion. 
An activity is morally valuable depending upon its consequences, 
and evaluation of consequences as good or valuable depends upon the 
attitudes which are able to satisfy a human being in such a situation. 
Values for Dewey are reflected in man's choices which are determined 
by his attitudes or desires. A good is a satisfaction of desire in a 
particular situation. Satisfaction becomes a good only as the result 
of consequences of the satisfaction being good and as those consequences 
promote other desires and interests, and as a result of its incorpora-
tion into an organized activity. The good is always a process, not a 
fixed state, for adaptation of personal capacities with environing 
forces. He says, 
The good character, considered in relation to the moral strug-
gle, is the one which chooses the right end, which endeavors 
to be better. The good character in itself is that made by 
this choice. . . . A wholly good man would feel such satisfac-
tion in the contemplation of the ideal good that contrary 
desires would not affect him. He would take pleasure only in 
the right. Every accomplished moral deed tends to bring this 
about. Moral realization brings satisfaction.76 
What is the good for Dewey? The good is seen as tools or instruments 
for making judgments of satisfaction and, therefore, it has value only 
in a particular, concrete situation. This is because the good consists 
in the activity of choosing what to do in a problematic situation. 
The good life for Dewey is "not getting or having, but doing and thus 
being. 1177 This means that there is no absolute in ethics any more than 
there is in growth; there is no good in itself apart from judgment of 
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the thing in question in relation to a particular problematic. 
What is meant by "doing and being?" Two types of virtuous (good) 
78 
action have been recognized by Dewey (1) the special virtues; and 
(2) the cardinal virtues. Special virtues arise from special capacities 
or special opportunities, that is, "some special fitness or power of an 
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agent" --for instance, the "virtue" of a painter, of a scientific 
investigator, of a statesman, etc. These are basically occupational 
skills. But what are the virtues for a whole human being? These are 
the cardinal virtues (e.g., conscientiousness, truthfulness). They do 
not have to do with an act belonging to some particular capacity. The 
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cardinal virtues have to do "with the spirit of the whole self" as 
manifested in an ideal human being as well as in ideal human relations. 
How can good be described? The good is the excellent81 activity of a 
man to become the whole man, and this is "the practical end of moral-
• t 1182 l. y. 
How can we as human beings act in particular situations? How is it 
possible to recognize the right means? 
Intelligence becomes ours in the degree in which we use it, and 
accept responsibility for consequences. It is not ours 
originally or by production. . . . The stuff of belief and 
proposition is not originated by us. It comes to us from 
others, by education, tradition and the suggestion of the en-
vironment. Our intelligence is bound up, so far as its mate-
rials are concerned, with the community life of which we are a 
part. We know what it communicates to us, and know according 
to the habits it forms in us.83 
As can be seen here, how to act in a particular situation is related to 
the problem of how to effect the interactions of the individual and his 
environment in order for him to discover good principles of conduct. 
Principles can be interpreted as general ideas arising out of experience 
as guides for experience--a view that would accord with both Aristotle 
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and Confucius. A rule, on the other hand, is like a recipe, a set of 
specific steps to follow to attain a fixed end. But for Dewey there are 
no fixed general ends, either psychological (as there are in Aristotle's 
case), sociological, or religious; no authority with a decreed moral 
principle (as there is in Confucius' case); and no eternally specified 
way of acting (virtues or vices). He insists that goals (ends), rules 
(the ways of action, laws) and judgments (how to act in particular 
situations) 84 must be balanced and related to each other in any account 
of ethics (any study of the interactions of the individual and his 
environment) and that the account must be given in terms of actual 
(moral) experience and not in terms of a divine plan. All judgments 
(the ways of action) involving valuation demand a concrete, specific 
context or an active, practical situation. Under these circumstances, 
Dewey states the problem of how our actions should be determined as 
follows: 
Our thoughts of our own actions are saturated with the ideas 
that others entertain about them, ideas which have been ex-
pressed not in explicit instruction but still more effec-
tively in reaction to our acts.85 
It has been observed that Dewey denies that there is a Good or an 
ideal as a principle, and also that the specific way of action is the 
means of producing value in particular situations. Nevertheless, our 
actions should be determined in an effective way in order to develop 
our way of living (virtue). How can virtue be developed effectively 
and significantly? Through the function of practical judgment. 86 How 
to judge what the direction of action should be in a problematic 
situation involves the process of practical judgment. Practical judg-
ments are of the form: ''M. N. should do thus and so; it is better, 
wiser. 87 •. to act thus and so." 
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Dewey's concern is thus with 
"e-valuating-activity" rather than just the. nature of value. Practical 
judgments deal primarily with fixing the course of action demanded to 
carry an incomplete situation to its fulfillment. Dewey says, 
I do not mean by practical judgment a type of judgment having 
a different organ and source from other judgments. I mean 
simply a kind of judgment having a specific type of subject-
matter. Propositions exist relating to agenda--to things to88 
do or to be done, judgments of a situation demanding action. 
Th h . . f . 1 . d 89 e c aracter1st1cs o pract1ca JU gment are: (1) its subject-matter 
implies an incomplete situation; (2) its subject-matter is itself a 
factor in the completion of the situation, carrying it forward to its 
conclusion; (3) that the judgment is practical implies that it makes a 
difference how the given is terminated; (4) a practical proposition is 
binary--a judgment that the given is to be treated in a specified way; 
it is a judgment of end and of means; and (5) the judgment of what is 
to be done implies a state of what the given facts of the situation 
are. All judgments, whatever they are, are indeed practical as long 
as they relate to what is to be completed or organized in the context 
of an incomplete or uncertain situation. Practical judgment is 
relative to a problematic situation which is the impetus for initiating 
the inquiry process. Consequently a judgment already having the value 
of good or bad for a specific subject-matter cannot be practical. 
Practical judgment informs us about a certain circumstance of the 
present situation (that it lacks something it should have), but also 
predicts the adequate (good) possible ways to get a solution to the 
particular situation. According to Geiger's comments on practical 
judgment, the practical judgment for Dewey, 
is one applying to specific, incomplete, problematic, objec-
tive situations; situations in which, as with the self-
fulfilling prophecy, the proposition plays a part, even if 
a minor one, in the completion of the situation. Thus, a 
practical proposition is one dealing hypothetically with a 
predictive future.90 
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How can practical judgment be decisive for the future direction of 
actions? Through intelligent choice. Here is the role of intelligence 
in Dewey's philosophy, especially in the art of living. Intelligent 
choice controls the means to reach the next step (end-in-view) through 
using knowledge of previous means-ends relations. The practical 
judgment determines means and ends at the same time through the function 
of intelligence. He explains the relation between means and ends, but 
does not say what way should be chosen for the activity because he denies 
any worthwhile substantive directions can be given for this choice. 
Dewey does not have a list of particular virtues as Confucius and 
Aristotle do, even though he distinguishes between the special virtues 
and the cardinal virtues. For Dewey a list like Confucius' or 
Aristotle's would inevitably be made up of those modes of behavior 
approved at a particular time and place. Instead of such a list of 
virtues Dewey gives the criteria of how to make practical judgments in 
particular situations. 
Sufficient unto the day is the evil thereof. Sufficient it 
is to stimulate us to remedial action, to endeavor in order 
to convert strife into harmony, monotony into a variegated 
scene, and limitation into expansion. The converting is 
progress, the only progress conceivable or attainable by 
man. Hence every situation has its own measure and quality 
of progress, and the need for progress is recurrent, con-
stant. 91 
The standard for practical judgment is harmony throughout intellectual 
choice. This is the good life; it is virtuous behavior for Dewey. 
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Conclusion 
There is no question that man can be shaped by environmental 
variables. Man is governed by them. Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey 
seem to agree on this point. Man is intended to live in relation with 
others as a social animal. Man can fulfill himself only within the life 
of the society. Man, according to Dewey, takes his origin from nature, 
is a part of nature, finds his fulfillment in nature and ends in nature. 
But, as indicated in Section 2 of Chapter II, what man does as a social 
being in the contemporary technological society is even more pervasively 
controlled by the community. The man who is shaped absolutely by his 
environment is a person with "other-directedness." This means that man 
experiences himself as other, does not even know why he acts, what to 
do, or where to go. Such a man has been defined as a man who has few 
independent convictions about himself. 
In order to solve such a man's situation, two questions have been 
raised: "what is the way of living in a society?" and "what is society's 
relation to human nature?" In the present chapter the notion of virtue 
in Aristotle's, Confucius' and Dewey's views has been described. Virtue, 
generally speaking, is the external manifestation of human nature. This 
means that in order for man to be virtuous human nature has to be con-
cretely actualized as an action, the so called way of living (virtue). 
It has been observed in Chapter III that a human being is a being 
of moral worth--a being of inherent dignity and incomparable value. 
This inherent property in man is identified with the essential, intel-
ligible nature of man for Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey. The activ-
ities of human nature are the life-style in a society. In other words, 
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similar to Socrates' view in the famous dictum, "Knowledge is virtue, 
and virtue is knowledge,'' this teaching can be summed up as "to know 
what human nature is is to do it." Human nature should be not only 
used for the direction of human life, for the control of the inner man, 
but also identified with the life-style. Man can form virtue for him-
self. 
(1) Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey all contend that man by his 
nature is a rational social being; and therefore he is not an isolated 
self but a member of his community. But within the community he must 
always perform his proper works or function. This· means that man must 
have an intelligently planned life. Reason has to be awarded a guiding 
place in the conduct of life. Through this man is able to know what he 
is doing and why, through his function of intelligence, he is moving 
toward a definite future goal. This is the way to make a person morally 
valuable. This is the way to avoid the situation of the dehumanized 
man. If man lives up to or does his proper works or functions in con-
formity with virtue, he surely will avoid alienation. 
(2) Confucius also seems to agree with Aristotle and Dewey that 
the performance of activities, or activity in conformity with virtue, 
is uniquely the good of man. Further while Confucius and Aristotle 
agree with one another that the doing as such is itself self-sufficiently 
pleasant, Dewey's view is that "doing" is always related to the next 
step (practical) for the solution of a problematic situation. However 
since virtuous activity is pleasant (either self-sufficiently pleasant 
for Confucius and Aristotle or instrumentally pleasant for Dewey), it 
is therefore the most delightful happiness of man for which he can pos-
sibly wish in his life~time. 
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(3) The next point is about how the concept of virtue has been 
defined by these three philosophers. They agree with each other that 
virtue is the excellent activity with the best and most complete func-
tion. In their views excellent activity means to cultivate man's own 
peculiar mind or reason, even though Dewey expresses differently the 
activity in man as a vocational technique for practical outcomes in 
society, that is, as a tool for the purpose of explaining and ultimately 
understanding why people do what they do. Nevertheless all three 
philosophers have a common aspect in regard to virtue, namely the 
virtuous life has to be lived through intellectual activity or choice. 
(4) The fourth point is how the good life of man is understood by 
these three philosophers. For Aristotle and Dewey the performance of 
activities, i.e., the virtuous life of man, is done through intellectual 
choice. For Aristotle the choice is made in the practical activity of 
the agent on the ground of intellectual virtue, i.e., wisdom and intui-
tion; Dewey's concern is with the process by which valuation occurs and 
on the nature of value only as a function. This process is one of intel-
ligent deliberation based on practical judgment. Confucius, however, 
says that the virtuous life of man is to follow Jen by confirming his 
conduct to the Way of Heaven (Jen). For Confucius and Aristotle the 
priori and universal principle for the virtuous life exists as reason 
in human nature, but Dewey sets up a situational value capable of stating 
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relations between things as means and other things as consequences, 
and denies that there is a Good or an ideal. Nevertheless all three 
philosophers assert that happiness is to be found in a life of virtuous 
activities. Only a 'man who fully realizes all hi$ human capacities can 
truly be called happy. Every man is striving for happiness, but not 
everyone can hope to obtain it. Happiness belongs to the man whose 
life is active and rational. 
Throughout this chapter there has been a strong emphasis on the 
unity of human nature and practice. No gap or inconsistency between 
human nature and practice should be allowed if there is to be a 
harmonious unity. 
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Here is a problem for our consideration: How can harmonious unity 
be established? How can reason in human nature be applied to concrete 
circumstances? This is the question of how to connect a principle 
with moral rules. Principle means something universally applicable to 
all mankind. Moral principle is the basis of the standard and rule of 
conduct which determines all concrete human behaviors. A rule has to 
be based on circumstances. It can be changed according to a particular 
person, situation or culture. It need not be absolute. Rules contain 
in themselves always the possibility to be changed. As observed above, 
principle is admitted in Aristotle and Confucius; the highest virtue 
(happiness) in Aristotle; Jen in Confucius. While Dewey does not accept 
a fixed principle or an eternally determined way of action, he does 
emphasize the growth of moral value in a problematic situation in a way 
that implies a kind of absolute or universal principle. Because man is 
shaped by circumstances, he can be changed and probably act at each 
situation. But he needs to discover the rationale for and justification 
of his whole behavior, no matter how or when he is acting. Thus it is 
important to think of one universal moral principle which lies at the 
foundation of all the varying moral rules of different societies. There 
is no question that what is right in one society may be wrong in another, 
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because each society provides different criteria (local rules) to judge 
moral situations. This does not, however, mean that a person has a 
different human nature applicable to each different society. The same 
mind internally is expressed differently, depending on particular 
situations. 
How can this combination between principle and rules in a person 
be achieved? Through "learning and practicing" in the situation. The 
person with this reconciliation can be called a wise man, a morally 
harmonious person, and a morally autonomous person. Thus human nature 
and human virtue can be united through "learning by doing" or 
"practice." 
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CHAPTER V 
EDUCATION 
To find a solution for the dehumanized situation of human beings in 
a modern technological society, two subjects--"what human nature is" and 
"what human nature does (works)"--have been investigated in Chapters III 
and IV according to Aristotle's, Confucius', and Dewey's views. But it 
is not enough simply to know "what it is" or "what it does." The most 
important task is to discover how these elements can be unified and 
developed into one whole, because the unification is the process of be-
coming a person. This process produces a true being, who should be an 
end in itself, but should not be a tool for others. 
How can this unification between human nature and its manifestation 
(virtue) be effectively accomplished? In other words, what is the 
solution to overcome the alienated situation involved in a technological 
culture? Through education, which will determine the shape of our liv-
ing and the direction of future life. Education here is not simply the 
function of cultural transmission, but it is also a process of making 
man become a person. If a man undergoes education, he would be educated 
for becoming a person, regardless of whether h~ is conscious of it or 
not. To overcome the dehumanized situation described in Chapter II, 
everybody should be educated as a person with independent convictions 
about himself. Here is the role of education and its significant mean-
ing. While human nature and virtue are being unified through education, 
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a man not only overcomes the phenomenon of dehumanization, but also he 
positively becomes a true being with happiness, the wise person. 
If the life of harmony with reason is necessary for a man to over-
come dehumanization, what is it that effectively makes the harmonious 
life? What kind of educating does a man need? What is the aim of such 
education? Answers to these questions will be sought through this 
chapter by comparing the educational views of these three philosophers: 
Aristotle, Confucius, and Dewey. Through such a discussion educational 
solutions to problems of technological culture will be suggested. 
According to Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey, the good life for man 
can be derived from and based on the essential characteristics of human 
nature. The good life for man is the aim of all human activities. And 
also this life is identified with "being happy." Being happy means to 
seek not simply living, but living-well, doing-well. This is because 
any account of happiness depends upon an account of the nature of 
virtue, "perfection of any sort." Perfection of any sort, or "excel-
lence," is called good. These three philosophers maintain that the 
good is related to the activity of human nature. If man lives up to or 
does his proper work on the basis of human nature, such an activity is 
"living well," or "doing well. 11 Thus, "living well" is the active dis-
play of human nature as it is cultivated ot actualized. A man who is 
living well is called "a person with happiness" because he is actualiz-
ing and fulfilling his essential human nature. This person is also in a 
situation of overcoming alienation, and of knowing "who he is going to 
be" or "where he is going." Such a person is a wise man, a superior man 
as a moral ideal. 
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How can human nature be fully actualized? How can human nature be 
exemplified through its activities (virtues)? By means of education. 
Education for these three philosophers is the key for the whole living 
enterprise whereby one becomes a wise man who has overcome the alienated 
situation through perfect virtue. Thus the aim of education is to move 
man in the direction of happiness, in the direction of obtaining all 
the good human nature craves and must actualize in order that its es-
sential nature might be fulfilled. 
How can human nature be put into practice? To answer this a more 
detailed explanation of views about the morally ideal person (the wise 
person for Aristotle, Chlin-Tzu for Confucius, and a realized man for 
Dewey) will be necessary; and along with this the respective philosophies 
of education will be outlined in this chapter. 
Aristotle's View 
For Aristotle man is partly an emotional and sensitive, and partly 
a rational being; all deliberate human activities aim at the good, and 
the good of man is the active exercise of his soul's faculties in con-
formity with excellence or virtue. Aristotle uses the phrase "well 
being" to identify the chief Good (Happiness), which is never considered 
as a means to some more final end. Happiness is not only the ultimate 
standard for all our moral judgments on the good for man, but also the 
ultimate aim of education. The aim of education is "to realize the 
good;" its central concern is '1to make man virtuous"1 in order that he 
may become a wise person. According to Aristotle, happiness is 
essential to morality from the outset. Man reaches the ultimate end 
of his activities through "habit or instruction." Aristotle also 
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stresses "learning by doing" or "instruction (formal discipline)." 
Habit means not only the repeated performance of just and temperate 
actions which produce virtue, but it also includes some conscious reflec-
tion on the activities, awareness of what one is doing. Instruction 
teaches the rules for right action or the reason why things are as they 
are. Aristotle describes the importance of education as follows: 
Returning to the constitution itself, let us seek to determine 
out of what and what sort of elements the state which is to be 
happy and well-governed should be composed •••• 
We maintain .•. that happiness is the realization and per-
fect exercising of virtue, and this not conditional, but 
absolute. . • • There are three things which make men good and 
virtuous; these are nature, habit, rational principle •.•• 
Man has rational principle, in addition, and man only. Where-
fore nature, habit, rational principle must be in harmony with 
one another; for they do not always agree; men do many things 
against habit and nature, if rational principle persuades them 
that they ought. We have already determined what natures are 
likely to be most easily moulded by the hands of the legisla-
tor. All else is the work of education; we learn some things 
by habit and some by instruction.2 
In this passage he defines the end of education, the nature of the thing 
to be educated, and the process of education. 
What is the ultimate aim of education? Happiness (the highest ' 
Good). Happiness means perfectability of human nature, and is an activ-
ity, not merely a capacity or a disposition. He says that the human 
good 
turns out to be activity of soul in accordance with virtue, 
and if there are more than one virtue, in accordance with 
the best and most complete. 
But we must add 'in a complete life. ,3 
Happiness is identified with the activities of "living well" of "doing 
well." Man has a soul as man; and man needs to exercise well and 
excellently the distinctive function of his soul, that is, his intellect 
or reason. The good of man is the active exercise of his soul's 
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faculties in conformity with excellence or virtue. But not all excellent 
activity of the soul is the highest good. The highest good for which we 
are seeking is desired as being what it is and not because of anything 
produced by it. 4 Happiness is something different from the activity 
which is required to produce it. Since happiness is an activity of man, 
it should be the best kind of activity, and this is the activity of the 
best part of man, i.e., of the part which thinks. The life of contempla-
tion will be this activity, for it is most continuous and most self-
sufficient as well as the necessary condition for happiness. Such activ-
· · 1 d. · 5 1ty is a so most 1v1ne. 
Happiness for Aristotle consists in two forms of rational activity: 
in the free exercise of reason in theoretical study and in the discipline 
of the emotions according to a rule or purpose formulated by reason. 
Accordingly, Aristotle distinguishes two forms of reason: theoretical 
wisdom (sophia, the scientific faculty) and practical wisdom (phronesis, 
the calculative faculty). The former is necessary to human happiness as 
a component, the latter as a productive agent. Sophia is concerned only 
with permanent truths which man is powerless to change. Phronesis is 
concerned with how to apply moral principles intuitively to given situa-
tions. Theoretical wisdom is to exercise its essential, "philosophiz-
ing," scientific, contemplative activity of grasping the truth. Through 
this faculty of reason man contemplates what is necessary and admits no 
contingency. On the other hand, when reason is calculating how to attain 
what will make a man happy, it displays itself as practical wisdom, 
which is the basis and guide of distinctively moral action. This 
calculative faculty of reason is concerned with what is contingent. 
Sophia is intrinsically valuable, but phronesis is a disposition the 
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active manifestations of which constitute happiness. Strictly speaking, 
the highest and most desirable form of happiness lies in the activity 
of contemplation (sophia). 6 
If a man wants to achieve his function, in order to be morally 
virtuous, then a necessary but not sufficient condition for moral 
virtues is acting for the sake of reasons or on reasons. Because the 
impetus to action is desire, however, Aristotle said that moral virtues 
belong to the sensitive soul. Nevertheless, one is virtuous only when 
one's desires are controlled by reason, because reason judges the worth 
of objects and discovers the means of obtaining them. How is theoretical 
wisdom useful? Although practical wisdom is not an efficient cause of 
happiness, what is it that makes practical wisdom more effective? The 
answer to both questions comes from the relation between sophia and 
phronesis. The relation is to be attained not merely by philosophical 
speculation, but by "an energy of the soul according to reason," by 
well-considered habits of choosing the golden mean between two 
extremes--excess and defect. The virtuous man must not only have good 
intellectual habits of various sorts, but also sound habits of action 
involving habitual desires of genuinely good ends as well as good emo-
tional dispositions. Here is the nature of the thing to be educated. 
In other words, the relationship between theoretical wisdom and 
practical wisdom (moral virtue) can be improved and developed by the 
process of education: habit and instruction. According to Aristotle, 7 
happiness, the best activity of human nature, is not endowed by nature, 
nor bestowed by divine providence, not yet attained by mere learning, 
and it is not a matter of luck. Moral virtue is a product of habitua-
tion or practice. It requires learning and also habit and discipline. 
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Habit means the repeated rational activities which understand the 
rules that make practice right and then which perform the right mean 
between extremes--excess and defect. Habit can be got only by perform-
ance, i.e., doing of what is good or just, and so on, as being good, 
just and so on. A man who habitually acts in a certain way knows the 
rules that determine the way he ought to act and the reason why he 
should follow these rules. In Aristotle's view habit includes some 
conscious reflection on what one is doing, and why. Instruction, the 
formal discipline, means to teach the rules for right action or the 
reason why things are as they are. When a man is trained to act rightly 
through habit, he is not likely to change his ways; moral behavior 
becomes second human nature as a personality. Aristotle says, "I say 
that habit's but long practice, friend, And this becomes man's nature 
in the end. 118 All teaching by way of reasoning proceeds from pre-
existing knowledge of happiness. 9 The knowledge of happiness should be 
exercised through the educational programs--reading, writing, gymnastics, 
music and drawing. Education is the activity of experiencing what is 
meant by happiness. Habit and instruction are the methods which can 
develop this activity of human nature. The more we partake of this 
method, the closer we come to the divine. These activities of education 
cannot be limited to a short period, but must continue through the whole 
life process. Aristotle says, 
Virtue, then, being of two kinds, intellectual and moral, 
intellectual virtue in the main owes both its birth and its 
growth to teaching (for which reason it requires experience 
and time), while moral virtue comes about as a result of 
habit, whence also its name ethike is one that is formed by 
a slight variation from the word ethos (habit). From this 
it is also plain that none of the moral virtues arises in us 
by nature; for nothing that exists by nature can form a 
habit contrary to its nature.10 
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Deliberate reflection on an act, according to Aristotle's view, can be 
characterized as a habit. It is a habit of intelligence which enables 
man to know the cause of his action. Habit involves being aware of the 
situation, seeing the future consequences and choosing one of several 
possible actions through practical judgment which requires an intel-
lectual deliberation. Since happiness is to be found in the best activ-
ities of human nature, these activities should be considered. In order 
f h b 'd d h . 1 . d11 or t em to e consi ere , t ree main e ements are require (1) 
what is meant by happiness as an activity and its connexion with good-
ness; (2) intellectual development; and (3) character-training. Since 
happiness belongs to man who has cultivated his human nature to the 
utmost, he knows what happiness really is through the active rationality 
and tries to have the best life (moral virtue) which can be expressed 
in practical wisdom. 
Aristotle states the relation of reason and moral virtue as follows: 
The origin of action--its efficient, not its final cause--is 
choice, and that of choice is desire and reasoning with a view 
to an end. This is why choice cannot exist either without 
reason and intellect or without a moral state; for good action 
and its opposite cannot exist without a combination of intel-
lect and character.12 
This implies that a man does not act rightly (does not have a moral 
sense) by nature, although he has a natural capacity for right behavior. 
Man must move from what he is capable of doing to what he actually does 
by knowing what he must do, deliberating about it, and then choosing in 
fact to do it. 
Aristotle sees that there must be deliberate choice13 in action. 
"The object of choice being one of the things in our power which is 
desired after deliberation, choice will be deliberate desire of things 
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14 in our own power." The proper human act is the act performed through 
choice preceded by deliberation. Deliberation is the search which con-
cerns not the end of the act, but the various possible means of attain-
ing this end. Choice preceded by deliberation can operate and answer 
only where there is indeterminateness and contingency. 15 Deliberation 
about this contingent situation, thus, is concerned with selecting the 
best means (moral virtue) to the good life (the final end); so delibera-
tion is a function of the productive intellect which can command and 
sometimes control the irrational soul, the feelings and desires. There 
cannot be any choice producing moral virtues apart from reason (the 
deliberating faculty). This is a significant role for the productive 
intellect (practical wisdom). 
Practical wisdom must not only calculate the means but recognize the 
end; so Aristotle remarks: "It is not possible to be good in the strict 
sense without practical wisdom, nor practically wise without moral 
virtue. 1116 Practical wisdom is intimately connected with moral virtue. 
Practical wisdom is a power which tells the agent how to act in an 
indeterminate situation. This means that this wisdom is not simply a 
faculty of rationality, but includes the power to control the agent in 
deciding which is the right means to happiness in a general situation. 
This wisdom is instrumental for happiness, as medicine is instrumental 
to health. Aristotle states it: 
It is thought to be the mark of a man of practical wisdom to 
be able to deliberate well about what is good and expedient 
for himself, not in some particular respect, ••• but about 
what sorts of thing conduce to the good life in genera1.17 
The means to the end should be evaluated as right or wrong relative to 
the end. Practical wisdom is concerned about the moral mean, not the 
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fact-description--what occurs in the situation--but the moral judgment 
' h . 18 h . . . b d d d h d h wit action --w at activities are to e pro uce an w y an ow. In 
other words, the origin of moral action is choice, by which we know to 
be good. 
Here is a question: How can practical wisdom choose rightly? 
Aristotle says nothing about the concrete criteria to select the 
sequences to happiness, so how can we choose the right means to the 
end? The moral virtues (the wise man's behavior) are something "possess-
ing truth about the first principle" or "following the principle." 
Aristotle points out: 
Therefore wisdom must plainly be the most finished of the 
forms of knowledge. It follows that the wise man must not 
only know what follows from the first principles, but must 
also possess truth about the first principles.19 
How can practical wisdom possess truth? Through intuitive reasoning. 
This wisdom presupposes intuitive reasoning which grasps the first prin-
ciple. Aristotle continues: "Therefore wisdom must be intuitive reason 
combined with scientific knowledge--scientific knowledge of the highest 
objects which has received as it were its proper completion. 1120 He says 
again in Posterior Analytics, 
If, therefore, it is the only other kind of true thinking ex-
cept scientific knowing, intuition will be the originative 
source of scientific knowledge (truth). And the ori~inative 
source of science grasps the original basic premiss. 1 
That is to say,·the relation between moral virtues and practical wisdom 
has to be sought not simply in the extension of the notion of means to 
reason, but in the fact that reason is the ultimate judge for the right 
mean constituting moral virtue. Therefore, philosophical wisdom 
(sophia) makes us choose the perfect happiness to aim at. The end for 
man is a life of contemplation establishing perfect happiness, the 
theoretical life. 
If happiness is activity in accordance with virtue, it is 
reasonable that it should be in accordance with the highest 
virtue, • . . The activity of this in accordance with its 
proper virtue will be perfect happiness. That this activ-
ity is contemplative we have already said.22 
The life of philosophic contemplation can confer supreme happiness 23 
(the chief Good) on a man. 
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By combining moral virtue and human intelligibility, Aristotle shows 
that man is a rational animal seeking the completion of his rationality 
both in thinking and practice. But Aristotle's basic concern, according 
to John H. Randall, Jr., is, "Always how to make this man here healthy. 
Just so, Ethics does not seek the Good in itself ... but how this man 
h 11 . h. . . 1124 ere can act we in t is situation. What is necessary in order for 
man to be good? Moral virtue. What is the formal standard for every 
moral virtue? Unfortunately Aristotle says nothing more than " ... lying 
in a mean, i.e. the mean relative to us, this being determined by a 
rational principle .. II But this is exactly why it is important for 
us to deal with human intelligibility as related to moral virtue. Happi-
ness for the best life is based on the complete operation of human moral 
virtue through practical wisdom. How can moral virtues be obtained 
through practical wisdom? 25 Not as a result of "subjective preference," 
or as being a hidden force in nature pushing nature toward the moral goal 
by necessity, 26 but by habit and instruction. 
Through habit and instruction, the activity of human nature can be 
perfected. In other words, education for Aristotle is intended to pro-
duce the good man. The good man is the educated man. What kind of 
education? "Moral-intellectual" education. Education which cultivates 
man's moral virtues as related to practical wisdom. It teaches not only 
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how to act at the present time, but also how to take new directions in 
life. Through this education, a man can discover how to decide what to 
do in a particular problematic situation, and also the educated man is 
able to close the gap between knowing what is right (moral knowledge) 
and doing it (moral action). The man who accomplishes this can be 
called a morally autonomous person. He knows "what he is going to be" 
and "where he is going." That is why he is no longer an alienated 
person. 
Happiness extends, then, just so far as contemplation does, 
and those to whom contemplation more fully belongs are more 
truly happy not as a mere concomitant but in virtue of the 
contemplation; for this is in itself precious. Happiness, 
therefore, must be some form of contemplation.27 
Confucius' View 
Confucius stresses the importance not only of internalizing the 
principles of Jen to make them a part of man's natural disposition, but 
also of putting them into daily practice. For Confucius Jen is not a 
lofty metaphysical abstraction beyond the comprehension of the ordinary 
person. On the contrary he insists that Jen is close at hand for every-
one to grasp. Confucius affirms a this-worldly life. Everyone needs to 
grasp the essence of Jen in order to become a man of Jen (this is the 
doctrine of the perfectability of human nature). But not all people 
will be men of Jen. How can the perfection of human nature be achieved? 
Through education. Education for Confucius is the process of cultivating 
human nature in order to produce Chlin-Tzu. This "ideal man" can be 
actualized through the development of a good character and its practice. 
Confucius says: 
Some are born with the knowledge of those duties [five duties 
of universal obligation]; some know them by study; and some 
acquire the knowledge after painful feeling of their ignor-
ance. But the knowledge being possessed, it comes to the 
same thing. Some practice them with a natural ease; some from 
a desire for their advantages; and some by strenuous effort. 
But the achievement being made, it comes to the same thing 
[the man of Jen] •28 
For Confucius the word "education" is not only used in the sense of 
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merely training a man intellectually, but it also means to develop and 
discipline man morally by practice. Confucius points out the importance 
of practice in education. 
The master said, 'To live in obscurity, and yet practice 
wonder, in order to be mentioned with honour in future ages--
this is what I do not do. 1 29 
The good man tries to proceed according to the right path, 
but when he has gone halfway, he abandons it--1 am not able 
so to stop.30 
When Confucius was asked about "humanity (Jen)," he said: "Jen is 
to love men and knowledge is to know man. 1131 For Confucius the proper 
function of man is Jen, which is innately good and capable of realizing 
its function in the universe. Confucian philosophy deals with the con-
crete and contingent human world, and considers history (innnediate 
experience) as the unfolding, as well as the deposit, of essence, that 
is, the intelligibility of human nature. That is why the way of Jen is 
found in the encounter of the common people living their lives in 
association with one another. He insists on this association. All any 
one can hope to achieve in his lifetime is to practice (follow) Jen: 
Jen is "the guiding principle for conduct through life. 1132 As indicated 
33 in the Chinese character '!.f::.(Jen)," man is involved in mankind and 
lives his everyday life in relation to others, i.e., in the family, in 
the community and in the nation. Man lives in an atmosphere of humanity. 
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Man in isolation is not only a fiction but also an infraction of being 
human. Reciprocity constitutes the humanness of man. Only through 
sociality does a man become a man. Thus, for Confucius, Jen is 
primarily an existential index of human reality. It is the "sacrament 
of coexistence, 1134 while man's ultimate concern is coexistence. As the 
way of everyday life and sociality in one, 35 Jen entails morality. To 
be a man of Jen (the superior man), one has to practice it. It is 
accessible not just to the privileged few, but, on the contrary, the 
privileged few are determined by the practice of Jen. 
There are generally two fundamental senses in which we may define 
the concrete use of reason (the essence of Jen) in Confucius' philosophy. 
In the first sense man has to open his eyes to reality and observe 
activities (doing) and patterns of things. Confucius states: 
Things have their root and their completion. Affairs have 
their end and their beginning. To know what is first and 
what is last will lead near to what is taught in The Great 
Learning.36 ~-
The first sense of reason is on the basis of empirical observation and 
experience at large. In the second sense Confucius' philosophy is 
generally oriented toward action and practice in society and government 
and aims at the reform and perfection of man and the world. This means 
that theoretical understanding (knowledge) must entail practical doing 
(practicability), and in practical doing of any kind one will acquire 
knowledge and wisdom of oneself and the world, and thus perfection 
through a process of self-cultivation37 and of concrete realization of 
knowledge in practice. Confucius points out the importance of self-
cultivation as follows, "From the emperor down to the mass of the 
people, all must consider the cultivation of the person the root of 
every thing besides. 1138 This process of self-cultivation is not simply 
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an intellectual activity of reason, but a manifestation of reasonable-
ness in life and in the attainment of an ideal of perfection. What is 
the ideal of perfection?39 The ideal of perfection in human nature is 
to be a man of Jen (Chiln-Tzu). This is the end of education for 
Confucius. And also a man of Jen becomes a person who has already over-
come dehumanization. 
What are the characteristics of the man of Jen? (1) One has to do 
his duty to others, but not require others to do their duties to him. 
Confucius says, "The superior man brings the good things of others to 
completion and does not bring the bad things of others to completion. 
The inferior man does just the opposite. 1140 The man of Jen sets himself 
free from all the instinctive and irrational desires in human life. 41 
(2) The man of Jen ought to cultivate his virtues and abilities without 
asking praise from others. Man, motivated by the universal principle 
of reas_on, would be naturally appreciated for what he has done to others. 
Confucius says, 
The Master said, 'Alas! there is not one that knows me.' 
Tsze-Kung said, 'What do you mean by thus saying--that no one 
knows you?' The Master replied, 'I do not mean murmur against 
Heaven. I do not grumble against men. My studies lie low, 
and my penetration rises high. But there is Heaven;--that 
knows me! 1 42 
In other words, leaving the desire for praise itself alone and as un-
conditionally right, then man may simply take the praise of others as 
personal gratification. (3) All the moral principles, moral ideals, 
and moral values of man's actions and intentions can be discovered by 
self-reflection in his mind. Since human nature is essentially good, 
moral ideals and its principles are nothing other than the norms or 
standards awakened within human nature and immanently presented to our 
moral self-consciousness for self-evaluation. Confucius says, 
When the mind is not present, we look and do not see; we hear 
and do not understand; we eat and do not know the taste of what 
we eat. This is what is meant by saying that the cultivation 
of the person depends on the rectifying of the mind,43 
The process of self-cultivation is not an extension from individual 
perfection to the perfection of all men; it is rather one of unifying 
one's internal attainment with one's external efficaciousness. 
How can self-cultivation be attained? Of the Confucian writings 
44 
specifically, The Great Learning presents eight steps of self-
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cultivation with harmonization of the world as the ultimate goal. The 
first two steps--investigating things and extending knowledge--are 
directed toward the goal of understanding the world. The next three 
steps--making sincere one's intentions, rectifying one's mind and 
cultivating or improving one's personality--are directed toward the goal 
of perfecting oneself within, so that one can be ready for social and 
political responsibility in order to serve others. The last three 
steps--regulating a family, governing a state well, and pacifying the 
world--are directed toward extending one's virtues among men so that 
one can be said to realize one's potentiality in a reality of relation-
ships. One needs to open his eyes to investigate the root of things 
(the principle of Jen). On the basis of this root, man can promote 
cultivation of character (Jen) in himself and others related to him in 
a specific way. That is why Confucius believes that there is unity and 
continuity in man's search for political ideals. The system of the 
ancient sage kings is but a symbol for a government of humanity. 
How can man carry on the eight steps of self-cultivation? Through 
practice. Practice is the method of education for Confucius. He does 
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not accept the means-end dichotomy; rather he suggests practice of the 
eight steps for their own sake and for their own perfection. The 
means-end dichotomy is not adequate to express the basic spiritual 
orientation involved because the attainment of sagehood is not the 
attainment of something external to man. Rather, it is a manifestation 
of that which constitutes true humanity. But it is misleading to argue 
that since a wise-man-nature is inherent in the nature of man, the 
attainment of sagehood requires nothing more than a process of inner 
transformation, independent of society at large. In fact Confucius 
points out a dialectical interplay between self-cultivation as internal 
examination and complete self-realization as communion with others and 
with the universe. Practice is the way by which the essence of human 
nature can be perfected. Confucius recommends "practice" accompanied 
b J H "T b bl . f. h. 45 h d y en. e says, o e a e to practice 1ve t 1ngs everyw ere un er 
heaven constitutes perfect virtue. 1146 For Confucius education does not 
aim at acquiring technical analytic skills or historical knowledge about 
philosophers, rather it is the cultivation of moral virtue and self-
realization by practice accompanied by Jen. Education is concerned with 
the moral performance of the individual by which he becomes a perfect 
moral man. The superior man is not the product of disciplines of a 
purely intellectual training, but is produced through the cultivation of 
the moral life. Such a man does not lead his society by exercising 
technical skills, nor does he lead it by exercising political power. He 
leads his society through the total performance of his moral action 
47 
which is the exemplification of his convictions and ultimate concern 
about a true man of Jen. 
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In discussing how to educate students Confucius acknowledged two 
ways: through the doctrine of rectification of names; and through hav-
ing students think of their own solutions. In the doctrine of rectifica-
tion of names, Confucius asserts that any name or title given to man is 
a manifestation of possible duties and obligations. 48 This means that 
if once a man accepts or acknowledges his name or title, he is at once 
obliged to discharge faithfully the responsibilities implied in that 
particular given name or title. As an educator Confucius does not 
separate the attainment of knowledge from action and practice, but 
asserts the complete identification of name with actuality. Concern 
with this matter reveals his underlying assumption that the name is not 
just a representation of a thing, but is the very essence of the thing 
itself. That is why he taught rulers and government officials principles 
of courage and prudence, the value of education and self-criticism, the 
rules of filial duty and of selecting friends, the basis of good human 
relations, and the art of good government. 49 For Confucius' second 
method of education, we can see that while Confucius might have been a 
sort of pragmatist, he certainly was not a dogmatist in the following 
passage: "He who learns but does not think is lost; he who thinks but 
does not learn is in danger. 1150 What he did was to urge people to think 
for themselves. He was willing to help them and train them how to 
think; but he would guarantee no answers. Confucius was frank in 
admitting that he did not know the truth but that he likewise was in-
volved in searching for it. Because knowledge is based on data and the 
method of thinking, if one has ho data to work with, and merely plays 
with the phantasms of one's imagination, thought will be unreliable or 
adventurous; but if one only collects data, no principle will run like 
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a thread through the congeries to organize them into a system. The 
result would be that one may know much but would be unable to reach a 
goal or to set up an ideal pattern for life. 
According to Confucius all men are essentially equal and basically 
good; and men desire to be happy and have peace of mind. His belief 
that any man might become a gentleman, regardless of his birth did not 
remain a mere matter of common men; he undertook to make his students 
into gentlemen. He accepted them from the lowest as well as the highest 
social class, and was equally earnest in teaching them, regardless of 
their social status and family origins. He believed in the educability 
of men, but he admitted differences in intellect and talent among them. 
In the Analects, he accepts those "who are born with knowledge" as the 
best, and those who learn after industrious study as the second type 
Of desl.·rable mi"nd. 51 C f · ' k b t "b "th k 1 d " on ucius remar a ou men orn wi now e ge 
is extremely provocative, but unfortunately the Analects does not yield 
any adequate exposition of this concept. 
52 \ The contents Confucius stresses in education are letter (.X:), 
ethics (1;j), devotion of soul q~.), and truthfulness (.-jj') . Letter means 
literature (the cause of truth); ethics is for the problem of virtue; 
the devotion of soul (loyalty) is for politics; truthfulness is 
linguistics, rhetoric. In describing these educational contents 
Confucius always uses concrete examples through the way of propriety, 
in archery, in the order of succession, in speech, charioteering, 53 and 
from music. These six example areas contain the lessons which Confucius 
wants to teach to the student. In other words, instead of learning 
fixed patterns of thought, man, according to his view, should learn the 
principles involved in Jen. A man needs to know how to apply the 
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principle (Jen) to concrete circumstances in order to overcome the kinds 
of conflicts which man may face in a society. 
Here is the significance of Confucius' division of education into 
two aspects: the cognitive learning style and moral education. The cog-
nitive learning style demands that man learn how to think, especially how 
to find clues to solve problems which many have faced day by day. Here 
a person's creative use of his or her energy (thinking-power) is of great 
importance. This is "self-governing," which is encouraged through 
self-directed education. It ·can be described as autonomous interac~ 
tion among persons and their present problematic situations. So 
education for Confucius means development of thinking power for a man to 
make his own decision for self-cultivation. This education is not either 
moral training or religious training. It is making man critically aware 
of what is involved in moral decisions and making moral judgments based 
on Jen. It is the development or influence of persons in such a way 
that their action becomes morally responsible. It is not a simple, but 
a composite phenomenon. This education, so-called moral education, 
makes man a moral actor, a man of Jen. He says: 
There are those who act without knowing (what is right). But 
I am not one of them. To hear much and select what is good 
and follow it, to see much and remember it, is the second type 
of knowledge (next to innate knowledge).54 
Though he accepted men from all classes he was very strict in his 
requirements about their intellectual abilities. He wanted them to 
have an inquiring mind, and would endure no laziness nor stupidity. 
Confucius taught that. through the development of a good character 
(Jen) and the practice of good conduct happiness could be achieved. He 
not only said it but also proved it by his own examples and by what he 
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achieved among his disciples. In other words, education for Confucius 
is intended to produce a superior man, a perfect man. He knows what is 
meant by happiness, and establishes moral virtues based on Jen. He 
knows not only to act at the present period, but also how to choose in 
each new direction the right thing to do. Through education, man is 
able to cultivate his true human nature of Jen for a moral agent, and 
to know why he should perform this act rather than other acts. 
A man of humanity, wishing to establish his own character, 
also establishes the character of others, and wishing to be 
prominent himself, also helps others to be prominent. To be 
able to judge others by what is near to ourselves may be 
called the method of realizing humanity.55 
The perfect man knows what he has to do in a society, and how. He knows 
where he is going. He is no longer an alienated person. 
Dewey's View 
For Dewey, what man is is what he does here and there, now and then 
through immediate experience. Experience means the organic unity 
between subject and object. Experience is the inclusive situation which 
determines the nature of the subject as experiencer and the object as 
experienced. Dewey believes that it is only through experience that 
man learns about the world, and only by the use of experience that man 
can maintain himself and better himself in the world. How can man make 
himself better in the world? Here is the role of inquiry in human 
nature. Dewey says: "The striving to make stability of meaning prevail 
over the instability of events is the main task of intelligent human 
effort. 1156 Through the activity of inquiry man lives in experience 
which can be transformed into a unified whole. 57 
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Immediate experience is neither a passive contemplation of trans-
temporal essences nor something "happening" somewhere in man's mind 
exclusively. It is an inter-actional, situational experience. Im-
mediate experience in its situational context is not simply located in a 
subject or an object. Immediate experience is "in" a situation which 
cuts across the subject-object distinction, The immediate experience 
is what Dewey calls "qualitative immediacy," "a dumb formless experience 
of things as good. 1158 Values are facts found in experience through 
intelligent inquiry in order to transform a problematic situation into 
a determinate one. 
The problem for Dewey was not to find the good, but to construct it. 
The goods that are experienced directly are unsettled and dubious. 
"Thought goes beyond immediate experience," and thinking (human nature) 
alone can settle and secure directly enjoyed goods as valuational policy. 
Dewey writes: "Without intervention of thought enjoyments are not values 
but problematic goods, becoming values when they reissue in a changed 
form from intelligent behavior. 1159 Valuation or value-inquiries are 
thought-processes (the intellectual choice), but this thought-process is 
not merely the problem of what~' but rather that of what should be. 
Now, how to determine what should be done for the particular situation? 
Dewey states his main proposition on valuation in the following way: 
Judgments about values are judgments about the conditions 
and the results of experienced objects;. judgments about that 
which should regulate the formation of our desire, affec-
tions and enjoyments.60 
The main problem with this is: How does Dewey move from one side to the 
other, that is, from "judgments about experiences" to judgment about 
that which should regulate what man is? How does he justify his judgment 
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on valuation? What does he really want us to inquire into through expe-
rience? Answers to these questions are entailed by his theory of 
education: the aim of education, the nature of the thing to be educated, 
and the method of education. How to construct the good is related to 
how man is educated. Because there is no fixed and final end that man 
should reach, growing itself, based on the activity of intelligence, is 
man's experience for something to be realized. Growing is education. 
Education is the process of growing or self-realization. 
To explain how, in Dewey's view, values are constructed by the 
intervention of thought the distinction he makes between the enjoyed and 
the enjoyable, desire and the desirable, the satisfying and the satisfac-
tory was introduced in the section on Dewey in Chapter IV. Values 
should be determined by the scientific method of inquiry. "Science. 
is the supreme means of the valid determination of all valuation in all 
aspects of human and social life. 1161 Dewey was impressed with the 
success of the physical sciences in solving practical problems and in 
explaining control of man's environment. He considered the scientific 
mode of inquiry and the scientific systematization of human experience 
the highest attainment in the evolution of the mind of man. And this 
way of thinking and approach has been used by Dewey to deal with value. 
Value in Dewey's view is not a metaphysical, but a practical, social 
problem which has to be determined by the evaluating activity. This 
scientific approach requires us to "know the conditions under which the 
act of liking, of desire and enjoyment, takes place" and also "to know 
62 
what are the consequences of that act." This activity includes the 
process of intelligence to make a choice among several alternative ways, 
and then the choice is called good or valuable. Choice is absolutely 
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the individual's own decision. Value (the good), thus, is not dis-
covered by our intelligence, but created by the activity of intelligence 
through the method of the "means-ends-continuum." 
Values for Dewey must be directly experienced or had in the means-
ends relation. In other words, every experience involves the thorough 
incorporation of the process with the next step, of the means with its 
consequences. Each end which is created intelligently by our thinking 
can be a means to create the next step. What is an end in one situation 
becomes a means to the creation of new values in the next; but whatever 
is an end is not simultaneously a means. Only when the relation of a 
means to the final consequence is perceived is the whole experience 
meaningful, significant, and valuable. However, such a means-consequence 
relation turns out not to be temporal; it is not a statement with a 
future reference; and it is not the formulation of a method. The means-
ends continuum is only the continuous process of perfecting. Perfecting 
what? 
Here is a problem: we may know that certain experienced objects 
have such and such conditions and consequences, but how does this knowl-
edge alone produce the conviction that we should regulate our desire and 
enjoyments in a particular way? Dewey has spoken of growth (education) 
as "the only moral end," and "the only end. 1163 Growth is not represented 
by or embodied in an ideal, that is, something settled and already fixed. 
As growing, it is an activity. The "acquisition of skill, possession of 
knowledge, attainment of culture are not ends : they are marks of growth 
d . . . ..64 . 1 . d an means to its continuity. Growing a one is goo • The personal 
choice is a matter of deciding what sort of person one is going to be. 
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Through the course of his intellectual choice man not only establishes 
intellectual development to be fully realized, but also makes himself 
unified, consistent and complete. Growth is not the approximation of 
something fixed and antecedently "given," but growth is the outcome and 
result that is the "significant thing, 1165 i.e., a "continual reorganiza-
tion, reconstruction and transformation of experience. 1166 Growth is an 
activity, but it seems to have a sense of direction, something to be 
realized. This something to be realized is not given to us a priori 
and fixed ideally (contrary to Aristotle's and Confucius' view), but 
it is still represented empirically in the world through continuity. 
Growth is not limited to any already given direction, but depends for 
its direction upon the means-ends-dichotomy. 
"Something to be realized" (self-realization) is not only the aim 
of education67 but also the "morally ideal" for Dewey. 68 For him self-
realization is not a filling up process of an undetermined self; but 
rather it is the self acting as self and not for the self. In Dewey's 
philosophy process is substituted for substance. Process means growth 
and becoming. Consequently, it is existentially subject to time, place, 
and circumstance. If the structure as well as the process are subject 
to change, how can the individual maintain his self-identity while 
learning, change, and maturation are going on? Dewey's answer involves 
the concept of the self acting as self. What does "the self acting as 
self" mean for self-realization? It means "to find the self in the 
highest and fullest activity possible at the time, and to perform the 
act in the consciousness of its complete identification with self. 1169 
"The self acting as self" means to realize one's own human nature and 
to perform one's self-identity through action. The self acting as self 
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is the aim of growth. The aim of education as the process of perfecting 
is to reach the realized self as the moral ideal through the present 
activities of intelligence. 
The daily activities in experience are, according to Dewey's view, 
the method by which the self specifies and defines its own satisfaction 
and anticipates the identity of self. Each particular process, there-
fore, becomes universalized in the total activity of the self which will 
constitute the remote ideal self. Dewey says, 
But in any case, to realize capacity means to make the special 
act which has to be performed an activity of the entire present 
self--so far is it from being one step towards the attainment 
of a remote ideal self.70 
The remote ideal self is "the nature of the moral end itself. 1171 The 
moral end itself includes both "the realized self" and "the ideal 
lf .,72 se • Dewey denies the separation of two selves--one the realized 
self, and the other the ideal self. According to him, this realized 
self is no reality by itself; it is simply a partial conception of the 
self erected into an entity--something to be realized (the ideal self). 
He says: 
the good person is precisely the one who is ••• most con-
cerned to find the openings for the growing self: he becomes 
'bad' (even though acting upon a relatively high plane of 
attainment) as soon as he fails to respond to the demand for 
the growth.73 
Now we can see why Dewey spoke of growth as the only moral end, how he 
moved from "judgments about conditions and results" to judgment about 
that "which should regulate •• " We can also see that the aim of 
education in Dewey is to reach the moral end itself as something to be 
realized. 
What capacities have to be fully, concretely actualized in order to 
find the self with its complete identification of self? He says that 
the progressive development of human nature, 
consists on one side in a richer and subtler individual activ-
ity, in increased individualization, in wider and freer func-
tions of life; on the other it consists in increase in number 
of those persons whose ideal is a 'common good,' or who have 
membership in the same moral community; and, further, it con-
sists in more complex relations between them. It is both 
intensive and extensive.74 
The function of intelligence has to be fully realized intensively and 
extensively. Its intensive function is intellectual freedom. Man's 
ability to think in progressing toward self-realization is what makes 
one free. For Dewey, it cannot be possible to separate the three 
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aspects of freedom: choice, action and responsibility. Intelligence 
and action are mutually dependent. Intelligence is the means of enlarg-
ing the scope and effectiveness of our choices through planned action, 
and action is the only means of strengthening intelligence. The distinc-
tive feature of human choice is that man can anticipate and deliberately 
select among alternative preferences. He can evaluate future possibil-
ities and intelligently enlighten his choice, thereby giving direction 
to his life. Thus choice can itself be a way of living, "a decisive 
direction of action which constitutes our life. 1176 On the basis of 
intelligent choice man will be morally responsible for his life. 
Traditionally free will has implied a separation between an act and an 
. h" h . . 77 environment w ic is its cause. Even though various philosophers have 
given special emphasis to one or the other of these areas, the separa-
tion cannot be accepted by Dewey. Freedom is not mere random activity, 
nor is it mere freedom from the restrictions which the social 
environment places upon it (negative freedom), nor is man endowed with 
it as a kind of innate gift. Freedom is an achievement of the individual 
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living in society, where the individual-social continuum contains the 
conditions required for its function. Here is the significance of the 
extensive function of intelligence. Dewey here means that the indi-
vidual develops itself within society. The individual can develop by 
displaying an ideal forged out of his concrete experiences and his 
particular function in his social environmental variables. Intelligence 
is instrumental, that is, it is prompted by a problem which arises in 
the on-going activity of living, and it is directed toward a practical 
outcome, solving a problem. Every individual is marked off from every 
other individual by his peculiar capacities (intelligence) and the 
special surroundings in which he functions. The adjustment of individual 
capacity to environment in the exercise of function effects the realiza-
tion of individuality, and its accomplishment marks off each individual 
from others. He says: "The exercise of function by an agent serves, 
· then, both to define and to unite him. It makes him a distinct social 
member at the same time that it makes him a member. 1178 "To realize 
oneself," therefore, means to encourage the development of one's personal 
faculties which are essential for making intelligent judgments and deci-
sions, and to create a community in which fundamental values are shared 
and critically examined. 
How can such a self-realization be successful? How can "the 
realized self" be united with "the ideal self?" Here is the importance 
of education. Dewey i9entifies education with living or growing and 
describes it as the continuous reconstruction of experience or as the 
enrichment of the content or meaning :of experience, saying that it goes 
on "in, by, and for experience." "Education is ..• a fostering, a 
nurturing, a cultivating, process. All these words mean that it implies 
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attention to the condition of growth. 1179 Education is not just growth, 
and is not just a "reconstruction of experience." Growth has a 
criterion and direction. According to W. K. Frankena's commentary on 
Dewey's philosophy of education, to grow is to develop a self capable 
of living a life that is good or enjoyable, and thus education is a 
continuous reconstruction of experience which is also a "construction of 
80 good. 11 
What are the aims of education? Dewey specifies aims as "natural 
development" and "social efficiency" which are clearly regarded as 
phases of universal growth by stressing the growth and enlargement of 
the whole individual. The status of various human values is contingent 
on the contribution they each make to universal growth at any given 
time. The end of education proposed by Dewey is "participation in social 
life, 1181 and education consists in "the formation of wide-awake, careful, 
thorough habits of thinking. 1182 He indicates that the ultimate problem 
of all education, 
is to coordinate the psychological and the social factors. 
The psychological requires that the individual have the free 
use of all his personal powers; and, therefore, must be so 
individually studied as to have the laws of his own structure 
regarded. The sociological factor requires that the indi-
vidual become acquainted with the social environment in which 
he lives, in all its important relations, and be disciplined 
to regard these relationships in his own activities. The co-
ordination demands, therefore, that the child be capable 
of ex~ressing himself, but in such a way as to realize social 
ends. 3 
Education is not only to develop the individual for social efficiency, 
but is also to ingrain into the individual's working habits methods of 
inquiry and reasoning appropriate to various problems. This "social 
efficiency" and "natural development" have been considered also as the 
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1 . d d f l" 84 u timate stan ar o mora ity. But they are ultimate in the sense 
of being essential qualities, not in the sense of being absolute goals. 
The goal of education is psychological, intrinsic growth and also 
social, specific discipline for the sake of relationship with the 
social environment. This growth not only arises within the context of 
ongoing activities, but it also will constitute the moral ideal. Any 
and all experiences are educative when they broaden and deepen the 
person's future experiences. Interaction and continuity are the criteria 
f . d . h d . 1 f . 85 or JU ging t e e ucative va ue o an experience. 
The other aspect of education in Dewey's thought is to educate the 
86 thinking person through the analysis of the complete act of thought. 
Teaching how to think is one of Dewey's aims in education just as it was 
one of Confucius' aims. The significance of thinking was indicated by 
Dewey: 
Thinking enables us to direct our activities with foresight and 
to plan according to ends-in-view, or purpose of which we are 
aware. It enables us to act in deliberate and intentional 
fashion to future objects or to come into command of what is 
now distant and lacking.87 
Thinking gives us a better control of our present life as well as of 
future possibilities. It enables us to have a rational and intelligent 
life. Thinking also enriches our life by giving additional meaning to 
things that surround us. The aims of education, thus, are to teach us 
how to think, and to let man dev~lop or grow both intellectually and 
morally. 
There are two ways capable of achieving these aims of education: 
(1) learning by doing; (2) aesthetic experience. Doing is the method by 
which we discover what man is. Learning is not accumulating already 
organized knowledge. "Learning" is "growing" through the present 
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situation which is unsettled, uncertain, and precarious. Learning by 
doing means to participate in something inherently worthwhile, and to 
transform the "something" within the relation of means to ends in order 
that it might be an essential part of what man is. All proper learning 
is achieved by an individual when he acquires something in the present 
that will help him learn more in the future. This is the significance 
of the cognitive learning style. 
Learning by doing requires the hard and earnest use of intelligence 
in experience through which it will be good to learn. What kind of 
experience? An aesthetic (or consummatory) experience. Aesthetic expe-
rience is an active and dynamic field of integrated participation in 
experience. The varied parts of experience are bound together into one, 
and do not just succeed each other. Consummatory experience is an activ-
ity through which man achieves a life that is enjoyable. 88 In this 
consummatory experience the experiencer and the experienced are so fully 
integrated into a unity that each disappears; but also this produces a 
.. 
state m~aningful and happy to the experiencer. Dewey believes, thus, 
that "education is a process of living and not a preparation for future 
living, 1189 and that "education must be conceived as a continuing re-
construction of experience1190 for something to be realized. 
For this aim of education, Dewey gives us a general principle by 
which to design the subject matter of education-contents: "relate moral 
theory to teaching, learning, and the curriculum. 1191 He asserts that 
the separation of industry and education, of mindless labor and noble 
living is to be deplored. We must make industry educational, and 
d · "d ·1 92 e ucation in ustria . 
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Man must be aware of his over-all purpose which is self-realization 
through education. Education constitutes the good and reasonable life. 
In Dewey's view happiness results from ,one's becoming the sort of person 
he has set himself to be; it results from the realization through growth 
of those capacities and abilities to which he has assigned priority. 
The character of happiness varies with the differences in talents, abil-
ities and intellectual capacities of individual persons. What it does 
is to promote the conditions which foster the growth of individual 
persons, even though we should remember Dewey's saying regarding the 
education of children, that "Growth is not something done to them; it is 
. 1193 
something they do. It can be assumed that for Dewey happiness is a 
byproduct of growth, a consequence of self-realization. 
The final happiness of an individual resides in the supremacy 
of certain interests in the make-up of character; namely, 
alert, sincere, enduring interests in the objects in which all 
can share. It is found in such interests rather than in the 
accomplishment of definite external results because this kind 
of happiness alone is not at the mercy of circumstances. No 
amount of outer obstacles can destroy the happiness that comes 
from lively and ever-renewed interest in other men in the 
conditions and objects which promote their development, •• , 
If we identify the interests of such a self with virtues, then 
we shall say, with Spinoza, that happiness is not the regard 
of virtue, but virtue itself,94 
Even if this passage can be read in several ways, Dewey may be saying, in 
the manner of Aristotle, that happiness is to be defined by reference to 
virtuous activity (for Dewey the creative activities associated with 
growth), but that such activity is only a necessary and not a sufficient 
condition of happiness. The good life in Dewey, therefore, is a harmo-
nious whole consisting of good experiences or values that are achieved 
through intelligent action. The good life must be assessed according to 
whether, and to what extent, individuals can freely develop and exercise 
their talents in which happiness consists. 
Freedom is an actuality when the recognition of relations, 
the stable element, is combined with the uncertain element, 
in the knowledge which makes foresight possible and secures 
intentional preparation for probable consequences. We are 
free in the degree in which we act knowing what we are 
about.95 
One's ability to think is what makes one free, and what makes one a 
morally realized person. Education for Dewey not only functions to 
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transmit the contents of knowledge, but also functions as the essential 
process to establish ways of living. 
Conclusion 
The alienated man expresses himself as one who has lost the meaning 
of life. Loss of purpose in the way of living is a meaningless state. 
It occurs when the individual role in a society is neglected, and when a 
man lacks understanding of coordinated activity. The meaninglessness of 
life is externalized, as observed in Chapter II, "a state of boredom," 
"Sunday neurosis," "juvenile delinquency," so-called, and as the 
"existential vacuum." 
In order to overcome the alienated situation, however, it has been 
suggested that everybody should be educated as a person with independent 
convictions about himself and with moral experience. How should man be 
educated? Where should education be grounded? What makes education 
most effective? For these answers, three philosophers' views regarding 
education have been described in this chapter. 
As indicated in previous chapters, III and IV, the good life for 
man, according to these three philosophers, is to cultivate his own 
mind. The phenomena of living coincide with the objectification or 
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manifestation of human nature. This manifestation is called virtue. 
Virtue can be rendered as "the art of living." The art of living has 
not been fixed at a given time and for given circumstances. How can 
that be correct? For Aristotle it is manifested through practical 
wisdom; for Confucius, through the principle of rectification; for 
Dewey, through practical judgment. How can the art of living be 
improved? Through the educational process. What is the final goal in 
such an educational program? To "become a person," who should be an end 
in itself in a society. 
(1) The unity of theory and practice has been a central theme in 
these three philosophers. In "Moral Theory and Practice, 1196 Dewey 
describes that theory as the cross-section of the given state of action 
in order to know the conduct that should be; practice is the realization 
of the idea thus gained. From Confucius' viewpoint the moral performance 
of the individual and the totality of his convictions or theories should 
b . h . . . h . . 97 e in armonious unity, wit out any inconsistency. Also the harmony 
between theory and practice has been emphasized in Aristotle's ethical 
discussion. There we meet this concept as the virtuous "mean" preventing 
contrary human propensities from operating excesses. Therefore, the 
harmonious unity between theory and practice is able to answer the ques-
tion of how human nature is related to concrete life-styles. And also 
this unity can give an answer to the questions of "who am I going to 
be?" and "where am I going?" Through this unification between theory and 
practice the value of a person can be recognized in a society. 
(2) This harmonious unity drawn from the .views of these three 
philosophers also emphasizes the difference between "simply living" and 
"living-well." They contend that "living well" is not just physical 
contentment or bare existence in the world, but the active display of 
human nature in pursuing the good way. "Simply living," according to 
them, means the way of living with unintelligent acts according to 
irrational functions. The purpose of "living-well" is to make man a 
person with real happiness. Real happiness for Aristotle is the life 
of philosophic contemplation realizing the first principles of the 
universe; for Confucius it is to "become a man of Jen;" and for Dewey 
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it is man's becoming a morally ideal person as a realized person. Such 
a person has no difficulty in deciding or in acting. This is because he 
knows why he is doing what he does, how he should act, and what the con-
sequences will be. 
(3) How can such a purpose be achieved? How can man make himself 
a valuable being? Through education with moral experience. Since the 
good life for man is intellectual and practical, education for this 
purpose should also be both intellectual and practical. The intellectual 
discipline enables one to know what is good and bad or right and wrong 
through the designed curriculum; but "learning by doing" or "by practice" 
actively promotes moral conduct related to achieving objectively a 
knowledge of moral principles: thus "being good" is related to "doing 
right." Moral knowledge and moral action, according to these three 
philosophers, can be different in expression, but they have the same 
contents. Rather than talking separately about moral knowledge and 
moral action, moral knowledge is supposed to be manifested objectively 
through the action. Rather than having merely intellectual knowledge 
about morality, moral knowledge should be actively demonstrated through 
the appropriate moral behavior. A pattern of human behavior is just a 
moral judgment. "Doing morally right" is the same as "knowing morally 
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right." A knowledge of good and bad is the same as knowing how to act, 
according to these three philosophers. 
(4) What is the final goal in the educational process in these 
three philosophers' views? To become a person, so-called, a morally 
educated person. A morally educated person is a person who knows that 
his contemplated action is right to do in a particular situation. Reason 
as human nature makes man know the meaning of good and bad, of right and 
wrong, in order to determine how he should act. The morally educated 
person develops his moral thinking ability as an individual rather than 
simply by following social rules. He can find the proper method to close 
the gap between knowing the good and doing the good. Despite man's 
ontical self-sufficiency to become a fully realized person, he must con-
stantly engage in the process of "learning by doing" or of "practice." 
This is because man is shaped by his environment. That is why it has 
been said that the unification between moral knowledge and moral action 
is of very great importance. 
Through this chapter an important point can be found : contemporary 
man has to be educated in a way different from what is customary in 
order to restore his independent belief or convictions, in order to know 
"who he is" and "where he is going." How should man be educated? 
"Developing the power of the individual to become a perfect man." Educa-
tion is not merely a means to accomplish an end, but the process itself 
of becoming a person. This means that educating a man is the same as 
producing a person. Knowing the good and doing the good are sufficient 
as well as necessary conditions for morally virtuous conduct. How can 
the gap between "knowing the good" and "doing the good" be eliminated? 
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Through education for moral choice. 98 This is education which helps the 
student (man) to become more sensitive to life's major alternative goals 
and to the moral means recommended for attaining them; that is the aim 
of education according to Aristotle, Confucius and Dewey. Here is the 
answer to the question of why everybody should be educated in a different 
way. The aim of education in their views is to develop the morally 
autonomous individual and to turn all students (men) into morally 
autonomous adults through the educational process. Here is an educa-
tional solution to the problem of technological culture. Why do stu-
dents need to be morally educated persons? In order to restore their 
independent beliefs or convictions and enable them to know "who they 
are" and "where they are going." 
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CHAPTER VI 
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
In the early twentieth century technology became the judge of all 
activities, human as well as mechanical. Many people feel in this 
society that they are treated like machines with values of "machine-
ef ficiency, replaceability-expendability." They seem to know them-
selves, but at the same time know that they do not know about themselves. 
People have become "problematic" to their own selves. 
Such a man has been described as a person "who transferred his 
ownership to another," and "who has little idea of who he is or where 
he is going." He has lost sight of himself and also lost his direction 
for himself. This man is called "alienated" or "dehumanized." In order 
to observe the specific phenomena of the alienated man, a philosophical-
ethical approach has been used. These phenomena are "self-identity 
crisis," "having few independent beliefs," and "the meaninglessness of 
life." But how did alienation come about in the technological society? 
It resulted from man's ignoring his true "human nature" in the society. 
In order to discover a solution for the dehumanized situation 
described, therefore, the following questions have been examined: "What 
is human nature?" "How can knowing about human nature be connected to 
human conduct?" "What educational practices will make the connection 
between human nature and human conduct more effective and relevant to a 
person?" These questions are the means by which potential solutions to 
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the problem of alienation can be discovered. These questions are 
answered in this dissertation through the works of Aristotle, Confucius, 
and Dewey because each attempts to correlate human nature and virtuous 
living for the perfect human being. Even though these three philosophers 
come from different cultural backgrounds they have developed views which 
might provide an adequate solution for the dehumanized man's situation 
in both West and East. 
Regardless of geographical boundaries, as long as there are human 
beings many in the world have common questions: "What is man really?" 
"How can he make himself a morally valuable being?" and "What is meant 
by a morally valuable being?" No matter how man in West and East has 
begun asking these questions, the purpose behind them is the same. It 
is not only to avoid but also to overcome dehumanization. 
Man has the inner power (strength) to actualize the potentiality 
of his existence, so he is not only a creature of his environments, 
but is also a decision-maker. This inner power of man by his nature 
is "rationality," a trait not possessed by any of the lower animals. 
Rationality makes a human being a valuable being. Rationality has two 
aspects: understanding and thinking. Understanding is related to 
grasping, analyzing, interpreting, and describing natural phenomena, but 
thinking (logos) is the basic principle in man which leads back to the 
ultimate ground of his existence as a human being. This ultimate ground 
constitutes the ontic property for the sanctity of the human being. 
"Being rational" means also that if man is to act rationally he must know 
what he is doing and why, and must do it freely--it must be really the 
man himself rather than some other compulsive pressure that makes him do 
it. Man as a rational being, therefore, must be responsible for his 
life because the way 'of living is a product of the essence of human 
nature. Here is the significance of the autonomy of reason. Ration-
ality implies freedom. 
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Human nature for these three philosophers involves a sense of com-
munity in the sense that human nature is revealed or manifested as the 
way of living. Although the question of "what is human nature?" is a 
metaphysical question, the answer can be known through observing man's 
external activities. In other words, the way of living for man is to 
cultivate his own mind, and the phenomenon of living is exactly the 
same as the objectification or manifesta4ion of human nature. This 
manifestation is called "virtue. 11 Virtue originates in human nature. 
Human nature, therefore, must be expressed externally as the life-style 
in a society. That is why man should be governed neither by desires 
nor by passions. Rationality should be the direction of human life. 
Despite man's ontical self-sufficiency to become a fully realized 
person, he must constantly engage in the process of "learning by doing" 
or "practice." This is because while there is no question that man can 
be shaped by environmental variables, the fully realized person is not 
something which has been already fixed or antecedently given. In other 
words, man is influenced by environmental variables and is on the way 
to beco~e. • • • But in a technological society man no longer knows who 
he is or what he is to become. Here is a problem. How can man know 
"who he is going to be" or "where he is going?" The answer is: "the 
power of the human intellect and the autonomy 'of reason must be developed 
or cultivated in the process of becoming a morally educated person." 
What kind of process? The process which will close the gap between 
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knowing and doing; the process which produces the morally educated man. 
But the process is not perfected at a moment or at a certain period. 
Its perfection is entirely based on "learning by doing" or "practicing" 
through practical wisdom or practical judgment. "To learn" means to 
learn how to think and to act. "To practice" means to follow and master 
the principle of rationality. Education here is more than something 
acquired through a formal process in a social institution. "Learning by 
doing" or "practice" is a process to produce the thinking person who 
contemplates the truth and then communicates it. Yet the morally 
educated person is a person who has an ability to prescribe action for 
right reasons and who develops the ability to think morally as an 
individual with subjectivity. His education is not only to undergo a 
process, but also to become a person. Through the unification between 
knowing and doing (living), a man becomes a person, that is, a self-
actualized person, develops a man's sagehood. This is the philosophical 
gate toward which a person of the future should be directed. 
It is clear to see what the philosopher of education is supposed to 
do for the dehumanized man. Early in this century educators who had 
communicated with young adults advocated reorganizing education to 
produce individuals able to "man" the machines of the industrial society. 
One of the crucial problems for today's education has been to emphasize 
the tec~nological aspect. Its emphasis could be interpreted as prepar-
ing people (the young adults) for the machines of technology. Education 
should not be simply something to let them be adjusted to or to let them 
accept the given society. But educating another human being cannot be 
compared to lighting a stick of wood or inducing a chemical reaction. 
Education should also be something to develop their human potentialities 
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through subjectivity and to develop a self-directedness capable of 
controlling the given society on the basis of the dignity of human 
nature. The former case emphasizes the passive function of rationality 
in human nature, that is, dependent, inseparable from the material world; 
the latter stresses the active function, that is, the separable, inde-
pendent, divine function of rationality. When a man is educated for 
something, it means that the value of "an existential subjectivity" is 
recognized. This subjectivity should not be a means but an end in 
itself. This is because the active function of rationality in human 
nature includes something divine as related to the first principle of 
the universe (God), the autonomy of reason, and the moral power of 
valuing good and bad. "Developing the power of the individual" is to 
cultivate and actualize the power of human nature. That is why, 
through "actualization of human nature," the young adult is able not 
only to discover what person he wants to be in terms of existential 
subjectivity, but also to project where he is going in the given 
society. 
The other problem for today's education is what kinds of direction 
should be given to the young adults. Dewey states about it: 
Philosophy still has a work to do. It may gain a role for 
itself for turning to consideration of why it is that man is 
now so alienated from man. It may turn to the projection of 
large generous hypotheses which, if used as plans of action, 
will give intelligent direction to men in search for ways to 
make the world more one of worth and significance, more home-
like, in fact.l · 
"To cultivate" human nature is expressed as an action. "To act" should 
be considered as the way to shed light on the 'reality of man's 
authentic self, but it also should be the realm of projection for future 
direction: "to identify living well and doing well with being happy."2 
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Happiness is to be found in a life of virtuous activities. A man who 
fully realizes all his human function (rationality), can be called a 
happy person. This person has a reason for doing so and so, and this 
reason must be some believed facts or convictions about himself. Such 
a person considers the world more worthwhile and homelike and then makes 
him pursue the goal of the final Happiness, that is, "the superior man 
or a man of superior refinement." Here is the philosophical meaning of 
the unification between thinking (knowing) and living resulting in a 
person. There is no longer the alienated man in this situation, because 
the superior man finds his self-subjectivity, and knows who he is and 
what he is going to be. He knows what he is doing and why, because he 
has a strong conviction and belief about himself. His actions, whatever 
they are, come from his subjective personality, so he has always the 
significance or meaning in life. "Knowing" and "living" in a society 
come to be part of man 1·s very being. Then such a person may say, with 
Confucius, that "having sincere faith and loving learning, I am not 
afraid to die for pursuing the good Way. 113 
Therefore, in order to restore a true human being, we must recover 
our home from homelessness. How? Through "education" capable of 
identifying living well and doing well with being happy. This is one 
of the answers to the question which might be raised about this 
dissertation: Why "human nature and education" should be dealt with. 
Education is not simply a methodological term. Education is the way 
through which a man can be brought to a self-restoration from a self-
loss. This is the philosophical goal of education toward which a person 
of the future should be directed. "The superior man seeks the Way and 
not a mere living •• 
4 
not about poverty." 
The superior man worries about the Way and 
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